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Abstract 
This dissertation tested whether people’s strength of self-esteem moderates self-
affirmation effects on health message processing. The findings from three studies (Study 
1: N = 115, Study 2: N = 294, Study 3: N = 426) with three different behavior contexts 
(sunscreen use, flossing, and alcohol consumption reduction) suggest that individuals’ 
strength of self-esteem can moderate self-affirmation effects on health message 
processing: people with high and low levels of self-esteem may respond differently to 
self-affirmation based health communication interventions in certain situations. However, 
despite the theoretical coherence, evident inconsistencies exist across the three studies. 
Therefore, at this point, I cannot reach a clear conclusion regarding when self-affirmation 
benefit people with high versus low levels of self-esteem and cannot provide specific 
suggestions on how self-affirmation should be used in health communication practices. 
Nonetheless, this research has shown that individuals’ self-esteem levels can influence 
the effectiveness of self-affirmation-based health communication interventions, and 
sometimes not in a desirable direction. Interventionists therefore should use caution when 
incorporating self-affirmation elements in health communication interventions as it may 
have positive effects for some, but weak or even adverse effects among others. 
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INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
Imagine you just finished renovating your home and you are very pleased with the 
end result. A person walks up to you and starts criticizing every single change you have 
made. How would you feel? What would be your response? Will you listen carefully to 
see whether the person’s critique has any merits, will you quickly turn the person away, 
or will you engage in an argument with the person to try to prove that he or she is wrong? 
Surely this absurd scenario rarely happens in daily life, but from experience, we know 
how we would feel and respond at a moment like this: it is highly possible that we would 
either turn the person away or refute each and every piece of critique the person made.  
Resisting information that challenges our existing valued beliefs is not uncommon 
in everyday life. In the health communication domain, there is good evidence that people 
often ignore and/or reject accurate and well-intended health messages that suggest their 
current behaviors may impair their health and that they can be heathier by making 
behavior changes. Resistance to health messages presents a critical barrier to promoting 
individual and population health, because people who are most at risk are typically the 
least persuaded by health messages. Self-affirmation theory suggests that such responses 
are driven by a fundamental human motive to protect a sense of the self being adaptively 
and morally adequate (Steele, 1988). If people are giving an opportunity to reflect on 
unthreatened, cherished values or personal attributes, they can secure the sense of self-
worth and increase openness to personally relevant health messages.   
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Whilst a mounting body of evidence attests to the benefits of self-affirmation, it is 
noteworthy that the reported effects are small and not always consistent (e.g., Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014; Epton, et al., 2015). A potential moderator that bears close conceptual 
relevance with self-affirmation and has important associations with health outcomes is 
self-esteem, people’s global evaluation or attitude about themselves (Rosenberg, 1965). 
Self-esteem’s moderating role on self-affirmation effects has yet to be comprehensively 
tested in the health communication context despite its critical implications for health 
intervention design – it may explain when self-affirmation-based health interventions 
may have positive effects for some, but weak or even adverse effects among others.  
To start filling this gap in the literature, the present research examines whether 
people’s strength of self-esteem moderates the effectiveness of self-affirmation based 
health communication messages and proposes circumstances in which self-affirmation 
would produce differential effects for people with high and low levels of self-esteem.  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides a review of the literature on defensive 
processing, self-affirmation theory, and self-esteem in the health communication context. 
I start Chapter 1 by clarifying the conceptualization of defensive processing with regard 
to health message processing. The mechanisms underlying defensive processing is 
unpacked to provide a foundation for following discussions on solution to defensive 
processing. Next, the root cause of defensive processing, i.e., the maintenance and 
perpetuation of self, is explained. In this section, I review relevant literature about the 
self, including the conceptualization of the self, properties of self-knowledge, and 
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people’s fundamental motivation to preserve the self. Afterwards, I discuss self-
affirmation theory as a solution to defensive processing and its applications in the health 
communication context. Then, I outline the unanswered questions and argue that self-
esteem is a critical individual difference factor that can moderate the effectiveness of 
self-affirmation manipulations on reducing defensive responses towards health messages. 
Research on the role of self-esteem in self-affirmation research is reviewed and three 
possibilities regarding the role of self-esteem are analyzed. Last, I propose three studies 
to examine the circumstances under which people’s strengths of self-esteem matter for 
self-affirmation effects in the health communication context.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation reports study 1 (N = 115). This study tests whether 
the proposition that self-esteem functions as resource and that self-affirmation enlarges 
disparities between people with high and low levels of self-esteem, applies in a health 
communication context where an autonomy threat is induced by a health message with 
controlling language.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation reports study 2 (N = 294). This study examines 
whether the extent to which self-affirmation manipulation secured participants’ sense of 
self-integrity (i.e., adequacy of self-affirmation) determines when people with high 
versus low levels of self-esteem benefits from self-affirmation manipulation.  
Chapter 4 of this dissertation reports study 3 (N = 426). This study tests whether 
induce self-affirmation before versus after the onset of a threat to the self (i.e., health 
message exposure) determines whether self-esteem functions as resources or functions as 
   4 
 
expectancies and produces differential effects for people with high and low levels of self-
esteem. The final chapter (Chapter 5) presents an overview of the research findings of the 
studies and discusses the theoretical and practical implications.  
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Defensive Processing of Health Messages 
What is Defensive Processing? 
Health communication messages are designed to persuade people to adopt healthy 
behaviors or to avoid unhealthy ones. Unfortunately, however, not all of them succeed in 
achieving the desired outcomes (e.g., Wakefield, Loken, & Hornik, 2010) and some even 
result in unintended adverse consequences (e.g., Byrne & Hart, 2009). For example, the 
US National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign that ran from 1999 to 2004, for which 
the U.S. Congress appropriated nearly $1 billion, not only failed to show desired effects 
on reducing youth’s marijuana use, but may have increased youth’s pro-marijuana 
cognitions and lowered their intention to avoid marijuana use (Hornik et al., 2008).  
Typically, a health message informs people that their current behaviors are putting 
their health at risk and that they should change their behaviors to be healthier. Some 
health messages use strong language and graphic images to emphasize the health risks, 
expecting people to be motivated to engage in protective actions by the fear of the 
potential harm (e.g., Janis & Feshbach, 1953; Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2014). However, 
there is good evidence that fear-inducing health messages are often ineffective, 
particularly when efficacy components are absent (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Ruiter et al., 
2014; Witte & Allen, 2000) and some can even be counter-productive (e.g., Albarracin et 
al., 2005; Brown & Locker, 2009; Thompson, Barnett, & Pearce, 2009). In response to 
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these fear-inducing messages, people often refute the message’s arguments, derogate the 
message source, downplay the seriousness of the health risks, and/or deny the personal 
relevance of the risk (e.g., Good & Abraham, 2007; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), a 
phenomenon labeled by persuasion and health communication scholars as defensive 
processing.  
Defensive processing occurs when people are motivated to arrive at a desired 
conclusion that is consistent with their existing valued beliefs or to reject an undesired 
conclusion that is inconsistent with their existing valued beliefs (Liberman & Chaiken, 
1992). The motivation to reach a desired conclusion or to reject an undesired one can bias 
information processing by influencing which beliefs and rules are accessed in memory 
when evaluating the information (Kunda, 1987; 1990). When people are motivated to 
reach a particular conclusion, they will rely on only a subset of the relevant beliefs and 
inferential rules that are supportive of the desired conclusion, while ignoring beliefs and 
rules that are unsupportive. Because being reasonable is usually a valued belief people 
have about themselves, they will ensure that the justification they formulated for the 
desired conclusion is reasonable by their standards. For example, a heavy drinker may 
dismiss a message about the link between excessive drinking and increased risk of heart 
disease by convincing him- or herself that his or her heart disease risk is low because he 
or she exercises often and/or heart disease often happens for people who already have 
other health conditions.       
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Defensive Processing and Message Effectiveness 
Defensive processing affects the effectiveness of health messages through 
influencing how a piece of information is comprehended and retained. Processing 
mediated messages involves three major sub-processes: (1) encoding, which reflects 
transforming information in a stimulus to a mental representation in working memory, (2) 
storage, which reflects linking newly encoded information to previously stored 
information in memory, and (3) retrieval, which reflects activating previously stored 
information through the associative network of memory (Lang, 2000, 2006). The three 
sub-processes are simultaneously active during media use, and the performances of them 
rely on a sufficient supply of cognitive resources (Lang, 2000, 2006). However, at any 
given time, people only have a limited supply of cognitive resources (e.g., Basil, 1994; 
Lang, 2000; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). These cognitive resources are allocated to the 
three processes as a function of a number of factors, such as the message structure, 
message content, and the individual’s goals, among others. When more resources are 
allocated to one process, the resources available for other processes will be reduced and 
the performances of these processes will deteriorate.   
In addition, people are “cognitive misers” who strive to use minimal cognitive 
effort to achieve maximal confidence on their conclusions from information processing 
(e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Within 
the bounds of available cognitive resources, people exert cognitive efforts till they reach 
their desired confidence level, the point at which people feel their conclusions satisfy the 
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motives that drive that processing (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). As a result of 
having limited cognitive resources and the tendency to be “cognitive misers,” people 
encode information selectively. Bits of information that are relevant to one’s goals and 
those that are novel or representing changes in the environment are more likely to be 
encoded than others (Lang, 2000).   
Research has shown that motivationally relevant stimuli in the environment (e.g., 
rewards, punishments) can activate two motivational systems, the appetitive (or 
approach) system, which is responsible for organizing responses to rewards or positive 
stimuli, and the aversive (or avoidance) system, which is responsible for organizing 
responses to punishments or negative stimuli (Bradley, 1994; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Lang, 2000, 2006; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). The appearance of positive stimuli 
(e.g., food) leads to activation of the appetitive system, whose goal is to facilitate 
information intake. The appearance of negative stimuli (e.g., disease) leads to activation 
of the aversive motivational system, whose goal is to protect the organism from danger 
(Lang, 2000, 2006; Bradley et al., 2001).  
People are well aware that health messages typically contain health risk 
information that is associated with negativity, such as harm, loss, disease, and death. 
Recognizing that a message is about a health risk (e.g., cancer, diabetes) can elicit 
activation of the aversive motivational system (e.g., Lang, Chung, Lee, & Zhao, 2005). 
At low levels of aversive activation (e.g., a person notices the mentioning of a health risk 
in a message), cognitive resources are automatically allocated to encoding to identify the 
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potential threat (Lang, 2000, 2006). If the level of aversive activation increases as the 
threat is identified, resources will be shifted away from encoding to retrieval to help the 
individual figure out how to cope with the threat. In addition, some resources will be 
shifted to storage because people need to remember what the threat is and how to avoid 
or cope with it next time (Lang et al., 2000, 2006). As a result, encoding and storage of 
other bits of information in the message will deteriorate.  
This means that if people perceive a health message as a threat to their valued 
existing beliefs rather than an opportunity for learning, they may not be able to take full 
advantage of the beneficial health information, because the activated aversive 
motivational system will shift their cognitive resources to encode threat-related 
information and then to retrieve previous knowledge to deal with the threat, rather than 
allocate sufficient resources to facilitate encoding of the beneficial health information. 
Even when these bits of beneficial information are encoded, they may not be properly 
stored because the cognitive resources are likely to be insufficient. In this case, people 
not only may be unable to recall the important bits of beneficial health information, but 
also may strengthen their existing beliefs, because repeated retrieval of information 
makes beliefs more salient in memory (Anderson, 1983).   
In short, at the cognitive level, defensive processing of a health message starts 
when the person identifies negative stimuli in the message that run counter to his or her 
existing valued beliefs. These stimuli can trigger activation in the aversive motivational 
system, which causes cognitive resources to be spent on dealing with the threat rather 
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than on properly encoding and storing the bits of beneficial health information. As a 
result, the encoding and storage of the beneficial health information deteriorates.  
It is important to note that defensive processing is not a uniform process, because 
people differ and the contexts in which information is processed differ. For example, 
people differ on the beliefs they value, on the extent to which a piece of new information 
is viewed as consistent with their valued beliefs, and on their motivations and abilities to 
process information. Therefore, defensive processing may take many different forms 
depending on the situation. For example, it may take the form of biased systematic 
processing, which is effortful but biased scrutiny of information that favor what is 
congruent with one’s existing beliefs while derogating the validity of what is 
incongruent. It may also take the form of selective heuristic processing, which is 
selectively relying on heuristics that have judgmental implications supporting the desired 
conclusion while ignoring those that are unsupportive. Moreover, it can take the form of 
defensive inattention, which is actively avoiding or refusing engagement with 
information that signals threat to one’s existing beliefs (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 
1999; Good & Abraham, 2007).  
Likewise, defensive processing may not produce uniform outcomes across 
different situations. A wide range of factors, such as message features (e.g., argument 
quality, use of graphic image), audience characteristics (e.g., availability of cognitive 
resources, background knowledge), and contextual factors (e.g., time constraint, 
distractions) can influence the type of defensive responses produced by defensive 
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processing. Previous research has found a variety of cognitive and affective responses 
that are likely outcomes of defensive processing. For example, in a meta-analysis, Good 
and Abraham (2007) identified 12 categories of defensiveness measures that researchers 
have used to capture various manifestations of defensiveness to threatening messages, 
including message acceptance, defensive avoidance, perceived severity, perceived 
susceptibility, perceived threat, perceived prevalence, hopelessness and fatalism, 
religiosity, perceived manipulation, dissonance-reducing attitude change, egocentric 
contrast effects in social judgements, and prospective judgements of risk status and 
perceived risk.  
The outcome measures in previous research can largely be categorized into three 
broad groups: (1) direct and proximate outcomes of defensive processing, such as 
affective responses measured right after message exposure and indicators of defensive 
avoidance, (2) distal outcomes of defensive processing indicated by one’s acceptance or 
perceived effectiveness of the message, such as perceived convincingness and relevance 
of the message, and (3) distal and indirect outcomes of defensive processing reflected by 
one’s perceptions and beliefs about the recommended behavior, such as attitude and 
intention, and the actual behavior change. In this research, I will follow this 
categorization and examine defensive processing as measured by indicators of 
defensiveness, indicators of message acceptance, and attitude and intention to perform 
the recommended behavior.   
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Why Does Defensive Processing Happen? – The Maintenance of Self 
There are two major theoretical perspectives on why defensive processing 
happens: maintaining self-consistency (e.g., E. Aronson, 1968, 1992; Cooper & Fazio, 
1984; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Greenwald & Ronis, 1978; Swann, 1983, 1990) and 
maintaining self-integrity (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1989; Steele, 1988; 
Tesser, 1988, 2000). These two perspectives are grounded on the same basic assumption: 
the existence of a valued self that people strive to sustain in the face of threats. Before 
diving into details about the two perspectives, I will review relevant literature on the self.   
What is the Self? 
The self in this dissertation refers to “the representation or the set of 
representations about oneself, parallel to the representations people have of other 
individuals” (Swann & Bosson, 2010, p. 591). The self is not a unitary, monolithic entity. 
Rather, it is a vast, multifaceted, dynamic collection of pieces of information: beliefs, 
conceptions, evaluations, perceptions, theories, prototypes, goals, thoughts, etc. that 
people have about themselves (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984, 
Markus & Kunda, 1986; Schlenker 1980). These pieces of information, referred to as 
self-knowledge (Baumeister, 1998), are generated through summarizing information 
about oneself from one’s interactions with his or her environment (Higgins, 1996). They 
capture one’s relations to the world and the consequences of these relations for the 
purpose of improving person-environment fit in the service of survival (Higgins, 1996).  
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Properties of Self-knowledge 
Individual pieces of self-knowledge vary on a number of dimensions: their 
importance/centrality, breadth/abstractness, explicitness, stability, clarity, among others. 
Of particular interest to this dissertation are the importance/centrality and 
breadth/abstractness dimensions of self-knowledge and their implications for the self. 
The variation on the importance of self-knowledge is straightforward. Some self-
conceptions are more significant or valuable for the individual than others. For example, 
for a taxi driver in Minneapolis, “I can remember all the streets in Minneapolis” may be a 
more important self-conception than “I can recite the first 100 digits of Pi.” But for 
someone who takes pride in his or her good memory for numbers, “I can recite the first 
100 digits of Pi” may be a more important self-conception than “I can remember all the 
streets in Minneapolis.” Importantly, people are more likely to behave in accordance with 
their highly important self-conceptions (Pelham, 1991) and they experience a stronger 
sense of threat when an important self-conception is challenged, and consequently are 
more apt to defend it (Markus, 1977; Swann & Bosson, 2010). For example, to James, 
having his self-conception of being a psychologist challenged was more frightening than 
attacks on his knowledge of Greek. As he put it, “I, who for the time have staked my all 
on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I 
am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek. My deficiencies there give 
me no sense of personal humiliation at all” (1890/1950, p. 310).  
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Self-knowledge also varies in their breadth, that is, the amount of information 
self-knowledge conveys (Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1987). The structure of self-
knowledge in memory can be seen as hierarchical, with broader self-conceptions 
positioned towards the top, and more specific self-conceptions nested underneath within 
domains (e.g., Marsh & Hattie, 1996; Swann & Bosson, 2010). At the broadest level of 
the self-knowledge hierarchy are global self-conceptions, such as self-esteem, which are 
generalized beliefs reflecting a range of personal qualities (e.g., “I am worthwhile”). At 
the narrowest level are specific self-conceptions pertaining to specific qualities one has 
(e.g., “I cannot run a marathon on a rainy day”). Between these extremes are mid-level 
breadth self-conceptions that convey a moderate amount of information about the self 
(e.g., “I am honest”; Swann & Bosson, 2010). The breadth of the self-conception reflects 
the abstractness of the belief(s) that comprise the self-conception. The global self-
conceptions such as self-esteem are the most abstract. They are context-free, reflecting 
knowledge about the self that is synthesized from a wide range of person-environment 
interactions. The narrowest self-conceptions are contextualized, such that thinking about 
these self-conceptions brings to mind specific scenarios and episodes of one’s life.  
Moreover, at any given time, people are only aware of a small portion of the vast 
body of self-knowledge (Baumeister, 1998: Swann & Bosson, 2010). This small amount 
of self-knowledge that is in one’s consciousness is termed working self-concept (Markus 
& Kunda, 1986), also referred to as the spontaneous self-concept (McGuire, McGuire, & 
Winton, 1979), active self-knowledge (Swann & Bosson, 2010), and phenomenal self 
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(Jones & Gerard, 1967). The working self-concept is highly responsive to context (e.g., 
the individual’s motivational state and/or the cues in the environment), such that different 
contexts activate different representations of the self in memory (Baumeister, 2010; 
Swann & Bosson, 2010). For example, health related self-knowledge (e.g., “I am 
relatively healthy,” “I usually eat a balanced diet”) may become highly accessible when a 
person reads a health message, while work performance related self-knowledge may be 
brought to mind when a person is being called to his or her boss’ office. Importantly, it is 
assumed that the broad, abstract self-conceptions, such as self-esteem, are chronically 
accessible and are relatively unresponsive to changes in one’s environment because of 
their importance in defining the self and wide applicability in various life situations 
(Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987).  
Two implications can be drawn. First, people’s view of the self at any given time 
may be confined by the context. Since a given context makes certain self-conceptions 
(but not others) accessible in memory, if no changes are introduced to the current 
environment, people will see themselves from an angle that is restricted by the portion of 
self-knowledge activated by their motivational state and the cues in the environment. For 
example, reading a health message suggesting that one’s current behavior is putting his or 
her health at risk in the long-term, the person’s attention may be fixated on the aspects of 
the self that are being addressed or threatened in the message (e.g., “I am relatively 
healthy,” “I know what’s good for me,” “I make wise decisions,” “I have control over 
important outcomes in life”), while being unaware of the vast body of other aspects of the 
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self that are equally or more important to them, such as their roles as good parents and/or 
helpful friends. Second, people’s conceptions of themselves can be (temporarily) 
manipulated by changing the contexts they are in, or by instructing them to think in 
certain ways. This temporary change in self-view can have an impact on their subsequent 
behaviors. For example, Fazio, Effrein, and Falendar (1981) found that asking people to 
respond to questions that were biased towards extroverted (or introverted) tendencies led 
them to view themselves as relatively extroverted (or introverted) and later behaved in 
ways consistent with the induced self-views. Therefore, in the health message processing 
example above, if we can strategically change the environment that people are in and 
bring out certain self-knowledge, we may change the course of how a health message will 
be processed.  
Another point worth stressing is that the pursuit of self-knowledge is selective. 
Previous research converged on three major motives that influence people’s quest for 
self-knowledge, reflecting three types of preferences people have about the information 
regarding themselves (for a general review, see Sedikides, 1993): the motive to know 
oneself objectively and accurately (i.e., self-assessment) – a preference for information 
that can provide a clear and accurate picture of the self (for reviews, see Trope, 1983, 
1986); the desire to enhance the positivity of self-conceptions or protect the self from 
negative information (i.e., self-enhancement) – a preference for information that has 
favorable implications for the self and avoid information that has unfavorable 
implications for the self (for reviews, see Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 
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2008); and the motive to confirm preexisting conceptions about the self (i.e., self-
verification) – a preference for information that is consistent with what one already 
believes about him or herself (for reviews, see Swann, 1983, 1990). Importantly, 
although it seems that learning the truth about oneself would bring more adaptive benefits 
than confirming what one already knows about the self or avoiding unpleasant news 
about oneself all together, Sedikides’ empirical tests (1993) showed that, in general, the 
self-enhancement motive is the strongest, followed by the self-verification motive, with 
the self-assessment motive being the weakest.  
Recognizing people’s general appetite for positivity and consistency over 
accuracy is critical for understanding how people process health messages. Health 
messages typically deliver information that has unpleasant implications for the self. 
Given people’s tendency to avoid unpleasant information about the self, health messages 
are inherently unwelcomed. Therefore, to motivate people to approach health risk 
information and adopt positive actions, an interventionist has at least two possible 
options: (1) change the message content so that the message will not induce unpleasant 
implications for the self (which can be hard to achieve given the negative connotations of 
the issues typically covered in the messages), or (2) deliver the message in a way that 
circumvents the self-enhancement and self-consistency motives and let the self-
assessment motive drive information processing.  
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The Maintenance and Perpetuation of Self 
It is generally accepted that any experience that suggests that people’s important 
self-conceptions are wrong ensues a sense of anxiety, and such anxiety motivates people 
to eliminate the threat. By doing so, people sustain their important self-conceptions and 
thereby sustain the self. Broadly, the phenomenon of defensive processing can thus be 
understood as resulting from the self exercising danger control: protecting itself from 
information that will cause a downward revision of one or more important self-
conceptions. Two major lines of research exist regarding how cognitions about the self 
influence the processing of unwelcome information. One line of research suggests that 
cognitions about the self serve as standards or expectancies; defensive processing results 
from people trying to maintain consistency (e.g., Aronson, 1968, 1992; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). Another line of research suggests that cognitions about the self 
contribute to one’s global sense of being capable and adequate; defensive processing 
results from people trying to maintain this global sense of adequacy (e.g., Steele, 1988; 
Tesser, 1988). These two lines of research bear many similarities but diverge on how 
defensive processing can be reduced.    
The Maintenance of Self-consistency  
The self-consistency reformulation of cognitive dissonance theory (Aronson, 
1968, 1992) suggests that situations that evoke the experience of anxiety (i.e., 
dissonance) do so because they create inconsistencies between an important self-
conception and the current behavior or cognition. Most people hold standards for their 
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behaviors that are based on conventional morals and prevailing values of society 
(Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992, p. 592). Positive self-conceptions reflect that the person 
upholds such standards. When a person performs a behavior or receives feedback that is 
at odds with these standards, dissonance is aroused, which in turn motivates the person to 
reduce this inconsistency and maintain positive self-conceptions by engaging in 
justification of the behavior or feedback (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). For example, a 
regrettable purchase of a music album does not go along very well with one being an 
effective decision-maker, and justifying this purchase (e.g., giving the product a more 
favorable rating) would allow one to restore the consistency (It is worth noting that if one 
does not hold high standards for competency and morality, the person will not perceive 
his or her incompetent or immoral behaviors as at odds with his or her self-conceptions, 
and thus will not experience dissonance).   
The Maintenance of Self-integrity 
Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), however, suggests that people act 
defensively not just because their current behaviors or cognitions threaten their important 
self-conceptions, but also because the threat to their important self-conceptions 
challenges their sense of self-integrity, that is, their sense of being a moral and adaptively 
capable person. Therefore, in the case of cognitive dissonance, or in any other defensive 
processing situations, it is not the inconsistency per se that is threatening, rather, it is the 
implication of the inconsistency for the self that is threatening: the inconsistency between 
one’s current behavior and one or more important self-conceptions implies the self is no 
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longer adequate and survival may be in jeopardy (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 
1989). Justification, or other forms of dissonance-reducing attitude or behavior change, 
reduces this inconsistency, and hence attenuates the discomforting implications for the 
self. From the perspective of self-affirmation theory, restoring consistency between one’s 
behavior and the related self-conception is the means, not the end.  
Although both perspectives suggest that defensiveness results from the 
discrepancy between one’s cherished self-conceptions and one’s behavior, they diverge 
in terms of the goal of defensive processing. The consistency view of dissonance theory 
holds that the goal of defensive processing is to restore the consistency between one’s 
behaviors and the specific self-conception. Therefore, in the context of health message 
processing, the only way to reduce defensive responses to health messages would be to 
avoid invoking perceptions of discrepancy, which means the message content need to be 
revised to tune down the threat to one’s self-conceptions. However, this can be hard to 
achieve given the negative connotations of the issues typically covered in health 
messages. In contrast, self-affirmation theory holds that the goal of defensive processing 
is to restore the sense of the self as being moral and adequate, rather than to restore the 
consistency between one’s behavior and the related self-conception. Therefore, in the 
context of health message processing, self-affirmation theory has the benefit of allowing 
alternative ways to reduce defensiveness other than changing the message content. In the 
following sections, I will unpack the tenets of self-affirmation theory and discuss why 
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and how self-affirmation theory brings a potential solution to defensive processing of 
health messages.  
Self-affirmation Theory – A Solution to Defensive Processing? 
Tenets of Self-affirmation Theory 
Self-affirmation theory emerged in social psychology as an alternative 
explanation of the cognitive dissonance phenomenon. The central tenet of self-
affirmation theory is that people are fundamentally motivated to maintain a global sense 
of self-integrity – to perceive oneself as “adaptively and morally adequate, that is, as 
competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling 
important outcomes, and so on (Steele, 1988, p. 262).” Whenever a threat to self-integrity 
is detected, be it a petty insult, losing one’s job, or being diagnosed with cancer, a 
motivation to reaffirm the self will be activated which propels the individual to use 
whatever means is available to uphold the perception of global self-integrity.  
Fluidity of the Multifaceted Self 
It is important to note that the goal of this self-protective motivation is to maintain 
a global sense of self-integrity and not necessarily to resolve the specific self-threats – “it 
is the war, not the battle, that orients this system” (Steele, 1988, p. 289). Therefore, there 
are various venues through which people can restore a global sense of self-integrity. They 
can directly cope with the threat itself – by reducing or eliminating the threat, by denying 
the perception of the threat, or by downplaying the personal relevance of the threat. In 
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addition, however, people can engage in cognitive and/or behavioral activities that direct 
at affirming the perceived integrity of the self but circumvent the threat. Given that the 
self is dynamic and multifaceted (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984, 
Markus & Kunda, 1986; Schlenker, 1980), people derive their perception of self-integrity 
from many sources; any important knowledge of the self can contribute to the perception 
of self-integrity. People thus can affirm a global sense of self-integrity by engaging in 
thoughts and/or actions that demonstrate one’s adequacy in one or more unthreatened 
areas of the self, as long as the affirmed alternative self-aspects support the perception of 
self-integrity as much as the threat threatens it (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; Sherman 
& Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). For example, one does not need to deny the health risks of 
smoking if a global sense of self-integrity is secured by being a good parent or helpful 
friend.  
Self-adequacy is Not Self-excellence 
Another critical point worth noting is that the motivation to maintain the 
perception of self-integrity is not to see oneself as superior or excellent, but to see oneself 
as adequate, good enough (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988). To affirm the sense of 
self-integrity, one only needs to establish a sense of adequacy in a cherished domain of 
the self, not a sense of excellence. In fact, bogus positive feedback that far exceeds the 
person’s self-evaluation will not help secure the perception of self-integrity, because it 
lacks credibility.   
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Accessibility and Cost-effectiveness of Means 
Steele (1988) suggests that what means will be used to affirm the self when a 
threat to the self is experienced is determined by availability, that is, to what degree a 
means of self-affirmation is accessible in the person’s working memory. For example, 
recovering from a hurtful insult through reminding oneself that one is a wonderful friend 
seems more productive than resolving it through aggression, but if at the moment, the 
person is not aware that reflecting on one’s quality of being a good friend can reduce the 
discomforting feeling invoked by the insult, this means will not be used.  
Moreover, among equally available means of self-affirmation, which means will 
be used is determined by their relative cost-effectiveness. That is, if an available means is 
known to the person to be too costly or ineffective compared to other available means, it 
will not be used. For example, for a person who believes that being environmentally 
responsible is important to who he is, discovering that his new car is not as eco-friendly 
as he expected would threaten his sense of self-integrity. To restore the sense of self-
integrity, he has a few options available: (1) reduce the importance he placed on being 
environmentally responsible, (2) sell the car and buy another one that is more eco-
friendly, or (3) use the car less by riding a bike to work more. The first two options would 
be too costly. If he really cherishes environmental responsibility, it would be very hard to 
change this belief about himself. Also, selling the car and buying a new one may be too 
costly in terms of time, effort, and money. Therefore, even though all three options are 
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available, the person may choose the third option to restore a sense of self-integrity 
because it is most cost-effective.  
Understanding Defensive Processing from the Perspective of Self-affirmation 
Theory  
People in general want to think of themselves as adequately healthy because being 
healthy is a necessary condition to maintain the sense of adaptive adequacy, while illness 
and the prospect of death are some of the most powerful threats to this adequacy 
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Confrontation with health messages that 
suggest that one engages in unwise behaviors that would eventually impair one’s health 
challenges one’s idea of being relatively healthy and capable of controlling important 
outcomes in life. This perception that one’s self-integrity is in jeopardy induces a 
discomforting psychological experience that the individual feels he or she must reduce. In 
an urgent need to alleviate this discomfort and restore the sense of self-integrity, the 
individual will use whatever means is available and cost-effective to reduce the threat 
(Steele, 1988). Often enough, the most accessible and effective means is to engage in 
defensive processing of the information to arrive at a desired conclusion consistent with 
existing beliefs about the self, by, for example, biasing the selection of cognitions and 
criteria used for information evaluation (Kunda, 1990). In this way, the self-threat is 
resolved and the sense of self-integrity is restored. However, the opportunity to benefit 
from the health risk information and the behavior recommendations is lost.  
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Alternative Means to Self-affirm without Resolving Self-threats 
Theoretically, any cognitive activity or behavior that demonstrates one’s 
adequacy and as a result secures one’s overall sense of self-integrity is a means of self-
affirmation (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988). In daily life, a means of self-
affirmation can be a big achievement like winning an Olympics medal, getting a 
promotion, or finishing a semester with straight “A”s; it can also be small joyful actions 
like volunteering at a local bike repair co-op, visiting a good friend, or taking selfies. 
Toma and Hancock (2013) found that even Facebooking can be self-affirming. Subjects 
who spent time browsing their own Facebook profiles before receiving negative feedback 
were as receptive of the feedback as subjects who completed a standard self-affirmation 
task and were more receptive of the feedback than un-affirmed subjects. Though small, 
these activities can bring to mind satisfying moments in life that are important to the 
individual and in turn achieve an expansive view of the self and help people withstand 
self-threats.  
Means of Self-affirmation in the Lab 
Empirical self-affirmation research so far has focused on experimentally 
providing subjects relatively uniform means of self-affirmation. These means of self-
affirmation are usually administered by researchers as independent procedures in lab 
experiments. Although differences in formats or procedures exist, most self-affirmation 
studies have people reflect on one or more cherished values or personal strengths that 
contribute to the overall sense of self-integrity (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; McQueen & 
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Klein, 2006). There are three formats of self-affirmation manipulations that are 
commonly used in self-affirmation research: essay, scale, and feedback.    
In the essay format self-affirmation manipulations, participants are typically asked 
to rank a list of values or personal qualities (e.g., intelligent, honest, helpful) in terms of 
personal importance. The list typically excludes values relevant to the domain of threat in 
order to avoid confining people’s attention on the threatened domain and to broaden 
people’s focus on alternative domains of the self. For example, to buffer people against 
threatening health information, researchers may exclude health and rationality from the 
list. People then write a short essay about the importance of their top ranked values and 
how they have used them in their lives.  
The scale format of self-affirmation involves completing a scale that resembles 
personality assessment. The scale items are worded in a way that emphasizes the 
positivity of a given value or personal quality. A frequently used scale format self-
affirmation manipulation is the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Values Scale (AVL; Allport, 
Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960) that includes six value domains: theoretical, economic, 
aesthetic, social, political, and religious. Self-affirmation studies using this scale typically 
ask participants to indicate which of the six values are important to them, and then use 
this information either to pre-select participants (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983) or assign to 
them a subscale corresponding to their important values (e.g., Tesser & Cornell, 1991).  
Because administrating the AVL scale involve multiple data collection stages and 
the language of the scale can be difficult for people with low literacy or education levels 
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to comprehend (McQueen & Klein, 2006: Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009), studies have 
explored alternative scale format self-affirmation manipulations. For example, Napper et 
al. (2009) developed a scale format self-affirmation manipulation that features 32 value 
statements from the Values in Action Strengths scale (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The 
value statements described values, characteristics, and personal strengths that people 
generally would found desirable (e.g., “My friends value my good judgment,” “I must 
stand up for what I believe in, even in the face of strong opposition”). Napper and 
colleagues’ validation study (2009) showed that this scale achieved comparable self-
affirmation effects as the AVL scale and the essay format self-affirmation task.  
The third category of self-affirmation manipulation involves giving subjects 
positive feedback of some sort on one or more domains of the self. For example, studies 
have done so by providing bogus positive results on personality tests (e.g., Steele, 
Spencer & Lynch, 1993) or valued skills (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999).  
Critically, a commonality of the different formats of self-affirmation 
manipulations is that they draw people’s attention to the cherished positive domains of 
self that are unaffected by the threat. This enables the individual to view the threatening 
situations from a broader perspective and focus on what really matters to them (Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014).  
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Evidence of Self-affirmation Manipulations Reducing Defensive Processing 
Evidence in Reducing Cognitive Dissonance 
Early empirical applications of self-affirmation theory focused on testing whether 
self-affirmation manipulation can attenuate dissonance-reducing attitude change (i.e., 
attitude change aimed at reducing dissonance caused by the discrepancy between one’s 
behavior and an important self-conception) after a cognitive dissonance experience. 
These studies typically used a 2 (dissonance: high, low) x 2 (self-affirmation: yes, no) 
experimental design and adopted the conventional forced-compliance paradigm to induce 
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spence, & Lynch, 1993) with the 
dissonance-reducing attitude change as the outcome variable. For example, in two of 
Steele and Liu’s (1983) studies, dissonance was induced by having subjects write 
counter-attitudinal essays supporting a large tuition rise at their university under 
conditions of high choice (i.e., subjects were aware that they were not coerced to write 
the essays); self-affirmation was administered by having subjects fill out a value scale; 
and dissonance reduction was measured as the amount subjects changed their post-essay 
attitudes to match their essay position. Steele and Liu found that those who wrote a 
counter-attitudinal essay experienced increased cognitive dissonance and changed their 
attitude to match their essay’s position, but completing the value scales immediately after 
essay writing eliminated this dissonance-reducing attitude change among subjects for 
whom the value was self-relevant.  
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The success of self-affirmation manipulations in attenuating dissonance-reducing 
attitude change provided support for evidence to the proposition that people’s motive to 
maintain self-integrity (i.e., self-affirmation motive) triggers the experience of cognitive 
dissonance and drives the dissonance-reducing attitude change and behaviors. These 
findings propelled researchers to apply self-affirmation manipulations in other contexts 
where encountering with uncongenial information might trigger self-defensive means to 
cope with the threat, such as in close relationships, education, and health communication.    
Evidence in Reducing Defensiveness to Health Messages 
Can self-affirmation reduce defensive processing of health messages? Overall, 
there is good evidence that self-affirmation manipulations can increase people’s openness 
to information about the potential risks of health-compromising behaviors and reduce 
message derogation. For example, Sherman, Nelson, and Steele (2000) found that 
compared with unaffirmed participants, self-affirmed female coffee drinkers were more 
accepting of a message that linked caffeine consumption to breast cancer and reported 
greater intentions to reduce coffee consumption (see also Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). 
Jessop, Simmonds, and Sparks (2009) found that self-affirmation led to less defensive 
processing of a message about the health risks of sunbathing among white female 
sunbathers. In addition, research has shown that self-affirmation manipulations can 
reduce defensiveness toward messages promoting disease detection behaviors. For 
example, van Koningsbruggen and Das (2009) found that for participants at risk for type-
2 diabetes, completing a self-affirmation task decreased derogation of a message 
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encouraging online diabetes risk testing, improved participants’ intentions to do an online 
diabetes risk test, and increased online diabetes risk test taking behavior as well.  
Self-affirmation effects even extend to deeply ingrained and hard to change 
behaviors such as smoking. Harris et al. (2007) found that compared to unaffirmed 
smokers, self-affirmed smokers rated four cigarette graphic warning labels as more 
threatening and personally relevant and reported higher levels of control, self-efficacy, 
and intentions to quit smoking. Armitage et al. (2008) found that among smokers low in 
socioeconomic status, self-affirmed participants showed higher message acceptance and 
intention to quit than unaffirmed participants. Also, significantly more self-affirmed 
participants took leaflets about how to quit smoking than unaffirmed participants.  
Besides reducing message derogation (and increasing message acceptance), there 
is also evidence that self-affirmation can influence other common indicators of defensive 
processing, such as downplaying the personal relevance and severity of health risks. For 
example, self-affirmed females rated their sexual experience as significantly more similar 
to those in an AIDS educational video than did unaffirmed females (Sherman et al., 
2000); self-affirmed smokers reported cigarette graphic warning labels to be more 
personally relevant (Harris, Mayle, Mabbott & Napper, 2007) than did their unaffirmed 
counterparts; and self-affirmed heavy drinking female students rated a message linking 
breast cancer and alcohol as just as relevant to them as to the average student, whereas 
their unaffimed counterparts rated it as more relevant to the average student (Napper, 
Harris, & Epton, 2009).   
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Some studies have also shown that self-affirmation resulted in increased self-risk 
perceptions. For example, self-affirmed female participants showed reported higher 
perceived risk for HIV after viewing an AIDS educational video (Sherman et al., 2000) 
and self-affirmed female heavy drinkers showed higher personal risk ratings for breast 
cancer (Harris & Napper, 2005) than their unaffirmed counterparts.  
However, not all self-affirmation studies in the health context reported supporting 
evidence. Some studies did not find positive effect of self-affirmation on reducing 
message derogation (e.g., Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan. 2005; Fry & Prentice-Dunn 2005; 
Harris & Napper, 2005; Zhao & Nan, 2010; Zhao et al. 2012) or increasing perceived 
personal risk (e.g., Harris et al., 2007). Also, recent meta-analyses (Epton et al., 2015; 
Sweeney & Moyer, 2014) revealed that across a range of health behaviors, the positive 
effect of self-affirmation on message acceptance is small (d = .17, CI [.03 to .31]), as are 
its effects on behavioral intentions (d = .14, CI [.05 to .23]) and on the uptake of actual 
behavioral recommendations (d = .32, CI [.19 to .44]).    
The mixed findings and small effect sizes suggest that more research is needed on 
the immediate outcomes of self-affirmation to determine the underlying mechanisms of 
self-affirmation effects and more research is needed on the potential moderators of self-
affirmation effects to uncover the boundary conditions. In the following sections, I will 
discuss research exploring these two unanswered questions. Particularly, I will outline 
one possible pathway through which self-affirmation may achieve its effect in reducing 
defensive responses towards health messages and described an individual difference 
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moderator that have acquired much attention and one that awaits more research. The 
purpose for these discussions is to set the foundations for later sections on the role of self-
esteem in self-affirmation effect.     
Unanswered Questions – Mechanisms and Boundaries of Self-affirmation 
Underlying Mechanism  
How do self-affirmation manipulations make people less defensive and more 
receptive of threatening information about health? What happens after people are self-
affirmed? To date, extant research has not agreed upon what the underlying mechanisms 
are, and there exists very little empirical evidence documenting how self-affirmation 
affects health message processing.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Potential mechanism underlying self-affirmation effects 
 
Conceptually, self-affirmation manipulation reduces defensiveness by alleviating 
the discomforting implication of threat to the self and hence reduces the motivation to 
affirm the sense of self-integrity, thus allowing the individual to dispassionately evaluate 
persuasive communication (Steele, 1988). Correll, Spencer, and Zanna (2004) proposed 
Self-affirmation Reduced Defensiveness ? 
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that if self-affirmation works by removing the self-defensive bias and increasing 
objectivity in information processing, we should observe that when the message optic is 
self-important, self-affirmed individuals would be more sensitive to argument quality 
than unaffirmed individuals, recognizing the merits and the demerits in the message, and 
be more persuaded by messages with strong arguments than weak arguments, even when 
the message is pro-attitudinal. Their study confirmed this proposition. They found that 
compared with unaffirmed participants, self-affirmed participants were more critical of 
pro-attitudinal arguments though they were not significantly more likely to accept 
contradictory arguments (see also Cohen et al., 2000, Study 3; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). 
Also, self-affirmed participants were more sensitive than unaffirmed participants to 
argument strength for both pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal messages, in that only 
self-affirmed participants rated strong arguments as more persuasive than weak 
arguments.  
Demonstrating that self-affirmation manipulation increases objectivity in 
information processing is one step closer to uncovering how self-affirmation reduces 
defensiveness to uncongenial information. However, this still only explains a distal stage 
of the cascade of effects that self-affirmation produces. How does self-affirmation 
increase objectivity in information processing? What happens immediately after self-
affirmation? 
  
   34 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Potential mechanism underlying self-affirmation effects 
 
A line of research that draws on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) 
suggests that self-affirmation manipulations lead people to process information using 
abstract or higher levels of mental construals. This information processing style enables 
people to evaluate a situation from a broader perspective that emphasizes the defining 
features rather than the secondary details (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). It also enables 
people to excise higher levels of self-control where behaviors are reflective of long-terms 
goals rather than impulsive responses to the situation (Schmeichel & Voh, 2009).   
Self-affirmation manipulations typically ask people to think about important 
values. These values reflect the most central and abstract features of the self. When 
people reflect on core personal values in a self-affirmation task, they tend to view 
themselves from a “big picture” perspective, which enables them to see the primary, 
defining characteristics of themselves. Relating to construal level theory, this “big 
picture” perspective reflects the use of high-level construals, and the activation of this 
high-level construal mindset will influence the processing of subsequent evaluative 
targets. For example, Wakslak and Trope (2009) found that compared to unaffirmed 
individuals, self-affirmed individuals perceived themselves in a more coherent, structured 
Increased 
Objectivity 
Self-affirmation 
Reduced 
Defensiveness ? 
   35 
 
manner, increasingly identified tasks in terms of their ends versus their means, more 
strongly based product evaluations on primary over secondary features, and performed 
better on a task requiring them to structure fragmented visual input than one requiring 
detail-oriented thinking. Consistent with Waslak and Trope’s findings, Schmeichel and 
Vohs (2009) found that self-affirmation led individuals to prefer more abstract 
descriptions of events, and affirming the self at a high level of mental construal led to 
greater self-control while affirming the self at a low level of mental construal did not. 
Moreover, Sherman and colleagues (2013) found that self-affirmation tasks broadened 
Latino American students’ construals so that they saw events at a more abstract rather 
than concrete level, which prevented daily adversities being interpreted as identity threats 
and hence insulated academic motivations from being undermined by identity threat.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Potential mechanism underlying self-affirmation effects 
 
In conclusion, self-affirmation can lead people to take a “big picture” perspective 
when evaluating subsequent events, including when the situation is self-threatening. 
Therefore, when self-affirmed, a threatening health message loses its self-threatening 
capacity because the individual now views both the self and the threatening information 
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from a broader perspective, and the individual can thus evaluate the message by its merits 
instead because self-integrity is no longer at stake (Sherman & Hartson, 2011). This view 
is consistent with Critcher and Dunning (2015)’s proposition that self-affirmation 
expands the working self-concept, offers a broader view of self-worth, and thereby 
weakens the evaluative impact of the threat on the self. Critcher and Dunning (2015) 
found that for self-affirmed participants, the threatened self-aspect was less defining of 
the self (although still just as important) compared with unaffirmed participants, and the 
broadened perspective on the self mediated the self-affirmation effects on defensiveness. 
Boundaries 
Individual Risk Level 
Another area that awaits more research is the boundary conditions of self-
affirmation effects. Whilst a mounting body of evidence attests to the success of self-
affirmation in reducing defensive processing and producing positive changes in 
behavioral outcomes, it is noteworthy that the reported effects are not always consistent. 
This suggests the possibility of moderating factors. To date, few potential moderators of 
self-affirmation effects have received systematic empirical scrutiny (Cohen & Sherman, 
2014). Like many other social psychological interventions, self-affirmation manipulations 
may influence certain types of people more than others. However, in the health domain, 
studies examining individual difference moderators of self-affirmation effects are few 
and far between (Harris & Epton, 2010). The only exception is the moderating role of 
individual risk level. It has been found that positive self-affirmation effects are usually 
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the most pronounced among individuals who are at moderate to high risk, while for 
individuals at low risk, self-affirmation exhibited no benefits (e.g., Armitage et al., 2008; 
Harris & Napper, 2005; Klein & Harris, 2009; van Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009). For 
example, Harris and Napper (2005) found that self-affirmed high risk participants (i.e., 
heavy drinkers) showed greater acceptance of the personal implications of message than 
did their unaffirmed counterparts; they reported higher personal risk ratings for breast 
cancer from their alcohol consumption, greater ease of imagining themselves developing 
the disease, and greater intention to reduce their current level of alcohol consumption. 
Similarly, van Koningsbruggen and Das (2009) found that self-affirmation decreased 
message derogation, increased intentions to do an online risk test, and promoted online 
risk test taking among participants at-risk for type 2 diabetes. In fact, among participants 
not at-risk, self-affirmation decreased intentions and online risk test taking.  
It is encouraging that self-affirmation has been shown to produce the most 
pronounced effects among people at moderate to high levels of a health risk, because this 
population is the most in need of health interventions to protect them from the health risk 
but also is the most likely to respond defensively to health messages. At the same time, 
an important implication can be drawn for research on other moderators of self-
affirmation effects. If positive self-affirmation effects are more likely to happen among 
people with moderate to high levels of risk than among those with low risk, having 
participants with moderate to high levels of risk may be a prerequisite for self-affirmation 
effects to be detected. Therefore, in self-affirmation research, when choosing a study 
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population or health risk topics to address, it may be necessary to ensure that the 
population selected faces at least moderate levels of health risk.  
What about Self-esteem? 
A dispositional factor that is critical to our understanding of the boundaries of 
self-affirmation effects in the health context is self-esteem – one’s global evaluation or 
attitude relating to the self (Rosenberg, 1965). Research examining the relationships 
between self-esteem and health outcomes has shown that people with low self-esteem 
have a greater tendency to engage in health-compromising behaviors in the future (e.g., 
McGee & Williams, 2000; Stinson et al., 2008; Trzesniewski et al., 2006), but people 
with high self-esteem are more likely to use self-serving cognitive strategies to justify 
their current health-compromising behaviors (e.g., Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan & 
Russell, 2000; Smith, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1997).  
Given self-esteem’s important associations with health outcomes and its close 
conceptual relevance with self-affirmation – the former approximates one’s self-
adequacy and the latter reflects efforts to secure one’s global sense of self-adequacy – it 
is critical to explore the interplay between self-affirmation and self-esteem to better 
understand when and how self-affirmation can reduce defensiveness and increase 
openness towards personally relevant uncongenial information. From an applied 
perspective, understanding whether self-affirmation influences people with varying 
strengths of self-esteem differently is especially important in determining the 
effectiveness of self-affirmation-based health interventions. It would be beneficial to 
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establish whether incorporating self-affirmation in health interventions may have positive 
effects for some, but weak or even adverse effects among others. This dissertation seeks 
to address this gap in the literature and contribute to health intervention design and 
planning by exploring the possible moderating role of self-esteem on the effectiveness of 
self-affirmation at reducing defensiveness to personally relevant health messages.  
Self-esteem – A Determinant of Self-affirmation Effect  
What is Self-esteem? 
In this dissertation, self-esteem is defined as one’s global evaluation or attitude 
relating to the self (Rosenberg, 1965). It is people’s value judgement on the self based on 
self-knowledge (Baumeister, 1998). Also, here, self-esteem is viewed as a relatively 
stable trait rather than a fluctuating state. The assumption is that most people have a 
relatively stable self-esteem, because it reflects an evaluation of the self that is based on a 
vast body of diverse person-environment interactions. Unless one’s interpretation or 
memory of a significant portion of these interactions is drastically changed or a 
significant amount of new interactions is added to the memory, self-esteem should 
remain relatively stable. People’s self-evaluations in a given situation may vary to some 
degree because the self-knowledge that is available at the time point may differ, but they 
generally fluctuate around the self-esteem baseline (Baumeister, 1998).  
Researchers have not agreed upon whether people’s self-esteem is accessible at 
any given time. Some believe that self-esteem is chronically accessible because of its 
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importance in defining the self and its wide applicability in various life situations (e.g., 
Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987), while others believe that self-
esteem needs to be activated in working memory through self-awareness which results 
from self-referencing (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). These 
two views are not necessarily contradictory because most life situations contain self-
relevant information which can trigger self-awareness and thus bring self-esteem online. 
Self-esteem and Health Outcomes 
Regardless of the popular belief in the general public that high self-esteem reflects 
optimal human functioning and is key for productivity, happiness, well-being, and 
academic achievement (Baumeister, 1998), previous research has associated high self-
esteem with both positive (e.g., Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001; Shrauger & 
Rosenberg, 1970; Tennen & Affleck, 1993) and negative outcomes (e.g., Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Crocker, Thompson, 
McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Fitch, 1970). In the health domain specifically, on the one 
hand, high self-esteem has been found to safeguard people from fear and uncertainty, and 
result in greater resilience in the face of stress and physical diseases (e.g., Broers et al., 
1998; Penninx et al., 1998). On the other hand, studies also found that people with high 
self-esteem are more likely to use self-serving cognitive strategies to discount their 
vulnerability to the health risks of their behaviors (e.g., Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan & 
Russell, 2000; Smith, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1997).  
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Regarding the outcomes of low self-esteem, the empirical literature is more 
uniform. Low self-esteem is considered as a risk factor for psychiatric vulnerability and 
health-comprising behaviors (Mann et al., 2004). For example, low self-esteem during 
childhood (Reinherz et al., 1993), adolescence (Teri, 1982) and early adulthood (Wilhelm 
et al., 1999) was found to be predictive of depression later in life. Also, compared with 
adolescents with high self-esteem, adolescents with low self-esteem had poorer mental 
and physical health and higher levels of criminal behavior during adulthood 
(Trzesniewski et al., 2006). McGee and Williams (2000) found that self-esteem in 
preadolescence significantly predicted linear trends in adolescent reports of problem 
eating, suicidal ideation, and multiple other health-compromising behaviors.   
Role of Self-esteem in Self-affirmation Effects 
The complex yet important relations between self-esteem and health outcomes 
suggest that self-esteem may be an influential individual difference factor worth attention 
in self-affirmation research on health message processing. Moreover, conceptually, self-
esteem and self-affirmation are closely related. Self-esteem approximates one’s self-
adequacy while self-affirmation reflects efforts to secure the sense of self-adequacy when 
it is threatened. People with high and low levels of self-esteem may have very different 
ideas about to what extent the self is considered adequate. People with high self-esteem 
(HSE) may have a high expectation for themselves and may consider themselves capable 
and adequate in a wide range of life situations, while people with low self-esteem (LSE) 
may have a low expectation for themselves and may consider themselves capable and 
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adequate in a limited number of life situations. What people with LSE considered as 
adequate may not be adequate for people with HSE while what people with HSE 
considered as adequate may be too overwhelming for people with LSE. Therefore, when 
threatened, people with HSE and LSE may require different levels of self-affirmation to 
restore the sense of self-adequacy.    
To date, self-esteem as a moderator of self-affirmation effects on health message 
processing has not been comprehensively studied. The few studies that examined self-
esteem and self-affirmation produced inconsistent findings. Three competing 
propositions exist regarding whether and how self-affirmation affects health message 
processing for people with different strengths of self-esteem. 
Self-esteem as Resource: Self-affirmation Enlarges Disparities 
Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) suggest that self-esteem is an indicator of 
people’s chronic self-affirmational resources: favorable knowledge about the self that 
contributes to one’s sense of self-integrity. People with HSE have a large reservoir of 
favorable knowledge about the self while people with LSE have a small reservoir of 
favorable knowledge about the self. Therefore, when self-knowledge is made accessible 
(e.g., reflecting on self-important values in a self-affirmation task), people with HSE will 
find it easy to recruit favorable self-knowledge to secure their sense of self-integrity and 
will be more resilient when facing a self-threat. In contrast, people with LSE will be 
aware of the scarcity of favorable self-knowledge when self-knowledge is made 
accessible. This discomforting experience will be amplified as they subsequently 
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confront a self-threat and thus lead to stronger defensiveness. This proposition has 
received some support in cognitive dissonance-related self-affirmation research. For 
example, Steele and colleagues (1993, study 2) found that participants with HSE who 
self-affirmed through completing the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale did not 
rationalize after a dissonance manipulation while participants with LSE who completed 
the same self-affirmation task rationalized. In addition, Nail, Misak, and Davis (2004) 
found that in a role-playing task where participants imagined being stood up by a friend, 
those with LSE derogated the friend more than those with HSE, regardless of whether the 
friend had a sufficient justification or not.  
If we apply this proposition to the health message processing context, we should 
expect that self-affirmed individuals with HSE show less defensiveness towards 
personally relevant health messages compared to their unaffirmed counterparts, because 
self-affirmation made them aware of their large reservoir of favorable self-knowledge 
that can be used to affirm a sense of self-integrity. On the contrary, self-affirmed 
individuals with LSE will report more defensiveness towards the messages compared to 
their unaffirmed counterparts because self-affirmation reminded them of the scarcity of 
favorable self-knowledge and thus amplified the discomforting implications of the 
message on the self. However, Steele et al., (1993)’s finding that self-affirmation reduced 
dissonance reduction attempts among people with HSE but increased dissonance 
reduction attempts among people with LSE has yet to be replicated in the health message 
processing context. So far, the only study that tested the role of self-esteem in self-
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affirmation effects on health message processing found the opposite: self-affirmation 
reduced message derogation among people with LSE but showed no effect among people 
with HSE (Düring & Jessop, 2014). I will discuss this in the following section.  
Self-esteem as Resource: Self-affirmation Reduces Disparities 
Though also based on the assumption that self-esteem reflects one’s chronic self-
affirmational resources, some scholars suggested the opposite regarding the role of self-
esteem in self-affirmation effects. They argue that individuals with LSE will benefit from 
self-affirmation in the face of self-threat while people with HSE will not (e.g., Düring & 
Jessop, 2014; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001; van Dijk et al., 2011). This view differs 
from Steele et al., (1993) in that it assumes that people with HSE have a reservoir of 
favorable self-knowledge that is not only larger but also more readily accessible when the 
need to secure self-integrity arises, compared to people with LSE. This reasoning is based 
on research showing that when faced with threatening information, people with HSE are 
more likely to recruit thoughts about their strengths while suppressing thoughts about 
their weaknesses (e.g., Dodgson & Wood, 1998). Therefore, when the self is threatened, 
for people with HSE, self-affirmation manipulation may not bring them extra benefits 
because they can automatically fall back on their strengths. In contrast, people with LSE 
may require an external intervention like self-affirmation manipulation to make them 
aware of the favorable self-knowledge to repair their sense of self-integrity.  
This view has been supported in several studies. For example, Spencer, Fein, and 
Lomore (2001) found that self-affirmation reduced the defensiveness towards threatening 
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information about test performance among people with LSE but showed no effect among 
those with HSE. Van Dijk et al. (2011) found that among unaffirmed participants, 
participants with LSE experienced a stronger self-threat when confronted with a high-
achiever and increased their schadenfreude, compared to participants with HSE. 
However, this response was attenuated when people with LSE were given an opportunity 
to self-affirm. In the context of health message processing, Düring and Jessop (2014) 
found that completing a self-affirmation task before reading a health message promoting 
exercising evened out the disparities between people with HSE and LSE on message 
derogation, attitude and intention toward increasing exercising: self-affirmed people with 
LSE showed reduced message derogation and increased attitude and intention toward 
increasing exercise compared to their unaffirmed counterparts; but among people with 
HSE, there was no difference between those who were self-affirmed and those who were 
unaffirmed.    
Self-esteem as Expectancy: Self-affirmation Highlights Discrepancies 
A third proposition on the role of self-esteem in self-affirmation effect stems from 
the self-consistency explanation of cognitive dissonance (Aronson, 1968; 1992). 
Aronson’s reformulation posits that the dissonance process is mediated by the self: 
dissonance results not just from two inconsistent cognitions but results from the 
cognition’s inconsistency with one’s self-concept. For example, recall that a regrettable 
purchase of a music album does not go along very well with one being an effective 
decision-maker, and thus rationalizing this purchase would allow one to restore the 
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positive self-image. Although the self-consistency view of dissonance and self-
affirmation theory seems identical at first glance, they propose competing predictions 
regarding the role of self-esteem in the dissonance reduction process. According to the 
consistency view, a dissonance-inducing act should cause more self-consistency-restoring 
rationalization among people with HSE than among people with LSE. This is because the 
dissonant act seems more inconsistent with a highly positive self-evaluation (e.g., HSE) 
versus a less positive one (e.g., LSE). The large discrepancy between the act and the self-
evaluation will motivate people with HSE to engage in dissonance reduction (e.g., 
defensive processing) to a greater extent than people with LSE (Thibodeau & Aronson, 
1992).  
In the health intervention context, Gibbons, Eggleston, and Benthin (1997) found 
that during participation in a smoking cessation program, the decline in risk perceptions 
among relapsers was associated with self-esteem; relapsers with HSE experienced greater 
decline in commitment to quitting than did relapsers with LSE. In addition, Boney-
McCoy, Gibbons, and Gerrard (1999) found that despite that participants with HSE and 
LSE showed no difference on the levels of risky behaviors, those with HSE who were 
made aware of their risky sexual behaviors reported lower perceived risks of STDs than 
their counterparts with LSE. Also, participants with HSE who reported risky behaviors 
reported more favorable personality ratings subsequently than participants in any other 
conditions. These findings suggest that compared to people with LSE, people with HSE 
may perceive greater discrepancies when they are made aware that their current health-
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related behaviors fell short of their positive self-evaluations. The discomforting 
inconsistencies will motivate them to engage in greater attempts to reduce the 
discrepancies to maintain their positive self-evaluations.  
 Self-affirmation manipulation, a procedure during which one’s attention is 
directed to the self, can activate a processing style that tends to encode information in 
terms of its relevance for the self and thus result in increased sensitivity and responsivity 
to self-relevant aspects of the environment (Hull & Levy, 1979; Hull et al., 2002). This 
means that self-affirmed individuals will attend to self-relevant information in a health 
message more readily than unaffirmed individuals and will be more sensitive to self-
threats (van Koningsbruggen, Das, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2009). For people with HSE, 
this also means the discrepancy between their boosted senses of self-worth and the self-
threat is made more salient and thus may result in even greater defensiveness.   
Summary 
In short, three competing propositions exist regarding whether and how self-
affirmation affects health message processing for people with different strengths of self-
esteem (See Table 1.1). The self-esteem as resource proposition (Steele, Spencer, & 
Lynch, 1993) suggests that people with HSE have a larger reservoir of chronical self-
affirmational resources (i.e., favorable self-knowledge that contributes to self-integrity) 
than people with LSE. When these resources are made accessible in working memory 
through, for example, self-affirmation manipulations, people with HSE will be more 
resilient in the face of self-threatening information from a health message and exhibit 
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lower defensiveness. However, for people with LSE, self-affirmation manipulation 
reminds them of their lack of favorable self-knowledge and therefore may increase their 
perception of self-threat and defensiveness when facing self-threatening information from 
a health message.  
A second possibility is that people with HSE have readily access to the larger 
reservoir of self-affirmational resources and automatically draw on these resources when 
facing self-threatening information, while people with LSE are less likely to do so. When 
people face self-threatening information from a health message, self-affirmation 
manipulations can make people with LSE aware of their favorable self-knowledge and 
hence aid them in repairing the sense of self-integrity. For people with HSE, self-
affirmation manipulations do not bring extra benefits because people with HSE can 
automatically draw on favorable self-knowledge to repair their sense of self-integrity. In 
this case, self-affirmation manipulation reduces the disparities on health message 
acceptance between people with HSE and LSE.  
The third possibility stems from the self-consistency proposition (Aronson, 1968; 
1992) and takes into account of the by-product of self-affirmation manipulation, i.e., self-
directed attention. For people with HSE, self-directed attention may make salient the 
large discrepancy between their positive self-evaluations and the negative feedback in the 
health message and hence lead to greater defensiveness, compare with their unaffirmed 
counterparts. However, for people with LSE, the discrepancies made salient between 
   49 
 
their self-evaluations and the negative feedback in the health message are much smaller 
and more acceptable and therefore less likely to induce defensiveness. 
In the following sections, I will first explore whether the proposition that self-
affirmation functions as resources and that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities 
between people with HSE and LSE would apply to the health message processing 
context. Next, I will explore circumstances in the health message processing context 
under which each of the three propositions may apply and explain when self-affirmation 
may reduce defensive processing of health messages among people with HSE and LSE. 
 
Table 1.1 Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Self-esteem 
Self-esteem as Resource 
Proposition 
1 
Self-affirmation  
enlarges disparities 
HSE: abundant positive self-concepts → less 
defensive 
LSE: lack of positive self-concepts → more 
defensive 
Proposition 
2 
Self-affirmation  
reduces disparities 
 
HSE: positive self-concepts constantly accessible 
→ no change 
LSE: brings positive self-concepts to mind → 
less defensive 
Self-esteem as Expectancy 
Proposition 
3 
Self-affirmation 
highlights 
discrepancies 
 
HSE: larger discrepancies between unwelcome 
info & self-evaluation  
→ more defensive 
LSE: smaller discrepancies between unwelcome 
info & self-evaluation   
→ no change 
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Domain of Self-threat 
It is worth noting that, to date, the proposition that self-esteem functions as 
resources and that self-affirmation can enlarge disparities between people with HSE and 
LSE in responses to dissonance experiences (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) has not 
been demonstrated in the health communication context. Studies that reported supporting 
evidence are in the free-choice paradigm of cognitive dissonance research (Brehm, 1956). 
These studies induce self-threat through a dissonance manipulation that typically asks 
participants to make a difficult choice between two equally valued options (e.g., two 
equally ranked music albums); the phenomenon that people subsequently value the 
chosen alternative more strongly than they initially had, and the unchosen one less so, is 
dissonance reduction, a cognitive strategy people use to relieve the self from the 
psychological discomfort caused by losing the equally desirable unchosen option. 
Essentially, this manipulation induces dissonance by inducing a threat to one’s sense of 
autonomy, manifested through reducing one’s freedom of behavioral choices (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). In the health communication context, a parallel of this autonomy threat 
manipulation is the use of controlling language in health messages (e.g., “you must floss 
twice a day,” “you have to quit smoking”). Studies have shown that health messages with 
controlling language induce higher levels of perceived threat to autonomy than health 
messages with polite language (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Miller et al., 2007; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007). Thus, to determine whether the proposition that self-esteem functions 
as resources and that self-affirmation can enlarge disparities between people with HSE 
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and LSE applies in the health communication context as in the autonomy threat caused 
dissonance context, we can first test whether it can be demonstrated in a health 
communication context where an autonomy threat is induced through the use of 
controlling language. 
If this proposition applies in a health communication context where an autonomy 
threat is featured, we should expect that after reading a personally relevant health 
message with controlling language, self-affirmed individuals with HSE will report lower 
levels of psychological discomfort and less defensive responses, alongside more positive 
attitudes and intentions towards the recommended health behavior, compared to their 
unaffirmed counterparts. By contrast, it is expected that for those with LSE, self-
affirmation will lead to higher levels of psychological discomfort and more defensive 
responses, alongside less positive attitudes and intentions towards the recommended 
health behavior, compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 1.4).  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior 
Self-esteem as resource: Self-affirmation enlarges 
disparities between HSE and LSE 
Affirm 
Health Msg w/ 
Autonomy threat 
HSE 
LSE ↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance, 
↓ Att & Int 
↓ Defensiveness,  
↑ Msg Acceptance, 
↑ Att & Int  
: 
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Adequacy of the Affirmed Self 
A closer look at previous research revealed that the studies that reported that self-
affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and LSE differ from the 
studies that reported that self-affirmation reduces the disparities between people with 
HSE and LSE in the type of self-affirmation manipulations used. Participants in the 
former studies typically affirmed a range of cherished values or the global self-
evaluations while those in the latter studies typically reflected on one important value. 
For example, Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993), whose findings showed that self-
affirmation enlarged the disparities between people with HSE and LSE, used the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) as the self-affirmation manipulation. 
Completing the Rosenberg scale directs people to reflect on their global self-evaluations 
(e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself,” “I take a positive attitude toward 
myself”). In contrast, Düring and Jessop (2014), whose findings showed that self-
affirmation reduced disparities between people with HSE and LSE, used the essay format 
self-affirmation manipulation where individuals wrote about their most important values. 
It is likely that reflecting on a range of values or the global self-evaluations versus 
reflecting on one’s most important value produced different effects on the sense of self-
integrity and in turn had different implications for people with HSE and LSE. 
Writing about the most important value directs people’s attention to the aspect of 
the self that one is most proud of, whereas affirming a range of values or reminding 
people their global self-evaluations may bring to mind not only the proudest moments but 
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also the unsatisfactory ones. For people with LSE, such unsatisfactory moments may be 
much more frequent and salient than the proud ones, but for people with HSE, they may 
find that they are performing well in most aspects of their lives, which further boosts their 
self-evaluations. Therefore, affirming the most important value achieves an adequate 
sense of self-integrity for both people with HSE and LSE. It thus brings people with LSE 
in line with people with HSE in terms of self-evaluations. When confronted with self-
threatening information, with a salient positive self-conception to fall back on, self-
affirmed people with LSE will find the information less threatening, exhibit less 
defensive responses, and show higher information acceptance, compared to their 
unaffirmed counterparts. For people with HSE, one salient positive self-aspect does not 
add much extra goodness to their existing high self-evaluations. They thus will not show 
much improvement in terms of defensiveness reduction or information acceptance, 
compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. 
On the contrary, reflecting on a range of values or on one’s global self-evaluation 
boosts the high self-regards of people with HSE but reminds people with LSE that their 
proud moments are scarce and the self is inadequate. When confronted with self-
threatening information, with a salient sense of self-integrity, people with HSE will find 
the information less threatening, exhibit less defensiveness, and show higher information 
acceptance, compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. However, for people with LSE, 
when they are made aware that the self may not be adequate, they not only will show no 
improvement in terms of defensiveness reduction or information acceptance, but may 
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even exhibit higher defensiveness and lower information acceptance, compared to their 
unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 1.5).  
 
 
Figure 1.5 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior, as a function of the adequacy of affirmed self 
 
 
 
  
Health 
Msg 
Affirm the Most 
Important Value 
HSE 
LSE ↓ Defensiveness, 
↑ Msg Acceptance, 
↑ Att & Int 
No Change  
: 
Health 
Msg 
Affirm a Wide 
Range of Values 
HSE 
LSE ↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance, 
↓ Att & Int 
↓ Defensiveness,  
↑ Msg Acceptance, 
↑ Att & Int  
: 
Self-esteem as resource: Self-affirmation reduces 
disparities between HSE and LSE 
Self-esteem as resource: Self-affirmation enlarges 
disparities between HSE and LSE 
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Timing of Self-affirmation 
A situation-level factor that may influence when self-affirmation benefits people 
with HSE versus LSE is the timing of self-affirmation manipulation – whether self-
affirmation is induced before or after the onset of the threat to self (i.e., health message 
exposure). It influences self-affirmation effects by determining whether self-esteem 
functions as resources or as expectancies (Stone, 1999).  
Self-affirming before health message exposure enables self-esteem to function as 
resources, because self-affirmation brings favorable knowledge about the self into the 
working memory before the threat to the self occurs. These cognitions then help offset 
the self-threat’s discomforting implications for the self. If self-affirmation happened 
before message exposure, positive cognitions about the self are in place when the threat 
strikes. People who have more favorable self-resources available (i.e., have a secure 
sense of self-integrity) will be more capable to withstand the threat. Therefore, people 
with HSE will benefit from self-affirmation (e.g., show reduced defensiveness and 
increased message acceptance) if they affirmed a wide range of self-aspects, while people 
with LSE will benefit if they affirmed the most important and positive self-aspect. 
If self-affirmation happened after message exposure, self-affirmation may 
backfire for people with HSE (Stone, 1999), regardless of affirming a wide range of self-
aspects or the most important self-aspect. This is because completing a self-affirmation 
task after message exposure enables self-esteem to function as expectancies. Message 
exposure makes people aware of the link between a given behavior and a certain health 
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risk. Self-affirmation manipulation, which directs attention to the self, may cause self-
referencing and make one’s standards and self-expectancies salient (Hull & Levy, 1979; 
Hull et al., 2002), which may highlight any discrepancies between one’s standards or 
self-expectancies and one’s health-compromising behavior (e.g., “I always make wise 
decisions, but I smoke which puts my health at great risk”).  
For people with HSE, who have higher expectations for being competent and 
prudent than people with LSE, reading a health message and next directing attention to 
the self through the self-affirmation manipulation may trigger greater discomfort, because 
the blow to their sense of self-integrity is greater than for people with LSE. They thus 
may be more likely to resort to defensive processing than self-affirmed people with LSE. 
Also, compared to their unaffirmed counterparts, self-affirmed people with HSE will 
show increased defensiveness, because self-affirmation made salient the discrepancy 
between their high self-expectations and their health-compromising behavior. In contrast, 
for people with LSE, who have lower expectations for being competent and prudent, 
because the discrepancy between the standard or self-expectancy and the health-
compromising behavior is smaller, a health message coupled with self-directed attention 
may not arouse much discomfort and thus may not increase defensiveness, compared to 
their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior, as a function of the timing of the self-affirmation 
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SE as resource: Self-affirmation reduces disparities 
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Overview of Studies 
This dissertation tests the moderating role of self-esteem in self-affirmation effect 
on reducing defensive processing of personally relevant health messages. Three studies 
test under what circumstances each of the three propositions apply (i.e., (1) self-esteem 
reflects self-affirmational resources and self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between 
people with HSE and LSE; (2) self-esteem reflects self-affirmational resources, and self-
affirmation reduces the disparities between people with HSE and LSE; (3) self-esteem 
reflects self-expectancies and self-affirmation makes salient the discrepancies).  
Study 1 (presented in Chapter 2) will test whether the proposition that self-esteem 
functions as resources and that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between people 
with HSE and LSE – which only has been demonstrated in free-choice dissonance 
situations – can be replicated in the health communication context, specifically, when a 
health message induces autonomy threat through the use of controlling language. It is 
hypothesized that in the high autonomy threat condition, self-affirmed people with HSE 
will exhibit less defensive responses and higher message acceptance than their 
unaffirmed counterparts; while self-affirmed people with LSE will exhibit more 
defensive responses and lower message acceptance than their unaffirmed counterparts.   
Study 2 (presented in Chapter 3) will test the adequacy of the affirmed self 
achieved through self-affirmation manipulation influences the moderating role of self-
esteem. Three self-affirmation tasks that varied in terms of the range and the importance 
of the values addressed will be used. It is hypothesized that affirming a range of values 
   59 
 
(e.g., scale affirmation) will reduce defensiveness among people with HSE but not for 
people with LSE, affirming a value more important than the value threatened will reduce 
defensiveness among people with LSE but less so for people with HSE, and affirming a 
value less important than the value threatened will increased defensiveness for people 
with LSE but not HSE.  
Study 3 (presented in Chapter 4) will test whether the timing of the self-
affirmation manipulation in relation to message exposure (i.e., whether self-affirmation is 
induced before or after message exposure) determines when self-esteem functions as 
resources versus expectancies. It is hypothesized that when self-affirmation is induced 
before message exposure, self-affirmed people with HSE will benefit more (i.e., show 
reduced defensiveness and increased message acceptance) if they affirmed a range of 
self-aspects, while people with LSE will benefit more if they affirmed the most important 
and positive self-aspect. When self-affirmation is induced after message exposure, 
regardless of affirming a range of values or the most important value, self-affirmed 
people with HSE will exhibit more defensiveness and lower message acceptance 
compared to their unaffirmed counterparts; while this difference will be weaker or even 
absent for people with LSE. 
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CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1 – DOMAIN OF SELF-THREAT 
Abstract 
The present study tested whether the proposition that self-esteem functions as 
resources and that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and 
LSE (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) applies in the health communication context, and 
specifically when a health message features an autonomy threat. It was expected that self-
affirmation will reduce defensiveness, increase message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention among people with HSE, but will increase defensiveness, reduce message 
acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with LSE.  
Contrary to the expectations, data on sunscreen use from 115 UMN college 
students showed that self-affirmation increased psychological discomfort, self-directed 
negative emotions, sunscreen use attitude, and sunscreen use intention among people 
with LSE but decreased them among people with HSE.  
  
   61 
 
Introduction 
Extant research on self-affirmation in the health communication domain mainly 
focused on identifying main effects of self-affirmation on reducing defensive responses 
and increasing openness toward health messages. The small effect sizes and 
inconsistencies reported in recent reviews of self-affirmation research in the health 
communication domain (e.g., Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Epton et al., 2015) call for more 
attention on the boundary conditions of self-affirmation effects.  
Self-esteem, one’s global evaluation or attitude relating to the self (Rosenberg, 
1965), is an individual level factor that has complex yet important relationships with 
health outcomes. People with high self-esteem has been found to be more resilient in the 
face of stress and physical diseases (e.g., Broers et al., 1998) but also are more likely to 
discount vulnerability to health risks (e.g., Gerrard et al., 2000). Low self-esteem, 
however, has been found to associate with psychiatric vulnerability and more health-
compromising behaviors (e.g., Mann et al., 2004).  
Conceptually, self-esteem and self-affirmation are closely related. Self-esteem 
approximates one’s self-adequacy while self-affirmation reflects efforts to secure the 
sense of self-adequacy when it is threatened. People with high self-esteem (HSE) and low 
self-esteem (LSE) may have very different ideas about to what extent the self is 
considered adequate and may thus respond differently to self-affirmation manipulations.   
Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) suggests that self-esteem can function as 
resources: people with HSE have more favorite knowledge about themselves, hence have 
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more chronic self-affirmational resources in the face of threat, while people with LSE 
have less favorite knowledge about themselves, hence have less chronic self-
affirmational resources in the face of threat. When the self-affirmational resources are 
made accessible through self-affirmation manipulation, people with HSE will be more 
resilient in the face of self-threats because they are made aware of their large reservoir of 
self-resources. Therefore, they will show reduced defensive responses to self-threats 
compared with their unaffirmed counterparts. In contrast, people with LSE may find the 
self-threat more threatening because they are made aware of their lack of positive 
knowledge about themselves. Therefore, they will show increased defensive responses to 
self-threats compared with their unaffirmed counterparts. 
This proposition that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with 
HSE and LSE has been supported in research examining self-affirmation effect in 
reducing justification resulted from free-choice dissonance situations. However, in the 
context of health message processing, so far no study has demonstrated such effects. 
Therefore, in this study, I will test whether this proposition applies in a health 
communication context where an autonomy threat is featured in the health message. It is 
expected that self-affirmed individuals with HSE will report lower defensive responses, 
higher message acceptance, more positive attitudes, and higher intentions toward the 
recommended health behavior, compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. By contrast, 
self-affirmed individuals with LSE will report higher defensiveness, as well as lower 
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message acceptance, less positive attitudes, and lower intentions toward the 
recommended health behavior (See Figure 2.1).   
Given that I planned to conduct the study with a college student sample, I chose 
daily sunscreen use as the behavior. Protecting skin from UV overexposure is a health 
topic relevant to the college student population that tends to spend a large amount of time 
outdoors. Also, the study was conducted toward the end of the Spring semester when 
summer break was approaching and UV overexposure was becoming especially relevant.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior 
Self-esteem as resource: Self-affirmation enlarges 
disparities between HSE and LSE 
Affirm 
Health Msg w/ 
Autonomy threat 
HSE 
LSE ↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance, 
↓ Att & Int 
↓ Defensiveness,  
↑ Msg Acceptance, 
↑ Att & Int  
: 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 173 undergraduate students from the University of Minnesota 
participated in the study for extra course credits. A total of 143 participants completed 
both a pre-study questionnaire and the main study two weeks later (retention rate: 
82.7%). Responses from 20 participants were excluded because of “click-through 
patterns,” that is, these participants chose the same answer to all Likert-type scale items 
at multiple parts of the questionnaire. Eight participants did not complete the survey 
questions continuously within an hour, that is, they stopped answering questions at some 
point then after a while came back to answer the rest of the questions. Responses from 
these participants were excluded from analysis as well. The ages of remaining 
participants ranged from 18 to 26 years with an average age of 20.1 (Median = 20; SD = 
1.6). Of all participants, 70.4% were female (n = 81). A total of 72.2% of participants 
were White (n = 83), 20.9% were Asian (n = 24), and 6.9% were multiracial or other (n = 
8) (See Appendix A.1 for sample characteristics). 
Design and Procedure  
An experiment with a 2 (Self-affirmation: yes, no) by 2 (Level of autonomy threat 
in message: low, high) between-subjects factorial design was conducted online. Two 
weeks before the study, all participants completed a pre-study questionnaire that included 
the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965), measures of sunscreen use history, and 
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demographics information. Two weeks later, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four experimental conditions. Participants in the self-affirmation condition were 
asked to write a short essay about their most important value, why it is important to them, 
and how they have used it in life. They were instructed to describe specific occasions 
when this value determined their actions (Harris & Napper, 2005). In the no self-
affirmation control condition, participants wrote about how digital media influenced the 
ways people get news, follow TV shows, and consume music. Next, participants received 
a health message. The messages in the low and high threat conditions differed in the 
extent to which controlling language was used. Last, participants filled out a 
questionnaire that included measures of the key variables of interest.   
Stimuli  
To develop stimuli for study 1, information from the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) was used to create contents for two messages about sunscreen use. 
The messages were comprised of a brief introduction, a list of harmful consequences of 
UV overexposure, and a conclusion section where sunscreen use recommendations were 
laid out. Aesthetic elements were added to make the messages look like real health 
messages that people may see in the media environment. 
Based on psychological reactance research in the health communication domain 
(e.g., Miller et al., 2007; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), autonomy threat in the messages 
was manipulated by using controlling language to recommend sunscreen use, or, 
alternatively, using non-coercive, autonomy supporting language. The high autonomy 
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threat message contained controlling terms such as “should” and “must” and included 
phrases such as “You simply cannot deny that,” “You simply have to do it,” and “You do 
not have a choice.” The low autonomy threat message contained non-coercive terms such 
as “can,” “may,” and “might” and included autonomy-supportive phrases such as “An 
option for you to consider,” “The choice is yours,” and “Now might be a good time to 
give it a try.”  
A pilot test was conducted to examine whether the messages can successfully 
induce high and low levels of perceived autonomy threat. A total of 28 participants were 
randomly assigned to the two message conditions. Among all participants, 13 read the 
high autonomy threat message and 15 read the low autonomy threat message. After 
reading the messages, participants answered manipulation check questions that assessed 
their perceptions of autonomy threat.  
The perceived autonomy threat manipulation check was comprised of eight 7-
point items based on Dillard and Shen (2005), with four items adopted from the original 
Dillard and Shen measure (e.g., “The message tried to make a decision for me,” 1 = 
“Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”) and four items created specifically for the 
sunscreen use behavior (e.g., “The message tried to restrict my freedom over sunscreen 
use”; α = .845). The analysis showed that although the high threat message induced 
higher levels of perceived autonomy threat (M = 3.94, SD = 1.13) than the low threat 
message (M = 3.10, SD = .96, d = .39, t(26) = 2.13, p = .043), the mean levels of 
perceived autonomy threat induced from the high threat message did not pass the scale 
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midpoint “4.” Therefore, to strengthen the autonomy threat in the high threat condition, a 
new message was created with stronger controlling language. For example, the title of the 
message was changed from “A Choice You Have to Make” to “You Do Not Have a 
Choice.” In addition, in order to make the controlling or the polite language more salient 
and to reduce cognitive load, I shortened the middle section where harmful consequences 
of sun overexposure were listed.  
The revised sunscreen use messages were used as the stimuli in study 1
1
. 
Participants assigned to the high autonomy threat condition read the message that 
contains controlling language and participants assigned to the low autonomy threat 
message read the message that contains non-coercive, polite language. Participants 
completed the perceived autonomy threat manipulation check after they finished reading 
the messages (See Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 for the messages).  
                                                 
1
 The revised messages were not pilot-tested before the main study because I speculated that the use of the 
stronger controlling language would sufficiently induce higher levels of autonomy threat. The manipulation 
check later showed that the messages successfully induced high versus low levels of autonomy threat.  
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Figure 2.2 Low autonomy threat sunscreen use message 
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Figure 2.3 High autonomy threat sunscreen use message 
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Key Measures  
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965). 
Participants responded to ten 7-point scale items, such as “On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself,” “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others,” 
and “I wish I could have more respect for myself” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”). Five items were reverse scored. Participants’ average scores of the ten 
items were used as the indicator of self-esteem (α = .891; M = 4.96, SD = 1.02).  
It is important to note that although the mean self-esteem score was considerately 
higher than the scale midpoint “4,” finding a high mean self-esteem score was consistent 
with previous research which shows that responses to the Rosenberg Scale were generally 
on the positive side of the scale, especially with U.S. college student samples (e.g., 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; Schmitt & Allik, 2005; Twenge & Campbell, 2001). For 
example, Twenge and Campbell’s meta-analysis (2001) showed that the mean self-
esteem score among college students was 32.27 (Range: 10 – 40; Scale midpoint: 25) and 
the mean score increased over time. Because it is socially desirable to have high rather 
than low self-esteem, it is likely that some people scored themselves more positively on 
the scale than what their true self-evaluations are.  
Indicators of Defensive Processing  
Psychological Discomfort was measured with three 7-point scale items adapted 
from Elliot and Devine (1994). “I feel uncomfortable,” “I feel uneasy,” and “I feel 
bothered” followed the stem “Please indicate how you are feeling right now” (1 = “None 
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of this feeling” – 7 = “A great deal of this feeling”). The mean of the three items was 
used as the composite score for psychological discomfort (α = .745; M = 2.74, SD = 
1.34).  
Anger was measured with two 7-point scale items adapted from Shen and Dillard 
(2005), “I feel irritated” and “I feel angry” (1 = “None of this feeling” – 7 = “A great deal 
of this feeling”). The mean of the two items was used as the composite score for anger (r 
= .599; M = 2.4, SD = 1.36). To reduce experimental demand concerns, I included 
additional items to measure self-directed negative emotions (“I feel disappointed with 
myself,” “I feel annoyed with myself,” and “I feel guilty”; α = .837; M = 2.56, SD = 1.49) 
and positive emotions (“I feel happy,” “I feel optimistic,” “I feel cheerful,” and “I feel 
content”; α = .916; M = 4.13, SD = 1.54).    
Message skepticism was measured with the 7-point scale item “While reading 
the message, I was skeptical of what was being said” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”; M = 3.67, SD = 1.65). 
Indicators of Message Acceptance 
A 7-item, 7-point bipolar semantic differential scale adopted from Yzer et al., 
(2011) was used to measure message acceptance. The stem phrase “To me, the message 
was:” was anchored with seven word pairs. The first four items, “extremely unconvincing 
– extremely convincing,” “extremely unbelievable – extremely believable,” “extremely 
forgettable – extremely memorable,” and “extremely bad – extremely good,” measured 
perceived convincingness (α = .714; M = 4.08, SD = 1.04). The fifth and sixth items, 
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“extremely unpleasant – extremely pleasant” and “extremely negative – extremely 
positive” measured perceived pleasantness (r = .615; M = 3.35, SD = 1.2). The last item, 
“extremely not meant for someone like me – extremely meant for someone like me,” 
measured perceived relevance (M = 4.22, SD = 1.67). 
Sunscreen Use Attitude and Intentions 
Eight 7-point (1 – 7) bipolar semantic differential scale items were used to 
measure attitude towards using sunscreen daily, namely “unpleasant-pleasant,” 
“annoying-nice,” “stressful-calming,” “frightening-assuring,” “negative-positive,” “bad-
good,” “harmful-beneficial,” and “worthless-useful.” The average score of the eight items 
was used as an overall measure of attitude (α = .870; M = 4.81, SD = 0.96).   
Intention to use sunscreen daily was measured by a 7-point scale item – “How 
likely are you to use sunscreen every day you would be out in the sun?” (1 = “Very 
unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 3.73, SD = 1.86). Given that the study was conducted 
between mid-April and early-May when UV radiation was low to moderate in Minnesota 
and that sun protection is more relevant for the college student population in the summer 
months than in other months of the year, participants’ daily sunscreen use intentions may 
be influenced by the temporal contexts of the behavior. Therefore, three additional 
intention measures were used to assess daily sunscreen use intention in three time frames. 
Intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week was measured by a 7-point scale 
item – “How likely are you to use sunscreen every day you would be out in the sun in the 
following week?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 3.20, SD = 1.74). 
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Intention to use sunscreen daily in the following month was measured by a 7-point scale 
item – “How likely are you to use sunscreen every day you would be out in the sun in the 
following month?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 3.93, SD = 1.91). 
Intention to use sunscreen daily in next three months was measured by a 7-point scale 
item – “How likely are you to use sunscreen every day you would be out in the sun in 
next three months?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 4.23, SD = 1.91).  
Control Variables 
Controlling for variables that are correlated with the dependent variable but 
uncorrelated with the independent variables in a regression model can reduce error 
variance without inducing multicollinearity and thus increase the precision of the 
estimated treatment effects (Wooldridge, 2015). I thus selected two variables that might 
have independent effects on the dependent variables as intended control variables for the 
analyses: current sunscreen use behavior and gender.  
Current Sunscreen Use. Regardless of self-affirmation manipulation, people 
who currently use sunscreen may report lower defensiveness and higher message 
acceptance because the message is consistent with their current position on the behavior. 
Also, current behavior is a major source for attitudinal beliefs and behavior intention and 
therefore is a strong predictor of attitude and intention. I measured participants’ current 
sunscreen use behavior in the pre-study questionnaire two weeks before the main study 
with the question: “Which statement best describes your current use of sunscreen?” (1 = 
“I do not use it at all” – 5 = “I use it every day”; M = 2.87, SD = 0.79). I examined the 
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correlations between current sunscreen use behavior and the dependent and the 
independent variables within each experimental condition to determine whether it is 
useful to include current sunscreen use behavior as a control variable in the analyses. The 
correlations between current sunscreen use behavior and the dependent variables were 
very weak except for perceived relevance and attitude and intention measures (See Table 
2.1). Therefore, current sunscreen use behavior was included as a control variable only 
for the analysis on message skepticism, perceived relevance, attitude, and intention.  
Gender. There are fairly well-established gender differences in sun protection 
behaviors and beliefs (e.g., Abroms et al., 2003; Thieden et al., 2005). For example, 
women usually have more favorable attitudes toward sunscreen use and are more likely 
to use sunscreen than men. Therefore, gender was included as an intended control 
variable as well. Similarly, I examined the associations between gender and the 
dependent and independent variables using Spearman correlation to determine whether it 
is useful to include gender as a control variable in the analyses. Gender had moderate 
correlations with indicators of defensiveness (i.e., psychological discomfort, anger, and 
message skepticism) and the attitude and intention measures (See Table 2.1). Therefore, 
it was included as a control variable in analyses of these dependent variables. 
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Table 2.1 Bivariate Correlations between the Intended Control Variables and Dependent 
and Independent Variables by Experimental Condition 
 Current Sunscreen Use Gender
2
 
      Control Self-Affirmed      Control Self-Affirmed 
Threat Level Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Self-esteem -.19  .32†  .09  .46* -.38* -.01  .19 -.10 
Discomfort -.01  .33†  .01 -.18  .45*  .60** -.44* -.04 
Anger -.01  .34†  .00  .02  .51**  .54* -.15 -.14 
Skepticism  .04 -.15 -.41* -.00 -.06 -.23 -.53** -.28 
Perc. Conv.  -.01  .03  .28  .30  .04  .12  .20  .09 
Perc. Plea. -.30  .09 -.11  .28 -.13 -.12  .11  .31 
Perc. Relevance   .14  .22  .41*  .19  .08 -.12  .36†  .05 
Attitude  .54**  .46**  .37†  .67*** -.06  .16  .50**  .26 
Intention  .46*  .73***  .60**  .72***  .00  .19  .47*  .19 
Int (Next wk)  .38†  .67***  .57**  .66***  .19  .37*  .17  .20 
Int (Next mo)  .35†  .66***  .50*  .67***  .12  .34†  .47*  .22 
Int (Next 3 mo)  .33  .61***  .46*  .60** -.07  .35†  .52**  .37* 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Gender: Male = 0, Female = 1. 
                                                 
2
 The associations between gender and other variables were analyzed using Spearman correlation. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
The effectiveness of the stimuli in inducing high versus low levels of autonomy 
threat was confirmed with the perceived autonomy threat manipulation check (α = .918; 
See p. 62 for scale items). The high threat message induced higher levels of perceived 
autonomy threat (M = 5.31, SD = 1.16) than the low threat message (M = 3.62, SD = 
1.26), d = 1.40, t(110) = -7.416, p = .000. 
At the data cleaning stage, I discovered that the length of the value affirmation 
essays varied greatly between participants, ranging from three individual words (e.g., 
“health, happiness, love”) to a long essay with 262 words. The average length of the 
essay was 79 words (SD = 49.86). It is conceivable that whether participants in the self-
affirmation condition were self-affirmed varied depending on whether they followed the 
self-affirmation task instruction in writing the value essay, as well as the amount of 
cognitive effort they put into the task. Therefore, to determine whether the self-
affirmation manipulation fulfilled its intended purpose, i.e., leading participants to reflect 
on aspects of the self that are important and positive, I examined whether participants 
closely followed the instructions to complete the self-affirmation task.  
The value essays were coded by two independent coders following a coding 
scheme adapted from Tesser et al. (2000). The judges rated each of the value essays with 
respect to the following three questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): (1) Did the essay allow one to 
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get to know the writer and how the value pertained to the writer personally? (2) Did the 
essay present positive information that seemed to cast the writer in a positive light? (3) 
Did the essay explain why the value was important to the writer? (Percent agreement = 
95.4%, 93.8%, 90.8%; disagreements were resolved through discussion.) Five 
participants whose essay received zero for all three questions were considered as not self-
affirmed and were regrouped into the control condition.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics of key variables are presented 
in Table 2.2 to Table 2.5 by threat conditions.  
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Outline of Results 
Overall, in the high threat condition, regression analyses revealed interactions 
between self-esteem and self-affirmation on psychological discomfort, attitude, and 
intention toward daily sunscreen use (See Table 2.6).  
In the following sections, I will present the results in the following order: (1) 
effects on indicators of defensiveness, (1) effects on indicators of message acceptance, 
and (3) effects on attitude and intention. Next, supplemental analyses will be provided to 
aid further understanding the findings.    
 
Table 2.6 Outline of Study 1 Results 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort High threat: Affirm x SE - 
Anger - 
High threat: SE (-);  
Affirm (+) 
Skepticism - - 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Convincingness - - 
Perc. Pleasantness - - 
Perc. Relevance - - 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude High threat: Affirm x SE  Low threat: Affirm (-) 
Intention  - - 
Int. (Next week) High threat: Affirm x SE - 
Int. (Next month) High threat: Affirm x SE - 
Int. (Next 3 months) - Low threat: SE (+) 
Note. Discomfort refers to Psychological Discomfort. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Perc. refers to Perceived. Int. refers to Intention.  
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1. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Defensiveness 
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
hypothesis that self-affirmation decreases the defensive responses towards the high threat 
health message among people with HSE but increases defensive responses among people 
with LSE. Such effects would be indicated by interactions between self-affirmation and 
self-esteem in regression models with indicators of defensive processing as the dependent 
variables. Two regression models were built for the low and high threat conditions for 
each dependent variable.  
In regression models for psychological discomfort, dummy-coded gender (Male = 
0, Female = 1) was entered at step 1 as a control variable, mean-centered self-esteem and 
dummy-coded self-affirmation (Self-affirmed = 1, Control = 0) were entered at step 2, 
and the two-way interaction term of self-esteem x self-affirmation was entered at step 3. 
In regression models for anger, mean-centered self-esteem and dummy-coded self-
affirmation (Self-affirmed = 1, Control = 0) were entered at step 1, and the two-way 
interaction term of self-esteem x self-affirmation was entered at step 2. In regression 
models for message skepticism, mean centered current sunscreen use and dummy-coded 
gender (Male = 0, Female = 1) were entered at step 1 as control variables, mean-centered 
self-esteem and dummy-coded self-affirmation (Self-affirmed = 1, Control = 0) were 
entered at step 2, and the two-way interaction term of self-esteem x self-affirmation was 
entered at step 3. When an interaction effect was identified, simple slopes analyses were 
conducted to examine the nature of the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991), specifically, 
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the dependent variable was regressed onto self-affirmation for participants with low (1 
SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem. 
Psychological Discomfort  
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction or main effect of self-esteem 
or self-affirmation was found (See Table 2.7 for regression analysis results). 
High Threat Condition. The regression analysis showed an interaction between 
self-affirmation and self-esteem on psychological discomfort, ΔR2 = .079, b = -.757, t(54) 
= -2.33, p = .024 (See Table 2.8 for regression analysis results). Simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), self-affirmation had a positive effect 
on psychological discomfort, b = .901, t(54) = 1.87, p = .067. Although the slope for 
participants with HSE (+1SD) was not statistically significantly different from zero, b = -
.709, t(54) = -1.45, p = .153, it was sufficiently lower than the slope for participants with 
HSE (Z = -2.34, p = .010, one tailed). 
Consistent with the proposition1 (Self-esteem as resource: Self-affirmation 
enlarges disparities), self-affirmed participants with LSE showed higher psychological 
discomfort compared to their unaffirmed counterparts, while self-affirmed people with 
HSE showed lower psychological discomfort compared to their unaffirmed counterparts 
(See Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4 Self-affirmation x self-esteem effect on psychological discomfort in the high 
threat message condition 
Left:    Predicted values for psychological discomfort among self-affirmed and 
unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above 
the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for psychological discomfort among self-affirmed and 
unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above 
the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Anger 
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction or main effect of self-esteem 
or self-affirmation was found (See Table 2.7 for regression analysis results). 
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, there was no interaction between self-
affirmation and self-esteem on anger. At step 2 of the regression model, there was a main 
effect of self-affirmation, R
2
Step 2 = .091, b = .649, t(56) = 1.76, p = .085, and a main 
effect of self-esteem, b = -.314, t(56) = -1.79, p = .078 (See Table 2.8 for regression 
analysis results). This means that self-affirmed participants expressed higher levels of 
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anger than unaffirmed participants, regardless of their self-esteem levels and participants 
with HSE expressed lower levels of anger than participants with LSE, regardless of 
whether they were self-affirmed or not.    
Message Skepticism 
Unexpectedly, the regression analysis showed no interaction between self-
affirmation and self-esteem on message skepticism, in either high or low threat condition. 
There was no self-affirmation or self-esteem main effect either (See Table 2.7 and Table 
2.8 for regression analysis results). 
 
Table 2.7 Regression Analyses with Defensiveness Measures as Dependent Variables in 
the Low Threat Condition 
 
Psychological 
Discomfort  
Anger 
 
Message 
Skepticism 
n = 53    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 2.82*** .35  2.57*** .24   4.16*** .47 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    -.86† .49 
Gender   .16 .35     -  -    -.24 .32 
Self-esteem  -.28 .18   -.28 .18    -.10 .24 
Self-affirmation  -.39 .35   -.28 .34    -.34 .46 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 2) .068 (.057)  .050 (.050)  .101 (.101) 
(Constant) 2.75*** .36  2.57*** .25   4.35*** .49 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -  -1.05* .51 
Gender   .22 .37     -  -    -.25 .31 
Self-esteem  -.17 .25   -.29
 
.24    -.39 .32 
Self-affirmation  -.36 .35   -.29 .34    -.38 .46 
Esteem x Affirm  -.24 .37    .08 .36     .66 .50 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 3) .075 (.008)  .051 (.001)  .134 (.033) 
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Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1.  
 
Table 2.8 Regression Analyses with Defensiveness Measures as Dependent Variables in 
the High Threat Condition 
 
Psychological 
Discomfort  
Anger 
 
Message 
Skepticism 
n = 59    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 2.01*** .42  2.09*** .25   4.52*** .54 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    -.98† .57 
Gender   .92 .44     -  -     .04 .31 
Self-esteem  -.34 .17   -.31 .18    -.14 .23 
Self-affirmation   .10 .36    .65 .37     .20 .45 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 2) .134 (.063)  .091 (.091)  .061 (.061) 
(Constant) 2.08*** .40  2.10*** .26   4.53*** .55 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    -.98† .58 
Gender   .90* .42     -  -     .04 .31 
Self-esteem   .09 .24   -.24
 
.27    -.03 .33 
Self-affirmation   .09 .34    .65† .37     .19 .45 
Esteem x Affirm  -.76* .33   -.13 .36    -.18 .43 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 3) .213 (.079)  .093 (.002)  .064 (.003) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1.  
 
2. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Message Acceptance 
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
hypothesis that self-affirmation increases the acceptance of the high threat health 
message among people with HSE but decreases message acceptance among people with 
LSE. Such effects would be indicated by interactions between self-affirmation and self-
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esteem in regression models with indicators of message acceptance as the dependent 
variables. Two regression models were built for the low and high threat conditions for 
each dependent variable.  
In regression models for perceived convincingness and perceived pleasantness, 
mean-centered self-esteem and dummy-coded self-affirmation (Self-affirmed = 1, 
Control = 0) were entered at step 1 and the two-way interaction term of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was entered at step 2. In regression models for perceived relevance, 
mean centered current sunscreen use was entered at step 1 as a control variable, mean-
centered self-esteem and dummy-coded self-affirmation were entered at step 2, and the 
two-way interaction term of self-esteem x self-affirmation was entered at step 3.    
Unexpectedly, regression analyses showed no interaction between self-affirmation 
and self-esteem on any of the message acceptance indicators (i.e., perceived 
convincingness, perceived pleasantness, and perceived relevance), in either high or low 
threat condition. There was no main effect of self-esteem or self-affirmation, either (See 
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 for regression analyses results).  
 
Table 2.9 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables in the Low Threat Condition 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
n = 53    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 4.44*** .17  3.76*** .19  4.74*** .30 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    .60* .28 
Gender    -  -     -  -     -  - 
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Self-esteem   .01 .13    .01 .14    .20 .22 
Self-affirmation  -.29 .24    .02 .27   -.50 .43 
R
2
 (Step 2 ΔR2) .029 (.029)  .000 (.000)  .143 (.048) 
(Constant) 4.48*** .17  3.76*** .19  4.79*** .30 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    .56† .28 
Gender    -  -     -  -     -  - 
Self-esteem  -.15 .16    .09
 
.18   -.03 .29 
Self-affirmation  -.30 .24    .02 .27   -.53 .43 
Esteem x Affirm   .39 .26   -.22 .29    .54 .45 
R
2
 (Step 3 ΔR2) .072 (.044)  .012 (.012)  .169 (.026) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. 
 
Table 2.10 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables in the High Threat Condition 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
n = 59    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 4.02*** .21  2.91*** .23  4.01*** .32 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    .57† .31 
Gender    -  -     -  -     -  - 
Self-esteem  -.01 .14    .15 .16   -.26 .24 
Self-affirmation  -.28 .30    .11 .34    .09 .46 
R
2
 (Step 2 ΔR2) .016 (.016)  .020 (.020)  .063 (.021) 
(Constant) 4.02*** .21  2.91*** .23  4.02*** .32 
Sunscreen Use    -  -     -  -    .57† .31 
Gender    -  -     -  -     -  - 
Self-esteem  -.00 .22    .16
 
.24   -.20 .34 
Self-affirmation  -.28 .31    .11 .34    .08 .46 
Esteem x Affirm  -.02 .29   -.01 .32   -.12 .44 
R
2
 (Step 3 ΔR2) .016 (.000)  .020 (.000)  .065 (.001) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. 
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3. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Attitude and Intentions  
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
hypothesis that in the high threat message condition, self-affirmation increases attitudes 
and intentions toward daily sunscreen use among people with HSE but decreases attitudes 
and intentions among people with LSE. Such effects would be indicated by interactions 
between self-affirmation and self-esteem in regression models with attitude and intention 
towards daily sunscreen use as the dependent variables. Two regression models were 
built for the low and high threat conditions for each dependent variable. In each 
regression model, mean centered current sunscreen use and dummy-coded gender (Male 
= 0, Female = 1) were entered at step 1 as control variables, mean-centered self-esteem 
and dummy-coded self-affirmation condition (Self-affirmed = 1, Control = 0) were 
entered at step 2, and the two-way interaction term of self-esteem x self-affirmation was 
entered at step 3. When an interaction effect was identified, simple slopes analyses were 
conducted to examine the nature of the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991).  
Attitude 
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction between self-affirmation and 
self-esteem was found on attitude toward using sunscreen daily. There was a main effect 
of self-affirmation, ΔR2Step 2 = .064, b = -.453, t(51) = -1.91, p = .062 (See Table 2.11 for 
regression analysis results). This means that self-affirmed participants showed a less 
favorable attitude toward sunscreen use than unaffirmed participants, regardless of their 
self-esteem levels. There was no main effect of self-esteem.  
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High Threat Condition. The regression analysis showed an interaction between 
self-affirmation and self-esteem on attitude toward daily sunscreen use, ΔR2 = .076, b = -
.519, t(53) = -2.60, p = .012 (See Table 2.12 for regression analysis results). Simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), self-affirmation had a positive 
effect on attitude, b = .517, t(53) = 1.74, p = .087, while among participants with HSE 
(+1SD), self-affirmation had a negative effect on attitude, b = -.587, t(53) = -1.95, p = 
.056.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, self-affirmed participants with LSE showed a more 
favorable attitude compared to their unaffirmed counterparts, while self-affirmed people 
with HSE showed a less favorable attitude compared to their unaffirmed counterparts 
(See Figure 2.5).  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Self-affirmation x self-esteem effect on attitude in the high threat message 
condition 
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Left:    Predicted values for attitude towards daily sunscreen use among self-affirmed and 
unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above 
the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
Right:  Hypothesized results for attitude towards daily sunscreen use among self-affirmed 
and unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD 
above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
 
Intention 
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction effects were found on 
intention measures. There was no main effect of self-affirmation, either (See Table 2.6 
for regression analyses results). However, there was a main effect of self-esteem on daily 
sunscreen use intention in next three months, ΔR2 Step 2 = .085, b = .527, t(47) = 2.32, p = 
.025 (See Table 2.11 for regression analysis results). This means that participants with 
HSE expressed higher intentions to use sunscreen daily in next three months than 
participants with LSE, regardless of whether they were self-affirmed or not.  
High Threat Condition. Regression analysis demonstrated no interaction 
between self-affirmation and self-esteem on intentions to use sunscreen daily, ΔR2 = 
.012, b = -.417, t(53) = -1.21, p = .23 (See Table 2.12 for regression analysis results). 
Interestingly, there was an interaction between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week, ΔR2 = .055, b = -.801, t(53) = -
2.47, p = .017, and on intention to use sunscreen daily in the following month, ΔR2 = 
.028, b = -.647, t(53) = -1.72, p = .092, but it disappeared when the timeframe of daily 
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sunscreen use was changed to next three months, ΔR2 = .008, b = -.336, t(53) = -.83, p = 
.409 (See Table 2.12 for regression analyses results).   
Regarding the self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction on daily sunscreen use 
intention in the following week, simple slope analyses showed that among participants 
with HSE (-1SD), self-affirmation had a negative effect on intention, b = -1.090, t(53) = -
2.24, p = .029. Although the slope for participants with LSE (-1SD) was not statistically 
significantly different from zero, b = .613, t(53) = 1.27, p = .208, it was sufficiently 
higher than the slope for participants with HSE (Z = 2.49, p = .006, one tailed).  
Contrary to the hypothesis, self-affirmed participants with LSE showed higher 
intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week compared to their unaffirmed 
counterparts, while self-affirmed people with HSE showed lower intention to use 
sunscreen daily in the following week compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See 
Figure 2.6).  
Regarding the self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction on daily sunscreen use 
intention in the following month, simple slope analyses showed that the slopes of self-
affirmation among participants with HSE (-1SD) and LSE (-1SD) were not statistically 
different from zero (HSE: b = -.750, t(53) = -1.33, p = .190; LSE: b = -.626, t(53) = -1.11, 
p = .270). However, the slope for participants with LSE was sufficiently higher than the 
slope for participants with HSE (Z = 1.73, p = .042, one tailed).  
Contrary to the hypothesis, self-affirmed participants with LSE showed higher 
intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week compared to their unaffirmed 
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counterparts, while self-affirmed people with HSE showed lower intention to use 
sunscreen daily in the following month compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See 
Figure 2.6).  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Self-affirmation x self-esteem effect on intention in the high threat message 
condition 
Left:    Predicted values for intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week among 
self-affirmed and unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and 
high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
Right:  Predicted values for intention to use sunscreen daily in the following month 
among self-affirmed and unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Self-affirm
In
te
n
ti
o
n
 (
N
ex
t 
w
ee
k
) 
Actual Results 
Low SE
High SE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Control Self-affirm
In
te
n
ti
o
n
 (
N
ex
t 
m
o
n
th
) 
Actual Results 
Low SE
High SE
   95 
 
 
Hypothesized results for intention to use sunscreen daily among self-affirmed and 
unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) 
levels of self-esteem (SE) in the high threat message condition 
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Supplementary Analyses 
I hypothesized that self-affirmation will decrease defensiveness toward the 
message and increase attitude and intention toward the recommended behavior among 
people with HSE, and that it would increase defensiveness toward the message and 
decrease attitude and intention toward the recommended behavior among people with 
LSE. However, the results showed that whereas self-affirmation decreased psychological 
discomfort among people with HSE, it also decreased their attitude and intention toward 
sunscreen use. Among people with LSE, self-affirmation increased psychological 
discomfort but also increased their attitude and intention toward sunscreen use. It is 
puzzling yet interesting that the pattern of results on psychological discomfort did not 
reverse on attitude and intention, as defensiveness towards the message should be 
negatively associated with attitude and intention toward the recommended behavior in the 
message. How do we decipher the seemingly contradictory patterns of results on 
psychological discomfort and on attitude and intention? A possible explanation is that the 
psychological discomfort I measured does not indicate defensiveness toward the 
message; therefore the pattern of results on psychological discomfort would be consistent 
with that on attitude and intention. In the following sections, I will evaluate the 
plausibility of this explanation.   
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When Does Psychological Discomfort Indicate Defensiveness? 
Conceptually, psychological discomfort is the proximate outcome when one’s 
sense of self-integrity is threatened. It is triggered by the threat’s undesirable implication 
on the self and it in turn drives the implementation of a strategy that reduces this 
discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994). The logic behind using psychological discomfort as a 
proxy for defensiveness is that when an alternative strategy (e.g., self-affirmation) is not 
available to reduce the discomfort, the individual will resort to reduce perceived threat 
through defensive processing. Therefore, the level of psychological discomfort should 
reflect the level of defensiveness.   
However, a potential methodological issue here is that the psychological 
discomfort I measured right after message exposure may not have captured the 
psychological discomfort that drove defensive processing. The stem of the psychological 
discomfort measure was phrased as “Please indicate how you are feeling right now,” 
therefore it measured the psychological state that was present after message exposure 
rather than the one present during message exposure. Because discomfort will reduce 
once a strategy (e.g., defensive processing) to reduce discomfort is implemented, if 
defensive processing took place during message exposure rather than after message 
exposure, the levels of psychological discomfort I measured after message exposure 
would not reflect the levels of discomfort that drove defensiveness.  
This scenario is plausible because exposure to a health message can initiate 
defensive processing while the person is reading the message and change how the 
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message is processed. Message cues that signal a threat to the self can activate the 
aversive motivational system which is responsible for motivating protection and 
withdrawal behaviors (e.g., Bradley, 1994), and change the allocation of cognitive 
resources in a way that favors the elimination of the perceived threat to the self rather 
than the intake of beneficial health information (Lang, 2000, 2006). In fact, defensive 
processing may even prevent health risk information from being fully encoded (e.g., 
avoidance of attention; Blumberg, 2000). If this is the case, there would not be much 
difference in the levels of psychological discomfort between the self-affirmation and 
control conditions because self-affirmed participants would experience low levels of 
discomfort while unaffirmed participants may reduce discomfort through defensive 
processing. Indeed, there was no difference between the self-affirmation and control 
conditions in the levels of psychological discomfort (MAffirm = 2.82, SDAffirm = 1.42, MCtrl 
= 2.76, SDCtrl = 1.43, t(57) = .156, p = .876).  
Interestingly, the Elliot and Devine (1994) study from which I adopted the 
psychological discomfort measure used the exact same phrase “Please indicate how you 
are feeling right now” as the stem for the measure, and demonstrated differences in 
discomfort levels between dissonance-experiencing participants who were given an 
alternative strategy to reduce discomfort (e.g., an opportunity to change their attitudes) 
and those who were not. So, why did the same measure work in their study but not in 
mine? The reason may lie in the difference in the threats to the self between the two 
studies. My study induced threat to the self through a personally relevant health message 
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while Elliot and Devine (1994) induced threat to the self by leading participants to write a 
counter-attitudinal essay out of their free will. With the same threat to the self 
manipulation as Elliot and Devine (1994), Critcher, Dunning, and Armor (2010) 
demonstrated that defensive processing of this type of threat to the self did not start until 
participants were presented with the defensiveness measure itself.  
Therefore, it is plausible that Elliot and Devine (1994) captured defensiveness 
using the psychological discomfort measure because defensive processing just started 
when participants were presented with the measure, whereas in my study, defensive 
processing might have already taken place before participants were presented with the 
measure, rendering the measure ineffective in capturing defensiveness.  
Willingness to Acknowledge Experiencing Threat? 
If the levels of psychological discomfort I measured do not reflect the levels of 
psychological discomfort that drove defensiveness, then what did I measure with the 
psychological discomfort measure, and how can we understand the self-esteem x self-
affirmation effect on “psychological discomfort”? I speculate that the psychological 
discomfort I measured may have reflected the opposite of defensiveness: willingness to 
acknowledge experiencing a threat to the self. It is likely that those who expressed higher 
levels of discomfort (e.g., feeling uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered) after message 
exposure recognized the negative health impacts of their current behavior (e.g., “I’m 
feeling uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered because I realized that sun overexposure is 
bad for my health and I have not done enough to protect myself from it.”). If this is the 
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case, we should expect psychological discomfort be positively correlated with the self-
directed negative emotions (“I feel disappointed with myself,” “I feel annoyed with 
myself,” and “I feel guilty”) and the self-esteem x self-affirmation effect observed on 
psychological discomfort should be seen on negative self-directed emotions as well.  
Indeed, there was a strong positive correlation between psychological discomfort 
and self-directed negative emotions (r = .621, p = .000). Further supporting my 
speculation, in the high threat condition, a regression analysis with mean centered self-
esteem and dummy-coded self-affirmation at step 1 and self-esteem x self-affirmation 
interaction term at step 2 demonstrated an interaction between self-esteem and self-
affirmation on self-directed negative emotions, ΔR2 = .068, b = -.659, t(55) = -2.16, p = 
.035. Simple slope analyses showed that, similar to what was observed on psychological 
discomfort, among participants with LSE (-1SD), self-affirmation had a positive effect on 
self-directed negative emotions, b = .910, t(55) = 2.00, p = .050. Although the slope for 
participants with HSE (+1SD) was not statistically significantly different from zero, b = -
.491, t(55) = -1.08, p = .286, it was sufficiently lower than the slope for participants with 
LSE (Z = -2.18, p = .015, one tailed). Compared to their unaffirmed counterparts, self-
affirmed participants with LSE (-1SD) showed higher self-directed negative emotions, 
while self-affirmed people with HSE (+1SD) showed lower self-directed negative 
emotions (See Figure 2.7).  
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Figure 2.7 Self-affirmation x self-esteem effect on self-directed negative emotions in the 
high threat message condition  
Predicted values for self-directed negative emotions (Left) and psychological discomfort 
(Right) among self-affirmed and unaffirmed participants with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) in the high threat message 
condition 
 
Taken together, it is reasonable to suggest that the levels of psychological 
discomfort I measured did not accurately reflect the levels of defensiveness; rather, they 
may have reflected individuals’ willingness to acknowledge experiencing a threat to the 
self. In this case, the self-esteem x self-affirmation effect can be understood, such that 
self-affirmation increased the willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat and self-
directed negative emotions among people with LSE, but reduced that willingness among 
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more insecure after health message exposure. In contrast, it reminded people with HSE of 
their relatively high positive self-knowledge and hence made them feeling better about 
themselves after health message exposure.    
If this is the case, then the pattern of self-esteem x self-affirmation effects on 
attitude and intention is in fact theoretically in accord with that on “psychological 
discomfort” and self-directed negative emotions. For participants with LSE, who initially 
had relatively low attitude and intention toward sunscreen use, self-affirmation may have 
made them feel worse about themselves after health message exposure and thus 
motivated them to engage in behavior change (e.g., increased attitude and intention 
toward sunscreen use). On the contrary, for participants with HSE, who initially had 
relatively high attitude and intention toward sunscreen use, self-affirmation may have 
made them feel better about themselves after message exposure and thus reduced their 
motivation to engage in behavior change (e.g., decreased attitude and intention toward 
sunscreen use). 
Discussion 
It was hypothesized that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between people 
with HSE and LSE when a high threat health message is processed. I expected that self-
affirmation decreases defensiveness to the high threat health message (and increase 
message acceptance, attitude, and intention to use sunscreen daily) among participants 
with HSE, but increases defensiveness to the high threat health message (and decrease 
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message acceptance, attitude, and intention to use sunscreen daily) among participants 
with LSE.  
Partially confirming the hypothesis, the results showed that in the high threat 
condition, self-affirmation increased psychological discomfort among participants with 
LSE but decreased it among participants with HSE. There was no interaction between 
self-esteem and self-affirmation on the rest of the defensiveness indicators or on any of 
the message acceptance indicators. Surprisingly, contrary to the hypothesis, self-
affirmation increased attitude and intention to use sunscreen daily in the following week 
among participants with LSE but decreased attitude and intention to use sunscreen daily 
in the following week among participants with HSE (See Table 2.13).  
However, because the psychological discomfort measure assessed the 
psychological state after message exposure rather than during the message exposure, it 
may have not accurately reflected defensiveness. Rather, it may have reflected 
participants’ willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat.  
 
Table 2.13 Summary of Study 1 Findings 
Hypotheses Results 
· Self-affirmation decreases 
defensiveness among 
people with HSE but 
increases it among people 
with LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· High threat: Self-affirmation 
decreased psychological discomfort 
among people with HSE but 
increased it among people with LSE 
· High threat: Self-affirmation 
increased anger regardless of self-
esteem levels; People with HSE 
showed higher anger than people 
with LSE, regardless of self-
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affirmation  
· Self-affirmation increases 
message acceptance 
among people with HSE 
but decreases it among 
people with LSE 
Not supported 
· No change on message acceptance 
indicators 
· Self-affirmation increases 
attitude and intention 
among people with HSE 
but decreases them among 
people with LSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Low threat: Self-affirmation 
decreased attitude regardless of self-
esteem levels; People with HSE 
showed higher daily sunscreen use 
intention than people with LSE 
regardless of self-affirmation  
· High threat: Self-affirmation 
decreased attitude and intention 
among people with HSE but 
increased it among people with LSE 
 
In conclusion, Study 1 showed that self-affirmation increased psychological 
discomfort, self-directed negative emotions, attitude, and intention among participants 
with LSE, but decreased psychological discomfort, self-directed negative emotions, 
attitude, and intention among participants with HSE. If high levels of psychological 
discomfort in this study reflected higher willingness to acknowledge experiencing a 
threat to the self rather than higher defensiveness, the findings suggest that, for people 
with LSE, although self-affirmation may make them feeling worse about themselves, 
these people may be more likely to engage in behavior change as a result of self-
affirmation. However, for people with HSE, although self-affirmation may make them 
feeling better about themselves, these people may be less motivated to engage in behavior 
change as a result of self-affirmation.     
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2 – ADEQUACY OF THE AFFIRMED SELF 
Abstract 
The present study tested whether the adequacy of the affirmed self achieved 
through self-affirmation manipulation determines when self-affirmation benefits people 
with HSE versus LSE. It was expected that affirming a value less important than the 
aspect of self threatened by a message increases defensive processing among people with 
LSE but not HSE, while affirming a value more important than the aspect of self 
threatened by a message reduces defensive processing among people with LSE but not 
HSE. In addition, affirming a wide range of values is expected to decrease defensive 
processing for people with HSE but increase defensive processing among people with 
LSE.  
Data on flossing from 294 U.S. adults showed that affirming one cherished value, 
regardless of its self-importance in relation to the aspect of self being threatened in the 
message, did not produce differential self-affirmation effects for people with HSE and 
LSE. Affirming a wide range of values, however, increased perceived manipulation 
among people with LSE but not HSE. This effect did not carry over to message 
acceptance, attitude, or intention. In fact, affirming a wide range of values reduced daily 
flossing intention among people with HSE, but not among people with LSE.  
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Introduction 
The adequacy of people’s sense of the self achieved through the self-affirmation 
manipulation may further determine when self-affirmation benefits people with HSE 
versus LSE. I propose that the type of self-affirmation manipulation may determine the 
extent to which a person’s sense of self-integrity is secured (i.e., the adequacy of the 
affirmed self) and hence determine how people with HSE and LSE would benefit from 
self-affirmation. 
Writing an essay about a cherished value (e.g., essay affirmation manipulation) 
directs one’s attention to a specific aspect of the self and brings to mind relevant life 
scenarios and memories. However, going through a wide range of values (e.g., scale 
affirmation manipulation) or reflect on one’s global self-evaluation draws one’s attention 
to a wide variety of aspects of the self. This may bring to mind not only the proudest 
moments in life but also the unsatisfactory ones. 
For people with LSE, who usually think they perform poorly in most aspects of 
their lives, unsatisfactory moments may be much more frequent and salient in their lives 
than the proud ones. Therefore, reflecting on a wide range of values may not be able to 
secure a sense of self-integrity for people with LSE, but may make them aware of the 
unsatisfactory moments in life and thus leading to increased defensiveness. On the 
contrary, reflecting on one specific cherished value may be able to secure the sense of 
self-integrity for people with LSE because it temporarily directs people’s attention to 
their proudest memories only. However, when essay affirmation can achieve an adequate 
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sense of self for people with LSE may be determined by the self-importance of the 
affirmed value in relation to the importance of the aspect of self threatened. If the value 
affirmed is more self-important than the aspect of self being threatened, completing the 
self-affirmation task can achieve an adequate sense of self for people with LSE and thus 
buffer the threat from the message and leading to lower defensiveness. However, if the 
value affirmed is less self-important than the aspect of self being threatened, just like 
affirming a wide range of values, completing the self-affirmation task cannot achieve an 
adequate sense of self for people with LSE, and thus may increase defensiveness.  
For people with HSE, who usually think they perform well in most aspects of 
their lives, proud moments may be much more frequent and salient in their lives than the 
unsatisfactory ones. Therefore, reflecting on a wide range of values will secure a sense of 
self-integrity for people with HSE and thus leading to decreased defensiveness. However, 
reflecting on one specific cherished value only makes salient one positive aspect of self. 
For people with HSE, this may not add much extra goodness to their existing positive 
self-evaluations but will not bring down their self-evaluations either. Therefore, it is 
expected that for people with HSE, affirming one cherished value, regardless of its self-
importance in relation to that of the aspect of self threatened, will not result in much 
change in terms of defensiveness, compared with their unaffirmed counterparts. 
In conclusion, affirming a value more important than the one threatened may 
bring people with LSE in line with people with HSE by achieving an adequate sense of 
self for people with LSE. On the contrary, reflecting on a range of values or on one’s 
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global self-evaluation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and LSE as it 
boosts the self-regards of people with HSE but reminds people with LSE that their proud 
moments are scarce. Specifically, it is hypothesized that affirming a value that is less 
important than the aspect of self threatened increases defensiveness towards the health 
message and decreases message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with 
LSE, but not among people with HSE. In addition, affirming a value that is more 
important than the aspect of self that is threatened in the message decreases defensiveness 
towards the health message and increases message acceptance, attitude, and intention 
among people with LSE, but not among people with HSE. Last, affirming a wide range of 
values increases defensiveness toward the health message and decreases message 
acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with LSE, but decreases defensiveness 
and increases message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with HSE (See 
Figure 3.1).   
I chose daily flossing as the behavior for this study, because flossing is more 
universally relevant compared to the sunscreen use behavior in Study 1. Flossing 
behavior is less likely to be influenced by environmental factors that people have no 
control over (e.g., the need to use sunscreen is influenced by UV radiation amount) and 
have fewer behavioral substitutes than sunscreen use (e.g., sunscreen use can be 
substituted by protective clothing, shade, etc.). 
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Figure 3.1 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior 
 
 
  
Health 
Msg 
Affirm a Less 
Important Value 
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LSE ↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance, 
↓ Att & Int 
No Change  
: 
Health 
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HSE 
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↑ Msg Acceptance, 
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: 
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disparities between HSE and LSE 
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Method 
Participants 
In Study 2, I recruited a U.S. adult sample from the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) panel. An MTurk sample consists of people who join the MTurk platform to 
perform human intelligence tasks (e.g., transcribing handwriting, classifying pictures) in 
exchange for monetary incentives. To conduct a study using an MTurk sample, the 
researcher needs to create a Requester account on MTurk, post a Human Intelligence 
Task (HIT) that describes the study and the compensation to be paid, and then allow 
workers to accept the HIT and complete the study. The researcher can set eligibility 
requirements so that only workers who meet the requirements can participate.  
My major reason for choosing a MTurk sample instead of a college student 
sample is because a MTurk sample is more heterogeneous in terms of age, racial 
background, education level, and socioeconomic status, and is more representative of the 
U.S. population (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), compared to a college student sample. 
College students are a homogenous and unusual population. They are WEIRD (i.e., 
Westernized, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010) and have good health status in general. College students may hold 
health beliefs and behaviors that are very different from other adults in the general 
population (e.g., less concerned about health risks than older adults). Therefore, a college 
student sample may yield treatment effects different from what would be observed in the 
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general population. The goal of the present research is to uncover psychological 
mechanisms underlying people’s responses to health messages and to inform the 
development of public health interventions. Therefore, it is important to use a sample that 
consists of people that would be the intended audiences of such public health 
interventions. 
A sample of 422 U.S. adults was recruited from the MTurk to participate in Study 
2. A total of 294 participants completed both a pre-study questionnaire and the main 
study two weeks after (retention rate: 70.4%). The ages of participants ranged from 18 to 
75 years with an average age of 39.07 (Median = 34; SD = 14.18), and 59.5% of 
participants were female (n = 175). A total of 79.9% of participants were White (n = 
235), 7.5% were Black (n = 22), 4.8% were Hispanic or Latino (n = 14), 4.4% were 
Asian (n = 13), and 3.4% were multiracial or other (n = 10) (See Appendix A.2 for sample 
characteristics). 
Design and Procedure 
A 4 (Self-affirmation task: essay affirmation 1, essay affirmation 2, scale 
affirmation, no affirmation) by 2 (Autonomy threat: low, high) between-subjects factorial 
experiment was conducted online. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
eight conditions. Two weeks before the main study, all participants completed a pre-study 
questionnaire that included the Rosenberg Self-esteem (1965) scale, measures of 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency, flossing behavior history, and demographics 
information.  
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The essay affirmation 1 and essay affirmation 2 conditions both used an essay 
task, but differed in whether the value that participants affirmed was more or less 
important than the value of autonomy. Specifically, in the essay affirmation 1 condition 
the values listed for people to choose from were less important than autonomy, and in the 
essay affirmation 2 condition, the values listed for people to choose from were equally or 
more important than autonomy. The relative importance of the values provided in the 
essay affirmation conditions was determined two weeks before the study when 
participants ranked the perceived importance of 18 human values from the Rokeach 
Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973). To clarify their meaning, each value was followed by a 
bracket containing two synonyms or brief descriptions (e.g., “Capable [competent, 
effective]”, “Independent [free from outside control, autonomous]”). During the main 
study two weeks later, participants in the essay affirmation 1 condition were presented 
with a list of those values they had ranked as less important than “Independent 
(autonomous)” and participants in the essay affirmation 2 condition were presented with 
a list of those values they had ranked as equally or more important than “Independent 
(autonomous).” In both essay affirmation conditions, participants were asked to rank the 
presented values in terms of their importance and write a short essay about the value that 
they ranked as the most important. As in study 1, participants were instructed to write 
about why the particular value was important to them, and how they had used it in life 
(Harris & Napper, 2005).  
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In the scale self-affirmation condition, participants completed the self-affirmation 
scale that was developed by Napper, Harris, and Epton (2009) using statements from the 
Values in Action Strengths scale (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Participants were asked to 
indicate to what extent each of 32 statements described them (e.g., “My friends value my 
good judgment,” “I must stand up for what I believe in, even in the face of strong 
opposition”). The questionnaire was designed to focus people’s minds on their important 
values rather than assess the strength of the values the statements represent. Last, the no 
affirmation condition served as a control condition. In this control condition participants 
were asked to write about the shops and buildings they saw on a route that they traveled 
regularly (Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009). 
After finishing the assigned self-affirmation task or the control task, participants 
read one of two messages recommending daily flossing that varied in terms of the level 
of threat to autonomy (i.e., the presence of forceful vs. polite language). Last, participants 
filled out a questionnaire that included measures of key variables of interest. 
Stimuli 
To develop stimuli for study 2, information from the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) was used to create content for two messages about daily flossing. 
The messages were comprised of a brief introduction, a middle section, and a conclusion. 
The middle section described the benefits of daily flossing, the harmful consequences of 
poor oral health, and statistics on gum disease prevalence in the U.S. The conclusion 
section summarized the benefits of flossing and recommended flossing daily. Aesthetic 
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elements were added to make the messages look like real health messages that people 
may see in the media environment.  
Similar to study 1, autonomy threat in the messages was manipulated by using 
controlling language to recommend daily flossing, or, alternatively, using polite, non-
coercive language. The high autonomy threat message contained controlling terms such 
as ‘‘should’’ and ‘‘have to’’ and included phrases such as “You have to admit that,” 
“You simply have to do it,” and “You do not have a choice.” The low autonomy threat 
message contained non-coercive terms such as “may’’ and “would” and included 
autonomy-supportive phrases such as “It would be a good idea,” “The choice is yours,” 
and “Now might be a good time to give it a try.”  
A pilot test was conducted to examine whether the messages can successfully 
manipulate perceived autonomy threat. A total of 53 U.S. adults recruited from the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk panel were randomly assigned to two message conditions. A 
total of 24 participants read the high autonomy threat message and 29 participants read 
the low autonomy threat message. After reading the messages, participants answered 
manipulation check questions that assessed their perceptions of autonomy threat.  
As in study 1, the perceived autonomy threat manipulation check comprised of 
eight 7-point items based on Dillard and Shen (2005), with four items adapted from the 
original Dillard and Shen measure (e.g., “The message tried to make a decision for me”) 
and four items created specifically for the flossing behavior (e.g., “The message tried to 
restrict my freedom over flossing”; α = .906). The result showed that the manipulation 
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was successful. The high threat message induced higher levels of perceived autonomy 
threat (M = 4.47, SD = 1.59) than the low threat message (M = 2.82, SD = .1.11), d = 
1.20, t(40) = -4.29, p = .000.  
The pilot-tested messages were used in study 2 as stimuli. Participants assigned to 
the high autonomy threat condition read the message that contained controlling language 
and participants assigned to the low autonomy threat message read the message that 
contained non-coercive, polite language. Participants completed the perceived autonomy 
threat manipulation check after they finished reading the message (See Figure 3.2 and 
Figure 3.3 for the messages).  
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Figure 3.2 Low autonomy threat flossing message 
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Figure 3.3 High autonomy threat flossing message 
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Key Measures  
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965). 
Participants responded to ten 7-point scale items, such as “On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself,” “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others,” 
and “I wish I could have more respect for myself” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”). Five items were reverse scored. Participants’ average scores of the ten 
items were used as the indicator of self-esteem (α = .938; M = 5.34, SD = 1.28).  
Indicators of Defensive Processing  
Because Study 2 was conducted before data analysis of Study 1 had been 
concluded, the same Psychological Discomfort measure was used in Study 2. As 
discussed in Study 1, measuring psychological discomfort after message exposure may 
not capture the psychological state that drove defensive processing but may reflect 
people’s willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat to the self. Therefore, we should 
be open to the possibility that psychological discomfort data may reflect the opposite of 
defensiveness: willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat. For consistency purposes, 
I will continue to label this measure as “psychological discomfort.”   
Same as in Study 1, psychological discomfort was measured with three 7-point 
scale items adapted from Elliot and Devine (1994). “I feel uncomfortable,” “I feel 
uneasy,” and “I feel bothered” followed the stem “Please indicate how you are feeling 
right now” (1 = “None of this feeling” – 7 = “A great deal of this feeling”). The mean of 
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the three items was used as the composite score for psychological discomfort (α = .89; M 
= 2.18, SD = 1.43). 
 Anger was measured with three 7-point scale items “I feel annoyed,” “I feel 
irritated,” and “I feel angry” (M = 1.92, SD = 1.24). To reduce experimental demand 
concerns, I included additional items to measure self-directed negative emotions (“I feel 
disappointed with myself,” “I feel annoyed with myself,” and “I feel guilty”; α = .920; M 
= 2.47, SD = 1.68) and self-directed positive emotions (“I feel confident” and “I feel 
good about myself”; r = .772; M = 4.48, SD = 1.68).       
Message skepticism was measured with the 7-point scale item “While reading 
the message, I was skeptical of what was being said” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”; M = 2.56, SD = 1.57). 
Given that the affective response measures (e.g., psychological discomfort and 
anger) are prone to floor effects and thus may not sufficiently capture defensiveness, two 
validated measures of defensive responses to message stimuli (Witte, 1991, 1994), i.e., 
message derogation and perceived manipulation, were added to provide more information 
on defensiveness and to triangulate the results obtained from the former three measures. 
Message derogation has been used in previous self-affirmation research to measure 
defensiveness to health messages as well (e.g., Jessop, Simmonds, & Sparks, 2009; van 
Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009).  
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Message derogation was measured with four 7-point scale items: “The 
information in the message was exaggerated,” “The information in the message was 
distorted,” “The information in the message was overstated,” and “The information in the 
message was overblown” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”). The mean of 
the four items was used as the composite score for message derogation (α = .948, M = 
2.75, SD = 1.48). 
Perceived manipulation was measured with three 7-point scale items: “The 
message made me feel manipulated,” “The message made me feel exploited,” and “The 
message deliberately tried to manipulate my feelings” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”). The mean of the three items was used as the composite score for 
perceived manipulation (α = .887, M = 3.07, SD = 1.61). 
Indicators of Message Acceptance 
A 7-item bipolar semantic differential scale (1 – 7) adopted from Yzer et al., 
(2011) was used to measure message acceptance. The stem phrase “To me, the message 
was:” was anchored with seven word pairs. The first four items, “extremely unconvincing 
– extremely convincing,” “extremely unbelievable – extremely believable,” “extremely 
forgettable – extremely memorable,” and “extremely bad – extremely good,” measured 
perceived convincingness (α = .813, M = 5.42, SD = 1.11). The fifth and sixth items, 
“extremely unpleasant – extremely pleasant” and “extremely negative – extremely 
positive” measured perceived pleasantness (r = .673, M = 4.72, SD = 1.35). The last 
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item, “extremely not meant for someone like me – extremely meant for someone like 
me,” measured perceived relevance (M = 4.99, SD = 1.66). 
Daily Flossing Attitude and Intention 
Ten 7-point bipolar semantic differential items were used to measure attitude: 
“Flossing my teeth every day is: “unpleasant – pleasant”, “unenjoyable – enjoyable”, 
“stressful – relaxing”, “frightening – assuring”, “difficult – easy”, “negative – positive”, 
“bad – good”, “harmful – beneficial”, “foolish – wise” and “unnecessary – necessary.” 
Participants’ average scores of the ten items were used as the indicator of attitude towards 
daily flossing (α = .896, M = 5.52, SD = 0.93).  
Four 7-point scale items were used to measure intention to floss daily: “How 
likely is it that you will floss every day? (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”)”, “I 
can see myself flossing every day,” “I will floss every day,” and “I intend to floss every 
day” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”). The average score of the four 
items was used as the overall measure of intention (α = .967, M = 5.06, SD = 1.72).  
Three additional intention measures with time frames were used to examine 
whether people’s intentions to floss daily would differ when a specific temporal context 
is added. Intention to floss daily in the following week was measured by a 7-point scale 
item – “How likely is it that you will floss every day in the following week?” (1 = “Very 
unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 5.04, SD = 1.95). Intention to floss daily in the 
following month was measured by a 7-point scale item – “How likely is it that you will 
floss every day in the following month?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 
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4.74, SD = 2.05). Intention to floss daily in next three months was measured by a 7-
point scale item – “How likely is it that you will floss every day in the next three 
months?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 4.51, SD = 2.17).  
Control Variables 
Recent work suggests that people may naturally reflect on their values or 
strengths in the face of a threat and this tendency to spontaneously self-affirm has been 
associated with outcomes similar to that of experimentally induced self-affirmation (e.g., 
Emanuel et al., 2016; Ferrer et al., 2015). Two weeks before the main study, participants’ 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency was measured with two 7-point scale items 
developed by Harris et al. (2011): “When I feel threatened or anxious I find myself 
thinking about my strengths” and “When I feel threatened or anxious I find myself 
thinking about what I stand for” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”; r = 
.598, M = 4.48, SD = 1.42). Despite randomized participant assignment, the distribution 
of spontaneous self-affirmation tendency varied across the experimental self-affirmation 
conditions, F(3, 286) = 3.13, p = .026, η2 = .031. To determine whether it was necessary 
to control spontaneous self-affirmation tendency in the analyses to reduce possible 
confounding effect, I examined the correlations between spontaneous self-affirmation 
tendency and the dependent variables within each experimental condition. Because 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency was correlated with psychological discomfort, 
anger, all message acceptance measures, and attitude and intention (See Table 3.1), it was 
included as a control variable in analyses on these dependent variables.  
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It is conceivable that, regardless of self-affirmation manipulation, people who 
currently floss daily might report lower defensiveness, higher message acceptance, and 
more favorable attitude and higher intention regarding flossing because the health 
message was consistent with their current position on flossing. Therefore, I also included 
flossing behavior history as a potential control variable. I measured participants’ flossing 
behavior history with two questions two weeks before the main study: “How often did 
you floss last week?” (1 = “Never” – 7 = “Every day”) and “How often did you floss last 
month?” (1 = “Never” – 5 = “Every day”). Responses to the 5-point scale item were 
converted to 7-point (Min = 1, Max = 7). The mean of the two items (r = .914, M = 3.87, 
SD = 2.29) was used as an indicator of flossing history. Because flossing history was 
moderately correlated with all defensiveness indicators, perceived pleasantness, and 
attitude and intention (See Table 3.2), flossing history was entered as a control variable in 
analyses on these dependent variables.  
 
Table 3.1 Bivariate Correlations between Spontaneous Self-Affirmation Tendency and 
Dependent and Independent Variables by Experimental Condition 
 Control Essay Affirm 1 Essay Affirm 2 Scale Affirm 
Threat Level Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Self-esteem  .42*  .02  .48*  .74*  .31*  .51*  .31†  .08 
Discomfort -.12  .08  .05 -.42*  .18  .08  .14  .17 
Anger  .04  .00  .23 -.45**  .17  .16  .24  .32† 
Skepticism  .01  .16  .24  .02  .08 -.22  .08 -.02 
Derogation -.05  .23  .21 -.08 -.06 -.19 -.04  .06 
Perc. Manipul.  .08  .00  .26 -.23  .11  .06  .04  .09 
Perc. Conv.  .01 -.13 -.13  .19  .07  .32*  .26† -.13 
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Perc. Plea.   .04 -.05 -.15  .47**  .26  .15  .22  .09 
Perc. Relev.  .04 -.02  .07  .09  .27  .39*  .35* -.09 
Attitude -.26  .07  .08  .51**  .21 -.14  .00  .07 
Intention -.24 -.18 -.14  .69*** -.05  .18 -.16  .02 
Int (Nxt Wk) -.29† -.17 -.03  .57*** -.02  .18 -.12  .05 
Int (Nxt  Mo) -.20 -.16 -.08  .61***  .00  .12 -.12  .21 
Int (Nxt 3 Mo) -.18 -.12  .00  .61*** -.04  .06 -.13  .26 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manipul. refers to perceived 
manipulation. Perc. Conv. refers to perceived convincingness. Perc. Plea. refers to 
perceived pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to perceived relevance. Int refers to Intention.  
 
Table 3.2 Bivariate Correlations between Current Flossing Behavior and Dependent and 
Independent Variables by Experimental Condition 
 Control Essay Affirm 1 Essay Affirm 2 Scale Affirm 
Threat Level Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Self-esteem  .28†  .08 -.00  .56***  .18  .25  .16 -.03 
Discomfort -.52** -.32* -.37* -.36* -.33* -.27† -.11 -.32† 
Anger -.37* -.23 -.38* -.37* -.33* -.38* -.10 -.23 
Skepticism -.02 -.33* -.29 -.16 -.09 -.26 -.21 -.33† 
Derogation -.08 -.26 -.26 -.15 -.09 -.24 -.31* -.22 
Perc. Manipul. -.12 -.42** -.39* -.25 -.25 -.21 -.22 -.16 
Perc. Conv.  .12  .07  .26  .21 -.06 -.01 -.03  .09 
Perc. Plea.   .20  .22  .37*  .46**  .09 -.01 -.15 -.00 
Perc. Relev. -.12 -.02  .11  .05 -.06 -.05 -.20 -.07 
Attitude  .31†  .60***  .45**  .53**  .38*  .50**  .46**  .55** 
Intention  .55***  .63***  .62***  .70***  .80***  .77***  .62***  .76*** 
Int (Nxt Wk)  .54**  .63***  .58***  .68***  .71***  .74***  .65***  .68*** 
Int (Nxt  Mo)  .50**  .66***  .65***  .63***  .75***  .73***  .59***  .74*** 
Int (Nxt 3 Mo)  .49**  .66***  .59***  .68***  .75***  .73***  .52***  .76*** 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manipul. refers to perceived 
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manipulation. Perc. Conv. refers to perceived convincingness. Perc. Plea. refers to 
perceived pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to perceived relevance. Int refers to Intention.  
 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
The effectiveness of the stimuli in inducing high versus low levels of autonomy 
threat was confirmed with the perceived autonomy threat manipulation check (α = .926; 
See p.110 for scale items). The high threat message induced higher levels of perceived 
autonomy threat (M = 4.32, SD = 1.54) than the low threat message (M = 2.93, SD = 
1.17), d = 1.02, t(292) = -8.73, p = .000. 
To test whether the self-affirmation manipulation led participants to reflect on 
aspects of the self that are important and positive, manipulation check questions adopted 
from Napper, Epton, and Harris (2009) were used. The stem “The task made me think 
about …” was followed by three 7-point (1 – 7) bipolar semantic differential scale items 
“negative aspects of myself – Positive aspects of myself,” “Things that are not important 
to me – Things that are important to me,” and “Things I don’t like about myself – Things 
I like about myself.” The mean score of the three items was used (α = .853, M = 5.33, SD 
= 1.42).  
An ANCOVA analysis with self-affirmation conditions as the independent 
variable and spontaneous self-affirmation tendency as a covariate showed that 
participants in the self-affirmation conditions thought the self-affirmation task led them 
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to think about things that are important and positive about themselves to a greater extent 
than people in the control condition (F(3, 289) = 25.73, p = .000, η2 = .199). Also, more 
people in the essay self-affirmation 2 condition reported that they thought about 
important and positive things about themselves (i.e., percentage of scores greater than 
midpoint “4”) than those in the essay self-affirmation 1 or those in the scale self-
affirmation condition (See Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Self-Affirmation Manipulation Check Results 
Condition n M (SE) % of scores > midpoint “4” 
Essay affirmation 1 68 5.65 (0.15) 85.3 
Essay affirmation 2 73 5.95 (0.15) 90.4 
Scale affirmation  76 5.51 (0.14) 80.3 
Control  77 4.29 (0.14) 55.5 
 
Data Analysis Strategy 
It was hypothesized that affirming a value that is less important than the one 
threatened (i.e., Essay affirmation 1 condition) increases the defensive responses towards 
the high threat health message, decreases message acceptance, attitude, and intention 
among people with LSE, but not among people with HSE. To test the hypothesis, the 
responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the essay affirmation 1 condition were 
compared with the responses of those in the control condition.  
In addition, it was hypothesized that affirming a value that is more important than 
the one threatened (i.e., Essay affirmation 2 condition) decreases the defensive responses 
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towards the high threat health message, increases message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention among people with LSE, but less so or not at all among people with HSE. To 
test the hypothesis, the responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the essay 
affirmation 2 condition were compared with the responses of those in the control 
condition.  
Last, it was hypothesized that affirming a wide range of values (i.e., Scale 
affirmation condition) increases the defensive responses toward the high threat health 
message, decreases message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with LSE, 
but decreases the defensive responses toward the high threat health message, increases 
message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with HSE. To test the 
hypothesis, the responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the scale affirmation 
condition were compared with the responses of those in the control condition.   
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with indicators of 
defensiveness, message acceptance, attitude, and intention regarding flossing daily as the 
dependent variables. Two regression models were built for the low and high threat 
conditions for each dependent variable. Three dummy-coded condition variables were 
constructed to represent the self-affirmation conditions (i.e., Essay Affirm 1, Essay 
Affirm 2, Scale Affirm; See Table 3.4). The control condition was used as a reference 
group and thus was coded as “0” in all three condition variables. Three two-way 
interaction terms were built by multiplying self-esteem with each condition variable (i.e., 
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Self-esteem x Essay Affirm 1, Self-esteem x Essay Affirm 2, and Self-esteem x Scale 
Affirm). 
 
Table 3.4 Dummy Coded Self-affirmation Condition Variables 
 Dummy-coding of condition variables 
Conditions Essay Affirm 1 Essay Affirm 2 Scale Affirm  
Essay affirmation 1  1 0 0 
Essay affirmation 2  0 1 0 
Scale affirmation  0 0 1 
Control  0 0 0 
 
In the regression models for psychological discomfort, anger, perceived 
pleasantness, attitude, and all four intention measures, I entered the mean-centered 
current flossing behavior and spontaneous self-affirmation tendency at step 1 as control 
variables. At step 2, I entered mean-centered self-esteem and the three dummy-coded 
self-affirmation condition variables. At step 3, I entered the three two-way interaction 
terms.  
In the regression models for message skepticism, message derogation, and 
perceived manipulation, I entered the mean-centered current flossing behavior at step 1 
as a control variable. At step 2, I entered mean-centered self-esteem and the three 
dummy-coded self-affirmation condition variables. At step 3, I entered the three two-way 
interaction terms.  
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In the regression models for perceived convincingness and perceived relevance, I 
entered the mean-centered spontaneous self-affirmation tendency at step 1 as a control 
variable. At step 2, I entered mean-centered self-esteem and the three dummy-coded self-
affirmation condition variables. At step 3, I entered the three two-way interaction terms.  
The proposed effects would be indicated by interactions between the self-
affirmation condition variables and self-esteem in the high threat message condition. An 
interaction between Essay Affirm 1 and self-esteem means that the effect of essay 
affirmation 1 task is different for people with HSE and LSE. Similarly, an interaction 
between Essay Affirm 2 and self-esteem means that the effect of essay affirmation 2 task 
is different for people with HSE and LSE. Last, an interaction between Scale Affirm and 
self-esteem means that the effect of scale affirmation task is different for people with 
HSE and LSE.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics of dependent and independent 
variables are reported in Table 3.5 to Table 3.10. 
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Outline of Results 
Overall, regression analyses revealed interactions between self-esteem and self-
affirmation in the high threat condition on perceived manipulation and intention when the 
scale affirmation condition was compared to the control condition. No self-affirmation x 
self-esteem interaction was found when the essay affirmation 1 and essay affirmation 2 
conditions were compared to the control condition and no interaction was found when the 
essay affirmation 1 condition was compared to the essay affirmation 2 condition, either 
(See Table 3.11 for results outline).  
Given the complexity of the research design, I will present the results in three 
sections based on the category of the dependent variable, namely, (1) effects on 
indicators of defensiveness, (1) effects on indicators of message acceptance, and (3) 
effects on attitude and intention. Next, supplemental analyses will be provided to aid 
further understanding the findings.    
 
Table 3.11 Outline of Study 2 Results 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort - 
Low threat: Scale Aff (+),  
SE (-); 
High threat: SE (-) 
Anger - 
Low threat: Scale Aff (+),  
SE (-); 
High threat: SE (-) 
Skepticism - Low threat: Scale Aff (-) 
Derogation - - 
Perc. Manip. High threat: Scale Aff x SE Low threat: Essay Aff 1 (-) 
Indicators of Perc. Conv. - - 
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Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Pleas. - High threat: Scale Aff (-) 
Perc. Relev. - Low threat: Scale Aff (+) 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude 
Low threat: Scale Aff x SE, 
Essay Aff 2 x SE  
- 
Intention  High threat: Scale Aff xSE Low threat: Essay Aff 1 (+) 
Int (Nxt wk) High threat: Scale Aff x SE Low threat: Essay Aff 1 (+) 
Int (Nxt mo) High threat: SE x Scale Aff Low threat: Essay Aff 1 (+) 
Int (Nxt 3 
mo) 
High threat: SE x Scale Aff Low threat: Essay Aff 1 (+) 
Note. Discomfort refers to Psychological Discomfort. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manip. refers to Perceived 
Manipulation. Perc. Conv. refers to Perceived Convincingness. Perc. Pleas. refers to 
Perceived Pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to Perceived Relevance. Int refers to 
Intention.  
 
1. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Defensiveness 
Psychological Discomfort 
Low Threat Condition. No interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation 
was found. There was no main effect of self-esteem either. However, there was a main 
effect of Scale Affirm, ΔR2Step 2 = .129, b = .639, t(139) = 2.22, p = .028. This means that 
participants who affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed higher 
levels of psychological discomfort than participants in other self-affirmation/control 
conditions, regardless of their self-esteem levels.  
Also, there was a main effect of self-esteem, b = -.364, t(139) = -3.97, p = .000 . 
This means that participants with HSE expressed lower levels of psychological 
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discomfort than participants with LSE regardless of whether they were self-affirmed or 
not (See Table 3.12 for regression analysis results). 
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-affirmation either. 
However, there was a main effect of self-esteem, ΔR2Step 2 = .095, b = -.363, t(141) = -
3.87, p = .000 (See Table 3.13 for regression analysis results). This means that 
participants with HSE expressed lower levels of psychological discomfort than 
participants with LSE regardless of whether they were self-affirmed or not. 
Anger 
Low Threat Condition. No interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation 
was found. There was no main effect of self-esteem either. However, there was a main 
effect of Scale Affirm, ΔR2Step 2 = .124, b = .491, t(139) = 2.06, p = .042. This means that 
participants who affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed higher 
levels of anger than participants in other self-affirmation/control conditions, regardless of 
their self-esteem levels. Also, there was a main effect of self-esteem, b = -.285, t(139) = -
3.75, p = .000. This means that participants with HSE expressed lower levels of anger 
than participants with LSE regardless of whether they were self-affirmed or not (See 
Table 3.12 for regression analysis results). 
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-affirmation either. 
However, there was a main effect of self-esteem, ΔR2Step 2 = .076, b = -.305, t(141) = -
   141 
 
3.51, p = .001. This means that participants with HSE expressed lower levels of anger 
than participants with LSE regardless of whether they were self-affirmed or not (See 
Table 3.13 for regression analysis results).   
Message Skepticism 
Low Threat Condition. No interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation 
was found. There was no main effect of self-esteem either. However, there was a main 
effect of Scale Affirm, ΔR2Step 2 = .081, b = -.538, t(140) = -2.00, p = .048. This means 
that participants who affirmed a wide range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed 
lower levels of message skepticism than unaffirmed participants, regardless of their self-
esteem levels (See Table 3.12 for regression analysis results).    
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem or self-affirmation 
either (See Table 3.13 for regression analysis results).   
Message Derogation 
Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation was found in 
either high or low threat condition. There was no main effect of self-esteem or self-
affirmation, either (See Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 for regression analysis results).  
Perceived manipulation 
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction effect of self-esteem x self-
affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem either. However, there 
   142 
 
was a main effect of Essay Affirm 1, ΔR2Step 2 = .035, b = -.602, t(140) = -1.98, p = .049 
(See Table 3.12 for regression analysis results). This means that participants who 
affirmed a value less important than “independent (autonomous)” expressed lower levels 
of perceived manipulation than participants in other self-affirmation/control conditions, 
regardless of their self-esteem levels.  
High Threat Condition. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction on 
perceived manipulation between Scale Affirm and self-esteem, ΔR2Step 3 = .047, b = -
.618, t(140) = -1.98, p = .049 (See Table 3.13 for regression analysis results). Simple 
slope analysis showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming a range of 
values had a positive effect on perceived manipulation, b = 1.546, t(140) = 2.76, p = .007. 
However, among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a range of values had no 
effect on perceived manipulation, b = -.028, t(140) = -.051, p = .959.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a 
range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed higher levels of perceived manipulation 
than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range 
of values showed no change on perceived manipulation compared to their unaffirmed 
counterparts (See Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4 Scale Affirm x self-esteem effect on perceived manipulation in the high threat 
message condition  
Left:    Predicted values for perceived manipulation among participants who affirmed a 
range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and unaffirmed participants 
(i.e., Control condition) with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above 
the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
Right:  Hypothesized results for defensiveness among participants who affirmed a range 
of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and unaffirmed participants (i.e., 
Control condition) with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the 
mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
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2. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Message Acceptance 
Perceived Convincingness 
Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation was found in 
either high or low threat condition. There was no main effect of self-esteem or self-
affirmation, either (See Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 for regression analysis results).  
Perceived Pleasantness 
Low Threat Condition. No interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation 
was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem or self-affirmation either (See 
Table 3.14 for regression analysis results).  
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem either. However, 
there was a main effect of Scale Affirm, ΔR2Step 2 = .037, b = -.770, t(141) = -2.31, p = 
.023 (See Table 3.15 for regression analysis results). This means that participants who 
affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed lower levels of perceived 
pleasantness than participants in other self-affirmation/control conditions, regardless of 
their self-esteem levels.  
 
 
 
 
   147 
 
Perceived Relevance 
Low Threat Condition. No interaction effect of self-esteem x self-affirmation 
was found. There was no main effect of self-esteem either. However, there was a main 
effect of Scale Affirm, ΔR2Step 2 = .048, b = .632, t(140) = 1.84, p = .067 (See Table 3.14 
for regression analysis results). This means that participants who affirmed a range of 
values (i.e., Scale affirmation) expressed higher levels of perceived relevance than 
participants in other self-affirmation/control conditions, regardless of their self-esteem 
levels.  
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem or self-affirmation 
either (See Table 3.15 for regression analysis results). 
 
Table 3.14 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables in the Low Threat Condition 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
n = 146    b SE      b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 5.51*** .16   5.22*** .19  4.88*** .25 
Flossing Behavior    -  -     .06 .05     -  - 
Spon. Self-Affirm.   .03 .06     .07 .08    .26** .10 
Essay Aff 1   .02 .23    -.09 .27    .26 .37 
Essay Aff 2  -.24 .23    -.43 .28    .07 .37 
Scale Aff   .33 .21    -.09 .26    .63† .34 
Self-esteem   .01 .07     .07 .08   -.17
 
.11 
R
2
 (ΔR2Step 2) .051 (.049)  .062 (.026)  .076 (.048) 
(Constant) 5.45*** .17   5.22*** .21  4.92*** .27 
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Flossing Behavior    -  -     .06 .05     -  - 
Spon. Self-Affirm.   .03 .06     .07 .08    .27** .10 
Essay Aff 1   .06 .24    -.08
 
.29    .20 .38 
Essay Aff 2  -.18 .24    -.37 .29    .02 .38 
Scale Aff   .40† .22    -.07 .29    .62† .36 
Self-esteem   .13 .26     .10 .19   -.27 .25 
SE x Essay Aff 1  -.29 .19    -.12
 
.22   -.07 .30 
SE x Essay Aff 2  -.12 .21     .10 .25    .05 .33 
SE x Scale Aff   .00 .19    -.05 .23    .37 .31 
R
2
 (ΔR2Step 3) .079 (.028)  .069 (.008)  .098 (.022) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Flossing Behavior refers to current 
flossing behavior. Spon. Self-Affirm. refers to spontaneous self-affirmation tendency. 
 
Table 3.15 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables in the High Threat Condition 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
n = 148    b SE      b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 5.37*** .20   5.72** .22  4.92*** .27 
Flossing Behavior    -  -     .10 .06     -  - 
Spon. Self-Affirm.   .05 .08     .15† .09    .27 .10 
Essay Aff 1  -.04 .29    -.47 .33    .20 .38 
Essay Aff 2  -.15 .28    -.26 .31    .02 .38 
Scale Aff  -.15 .30    -.77* .33    .62† .36 
Self-esteem   .04 .09     .01 .10   -.27
 
.25 
R
2
 (ΔR2Step 2) .010 (.005)  .062 (.026)  .098 (.022) 
(Constant) 5.37*** .20   5.71*** .22  4.93*** .28 
Flossing Behavior    -  -     .10 .06     -  - 
Spon. Self-Affirm.   .05 .08     .15 .09    .21 .12 
Essay Aff 1  -.04 .30    -.51
 
.33   -.14 .27 
Essay Aff 2  -.15 .28    -.28 .32   -.37 .42 
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Scale Aff  -.15† .31    -.76* .34    .28 .40 
Self-esteem   .01 .19     .05 .21   -.25 .27 
SE x Essay Aff 1  -.01 .27     .10
 
.30   -.13 .37 
SE x Essay Aff 2   .07 .25    -.20 .28    .26 .35 
SE x Scale Aff   .03 .25    -.01 .27    .08 .34 
R
2
 (ΔR2Step 3) .011 (.001)  .069 (.008)  .053 (.010) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Flossing Behavior refers to current 
flossing behavior. Spon. Self-Affirm. refers to spontaneous self-affirmation tendency. 
 
3. Role of Self-Esteem in Self-Affirmation Effects on Attitude and Intentions 
Attitude 
Low Threat C ondition. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
between Essay Affirm 2 and self-esteem and an interaction between Scale Affirm and 
self-esteem on attitude toward floss every day, ΔR2Step 3 = .026, bEssay 2 = .334, t(136) = 
1.90, p = .060, bScale = .293, t(136) = 1.79, p = .076 (See Table 3.16 for regression 
analysis results).  
Regarding the interaction between Essay Affirm 2 and self-esteem, simple slope 
analyses showed that the slopes for participants with HSE (+1SD) (b = .329, t(136) = 
1.14, p = .256) or with LSE (-1SD) (b = -.531, t(136) = -1.65, p = .101) were not 
statistically significantly different from zero. However, the slope for participants with 
LSE was sufficiently lower than the slope for participants with HSE (Z = 1.99, p = .023, 
one tailed).  
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This suggests that participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a value more 
important than “independent (autonomous)” (i.e., Essay affirmation 2) showed more 
favorable daily flossing attitude than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with 
LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a value more important than “independent (autonomous)” 
showed less favorable daily flossing attitude compared to their unaffirmed counterparts 
(See Figure 3.5). 
Regarding the interaction between Scale Affirm and self-esteem, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a range of values 
had a positive effect on daily flossing attitude, b = .427, t(136) = 1.69, p = .093. 
However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming a range of values had no effect 
on their daily flossing attitude, b = -.327, t(136) = -1.04, p = .302.  
This suggests that participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range of values 
showed more favorable daily flossing attitude than their unaffirmed counterparts, while 
people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a range of values showed no change on daily 
flossing attitude compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 3.5). 
High Threat Condition. Unexpectedly, no interaction effect of self-esteem x 
self-affirmation was found. There were no main effects of self-esteem or self-affirmation 
either (See Table 3.17 for regression analyses results). 
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Figure 3.5 Essay Affirm x self-esteem and Scale Affirm x self-esteem effects on attitude 
in the low threat message condition 
Left:    Predicted values for daily flossing attitude among participants who affirmed a 
value more important than “independent (autonomous)” (i.e., Essay affirmation 2 
condition) and unaffirmed participants (i.e., Control condition) with low (1 SD 
below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE)  
Right:  Predicted values for daily flossing attitude among participants who affirmed a 
range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and unaffirmed participants 
(i.e., Control condition) with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above 
the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Intention 
Low Threat Condition. As expected, no interaction effect was found. There were 
no main effects of self-esteem either. However, there was a main effect of Essay Affirm 
1 on intention to floss daily, ΔR2Step 2 = .023, b = .673, t(139) = 2.17, p = .032, on 
intention to floss daily in the following week, ΔR2Step 2 = .030, b = .865, t(139) = 2.24, p = 
.027, on intention to floss daily in the following month, ΔR2Step 2 = .025, b = .881, t(139) 
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= 2.31, p = .022, and on intention to floss daily in next three months, ΔR2Step 2 = .026, b = 
.946, t(139) = 2.25, p = .026 (See Table 3.16 for regression analyses results). This means 
that participants who affirmed a value less important than “independence (autonomous)” 
(i.e., Essay affirmation 1) expressed higher intention to floss daily, in the following week, 
in the following month, and in next three months, than participants in other self-
affirmation/control conditions, regardless of their self-esteem levels.  
High Threat Condition. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
between Scale Affirm and self-esteem on intention to floss every day, ΔR2Step 3 = .021, b 
= -.537, t(138) = -2.28, p = .024 (See Table 3.17 for regression analysis results). Simple 
slope analysis showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a range of 
values had a negative effect on daily flossing intention, b = -.873, t(140) = -2.04, p = 
.043. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming a range of values had no 
effect on their daily flossing intention, b = .495, t(140) = 1.21, p = .229. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range 
of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) showed lower daily flossing intentions than their 
unaffirmed counterparts, while people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a range of values 
showed no change on daily flossing intentions compared to their unaffirmed counterparts 
(See Figure 3.6).  
In addition, the regression analysis demonstrated an interaction between Scale 
Affirm and self-esteem on intention to floss every day for the following week, ΔR2Step 3 = 
.030, b = -.646, t(140) = -2.31, p = .022 (See Table 3.17 for regression analysis results). 
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Simple slope analysis showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a 
range of values had a negative effect on daily flossing intention in the next week, b = -
1.209, t(140) = -2.37, p = .019. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming 
a range of values had no effect on their daily flossing intention in the next week, b = .435, 
t(140) = .899, p = .370.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range 
of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) showed lower daily flossing intention in the following 
week than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a 
range of values showed no change on daily flossing intentions in the following week 
compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 3.6).  
Moreover, the regression analysis demonstrated an interaction between Scale 
Affirm and self-esteem on intention to floss every day for the following month, ΔR2Step 3 
= .012, b = -.525, t(140) = -1.79, p = .076 (See Table 3.17 for regression analysis results). 
Simple slope analysis showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a 
range of values had a negative effect on daily flossing intention in the next month, b = -
.912, t(140) = -1.71, p = .090. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming 
a range of values had no effect on their daily flossing intention in the next month, b = 
.424, t(140) = .831, p = .407.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range 
of values (i.e., Scale affirmation) showed lower daily flossing intention in the following 
month than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a 
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range of values showed no change on daily flossing intentions in the following month 
compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 3.6).  
Last, the regression analysis demonstrated an interaction between Scale Affirm 
and self-esteem on intention to floss every day for next three months, ΔR2Step 3 = .013, b 
= -.554, t(140) = -1.83, p = .070 (See Table 3.17 for regression analysis results). Simple 
slope analysis showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming a range of 
values had a negative effect on daily flossing intention in the next three months, b = .925, 
t(140) = 1.76, p = .081. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming a range 
of values had no effect on their daily flossing intention in the next three months, b = -
.485, t(140) = -.875, p = .383.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a range of 
values (i.e., Scale affirmation) showed higher daily flossing intention in next three 
months than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed 
a range of values showed no change on daily flossing intentions in next three months 
compared to their unaffirmed counterparts (See Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6 Scale Affirm x self-esteem interaction effect on intention in the high threat 
message condition 
Top row: 
Left:    Predicted values for daily flossing intention among participants who affirmed a 
range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and unaffirmed participants 
(i.e., Control condition) with LSE (1 SD below the mean) and HSE (1 SD above 
the mean)  
Right:  Predicted values for daily flossing intention in the following week among 
participants who affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and 
unaffirmed participants (i.e., Control condition) with LSE (1 SD below the mean) 
and HSE (1 SD above the mean)  
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Bottom row: 
Left:    Predicted values for daily flossing intention in the following month among 
participants who affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and 
unaffirmed participants (i.e., Control condition) with LSE (1 SD below the mean) 
and HSE (1 SD above the mean) in the high threat message condition 
Right:  Predicted values for daily flossing intention in next three months among 
participants who affirmed a range of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and 
unaffirmed participants (i.e., Control condition) with LSE (1 SD below the mean) 
and HSE (1 SD above the mean) in the high threat message condition 
 
 
Hypothesized results for daily flossing intention among participants who affirmed a range 
of values (i.e., Scale affirmation condition) and unaffirmed participants (i.e., Control 
condition) with LSE (1 SD below the mean) and HSE (1 SD above the mean) in the high 
threat message condition 
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Supplemental Analyses 
The Essay Affirmations 
It is interesting to note that no self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects 
were found on any dependent variables when the two essay affirmation conditions were 
compared with the control condition. This means that completing an essay affirmation 
task or a control task did not produce differential effects on heath message processing for 
people with HSE and LSE. But this does not mean that the effects of affirming a more 
important value (i.e., Essay Affirm 2) would not differ from affirming a less important 
value (i.e., Essay Affirm 1). In fact, because it was expected that for people with LSE, 
affirming a value more important than the aspect of self threatened would reduce 
defensiveness, while affirming a value less important than the aspect of self threatened 
would increase defensiveness, the differences in defensiveness between participants with 
LSE in the essay affirmation 1 condition and their counterparts in the essay affirmation 2 
condition should be larger than that between participants with LSE in the essay 
affirmation 1 (or essay affirmation 2) condition and their counterparts in the control 
condition. However, for people with HSE, it is expected that affirming a more important 
value or a less important value would not make a difference on self-affirmation effects. 
Therefore, completing the Essay Affirmation 2 task (versus completing the Essay 
Affirmation 1 task) is expected to have a negatively effect on defensiveness for people 
with LSE, but not for people with HSE.  
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To examine whether the two essay affirmations differ in their effects on message 
processing for people with HSE and LSE, I compared Essay Affirm 1 condition with 
Essay Affirmation 2 condition. I conducted regression analyses for the low and high 
threat conditions for each dependent variable. In each regression model, current flossing 
behavior and spontaneous self-affirmation tendency were entered at step 1 as control 
variables, mean-centered self-esteem and dummy-coded essay affirmation condition 
variable (i.e., Essay Affirm 1 = 0, Essay Affirm 2 = 1) were entered at step 2, and the 
two-way interaction terms of essay affirmation x self-esteem were entered at step 3. 
Unexpectedly, there was no essay affirmation x self-esteem interaction effect on any 
dependent variable, in either low or high threat message conditions. In terms of main 
effect, completing the essay affirmation 2 task rather than essay affirmation 1 task 
increased message skepticism, regardless of participants’ self-esteem levels, ΔR2Step 2 = 
.117, b = 1.087, t(69) = 2.90, p = .005. These results suggest that there was no evidence 
that completing the essay affirmation 2 task differed from completing the essay 
affirmation 1 task regarding self-affirmation effects on health message processing among 
people with HSE and LSE.  
The Distribution of Self-Esteem Scores 
Why were there self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects in certain self-
affirmation condition on some dependent variables but not on others? A closer look at the 
descriptive statistics of self-esteem showed that there might be a methodological reason. 
The distribution of self-esteem scores in the sample across conditions was negatively 
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skewed (Skewness = -.795): there were many more participants with high levels of self-
esteem than participants with low levels of self-esteem (See Figure 3.7).  
The skewed distribution of self-esteem can pose a methodological challenge for 
detecting self-esteem x self-affirmation interaction effects. McClelland and Judd (1993) 
have elegantly described this problem. They note that the statistical power of an 
interaction test is determined by the residual variance in the interaction term after 
controlling for variance in the main effects. The residual variance in the interaction term 
is determined by the joint distribution of the predictor and the moderator variables. 
Therefore, the statistical power of the interaction test is maximized when both the 
predictor and moderator variables have maximum variances for their ranges (which 
means having half of the observations happen at each extreme) and when the extreme 
values of the predictor variable co-occur with the extreme values of the moderator 
variable (which means having one fourth of the observations happen at each extreme 
corner of the 2 x2 design; McClelland & Judd, 1993). In the present study, because there 
were far fewer observations in the LSE-Control and LSE-Affirm cells than in the HSE-
Control and HSE-Affirm cells, the interaction tests may not have had enough statistical 
power to detect the hypothesized interaction effects.  
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Figure 3.7 Histogram showing the distribution of self-esteem scores in Study 2 
 
To reduce the skewness of the distribution of self-esteem scores, I tried data 
transformation by first reflecting the scores through subtracting them from the maximum 
score “7” plus one and then taking logarithms of the reflected scores (i.e., Transformed 
self-esteem = log10(max + 1 - self-esteem)). The transformation reduced skewness to -
.083 (See Figure 3.8 for new distribution). It is important to note that transforming self-
esteem scores cannot solve the problem that there were not as many participants with 
LSE as there were participants with HSE. Also, because the majority of the observations 
of the new distribution were at the center rather than at the two extremes, transforming 
self-esteem may not help improving the statistical power of the interaction tests.   
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Figure 3.8 Histogram showing the distribution of transformed self-esteem scores 
 
I then tested the transformed self-esteem x self-affirmation interactions on the 
dependent variables. Two regression models were built for the low and high threat 
conditions for each dependent variable. In each regression model, mean-centered 
transformed self-esteem and dummy-coded affirmation condition variables (i.e, Essay 
Affirm 1, Essay Affirm 2, Scale Affirm) were entered at step 1 and the two-way 
interaction terms of transformed self-esteem x self-affirmation were entered at step 2.  
Transforming self-esteem scores did not lead to discovery of new interaction 
effects. Consistent with the original results, the analyses using the transformed self-
esteem scores demonstrated an interaction between Scale Affirm and transformed self-
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esteem on perceived manipulation, intention to floss daily, and intention to floss daily in 
the following week. Transforming self-esteem scores did not change the nature of the 
previously identified interactions; it only slightly changed the effect sizes (e.g., on 
perceived manipulation: ΔR2Step 3-Transformed = .045 vs. ΔR
2
Step 3-Original = .047; on daily 
flossing intention: ΔR2Step 3-Transformed = .014 vs. ΔR
2
Step 3-Original = .021; on daily flossing 
intention in the following week: ΔR2Step 3-Transformed = .023 vs. ΔR
2
Step 3-Original = .030).  
The above findings suggest that it is possible that the skewed distribution of self-
esteem scores limited the possibility of finding the hypothesized effects for people with 
LSE. Because the majority of the sample consisted of people with HSE, in general, the 
analyses only tested the self-affirmation effects among people with HSE. This provided a 
potential explanation for the null effects of the two essay affirmation conditions. Given 
that the hypothesized effects of the two essay affirmation conditions mainly concerning 
people with LSE, if the population that was expected to exhibit the effects was not 
sufficiently represented in the sample, it is unlikely that the hypothesized effects will be 
observed.  
Discussion 
Unexpectedly, my hypothesis that affirming a value less important than the aspect 
of self threatened would increase defensiveness and decrease message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention among people with LSE, but not for those with HSE, was not 
supported. When the Essay Affirmation 1 condition was compared to the control 
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condition, no interaction was found between self-esteem and Essay Affirmation 1 on any 
dependent variables.  
In addition, my hypothesis that affirming a value more important than the aspect 
of self threatened would decrease defensiveness and increase message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention among people with LSE, but not for those with HSE, was not 
supported, either. When the Essay Affirmation 2 condition was compared to the control 
condition, no interaction was found between self-esteem and Essay Affirmation 2 on any 
dependent variables. 
Moreover, my hypothesis that affirming a range of values would increase 
defensiveness among people with LSE and decrease message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention, but not for those with HSE, was partially supported. In the high threat message 
condition, participants with LSE who affirmed a range of values showed higher perceived 
manipulation than their unaffirmed counterparts, while people with HSE who affirmed a 
range of values showed no change compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. However, 
this pattern of results did not carry over to message acceptance or attitude and intention 
toward daily flossing. There was no interaction between self-affirmation and self-esteem 
on message acceptance indicators or on attitude toward daily flossing. Regarding daily 
flossing intention, in the high threat message condition, affirming a wide range of values 
decreased daily flossing intentions among people with HSE but not among people with 
LSE (See Table 3.18 for summary of findings).    
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Table 3.18 Summary of Study 2 Findings 
Hypotheses Results 
Affirming a value less 
important than the one 
threatened:  
Compare Essay Affirm 1 condition & control condition 
· Increases defensiveness 
among people with 
LSE but not among 
people with HSE 
Not supported 
· High threat: decreased message 
skepticism regardless of self-esteem 
level  
· Decreases message 
acceptance among 
people with LSE but not 
among people with HSE 
Not supported 
· No change in message acceptance 
indicators 
· Decreases attitude and 
intention among people 
with LSE but not 
among people with HSE 
Not supported 
· Low threat condition: increased 
sunscreen use intentions regardless of 
self-esteem level 
Affirming a value more 
important than the one 
threatened:  
Compare Essay Affirm 2 condition & control condition 
· Decreases defensiveness 
among people with LSE 
but not among people 
with HSE 
Not supported 
· No change in defensiveness 
indicators  
· Increases message 
acceptance among 
people with LSE but not 
among people with HSE 
Not supported 
· No change in message acceptance 
indicators 
· Increases attitude and 
intention among people 
with LSE but not 
among people with HSE 
Not supported 
· Low threat: Increased attitude among 
people with HSE but decreased it 
among people with LSE 
Affirming a wide range of 
values: 
Compare Scale Affirm condition & control condition 
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· Decreases defensiveness 
among people with HSE 
but increases it among 
people with LSE 
Supported 
· Low threat: increased psychological 
discomfort and anger, but decreased 
message skepticism regardless of self-
esteem level 
· High threat: increased perceived 
manipulation among people with LSE 
but not among people with HSE.  
· High threat: increased perceived 
message skepticism regardless of self-
esteem level 
· Increases message 
acceptance among 
people with HSE but 
decreases it among 
people with LSE 
Not supported 
· Low threat: increased perceived 
convincingness regardless of self-
esteem level 
· High threat: decreased perceived 
pleasantness regardless of self-esteem 
level 
· Increases attitude and 
intention among people 
with HSE but decreases 
them among people with 
LSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Low threat: Increased attitude among 
people with HSE but not among 
people with LSE 
· High threat: Decreased intention 
among people with HSE but not 
among people with LSE 
 
In conclusion, Study 2 showed that affriming a wide range of values increased 
perceived manipulation among people with LSE but reduced behavior intention among 
people with HSE. In addition, among those who perceived that having gum disease will 
cause moderate to serious health, finacial, and/or social consequences, affirming a value 
less important than the aspect of self being threatened by the message (i.e., Essay 
affirmation 1) increased psychological discomfort, anger, perceived manipulation and 
reduced daily flossing intention among people with LSE but not HSE.  
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These findings provided partial support to my hypothesis that when self-
affirmation manipulation failed to achieve an adequate sense of self-integrity among 
people with LSE, it can backfire. Interestingly, the only situation hypothesized to benefit 
people with LSE, affirming a value more important than the aspect of self being 
threatened (i.e., Essay affirmation 2), showed no beneficial effects at all in the high threat 
message condition, among both people with LSE and those with HSE.    
It is surprising that the same self-affirmation effect identified in study 1 was not 
replicated in study 2. Because study 2 differed from study 1 on a number of fronts, it is 
difficult to identify what exactly caused the inconsistencies in the two studies’ findings. 
For example, Study 2 used a general population sample that was much more 
heterogeneous than the college student sample used in Study 1: the Study 2 sample 
included adults with a wide range of ages, education levels, and household income levels 
(See Appendix A.2). Also, the distribution of self-esteem scores in the Study 2 sample 
was more heavily skewed than the Study 1 sample. Moreover, Study 2 used a health 
behavior context (i.e., daily flossing) that is more universally relevant than the sunscreen 
use behavior context in Study 1.  
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3 – TIMING OF SELF-AFFIRMATION 
Abstract 
The present study tested whether the timing of self-affirmation in relation to 
exposure to an anti-excessive drinking message (i.e., self-affirm before or after message 
exposure) determines when self-affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE. It was 
expected that affirming their most important value before message exposure reduces 
defensive processing among people with LSE but not HSE, while affirming their most 
important value after message exposure increases defensive processing among people 
with HSE but not LSE. In addition, affirming a range of values before message exposure 
was expected to decrease defensive processing for people with HSE but increase 
defensive processing among people with LSE, while affirming a range of values after 
message exposure was expected to increase defensive processing for people with HSE 
but not LSE.  
Data on alcohol intake from 426 U.S. adults showed that regardless of the timing 
and the type of self-affirmation manipulation, self-affirmation reduced defensive 
processing among people with HSE but not LSE. For participants with HSE, affirming 
their most important value or a range of values before or after message exposure resulted 
in lower defensive responses and higher message acceptance, though the effects did not 
carry over to attitude and intention regarding reducing alcohol intake. In contrast, there 
was no effect of self-affirmation manipulation on outcomes for participants with LSE.  
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Introduction 
In Study 2 (Chapter 3), I explored whether the adequacy of people’s sense of the 
self achieved through the self-affirmation manipulation may determine when self-
affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE. In the present study, I will test whether 
a situation-level factor, timing of the self-affirmation manipulation – whether self-
affirmation is induced before or after the onset of the threat to self (i.e., health message 
exposure), may influence when self-affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE.  
Timing of self-affirmation manipulation influences self-affirmation effects on 
people with HSE and LSE by determining whether self-esteem functions as resources or 
as expectancies (Stone, 1999). Self-affirmation buffers a threat to the sense of self by 
bringing unthreatened positive cognitions about the self into the working memory; these 
cognitions then help offset the threat’s discomforting implications for the self. On the 
other hand, directing attention to the self through completing a self-affirmation task can 
cause self-referencing and make salient one’s standards and expectancies for him or 
herself (Hull & Levy, 1979; Hull et al., 2002). Being aware of one’s self-expectancies 
may highlight any discrepancies between one’s self-expectancies and the self-evaluative 
information in one’s environment (e.g., a health message).  
Self-affirming before health message exposure enables self-esteem to function as 
resources because self-affirmation brings favorable knowledge about the self into the 
working memory before the threat to the self occurs. Those who have more favorable 
self-knowledge in the working memory will be more capable of withstanding the threat 
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than those with less favorable self-knowledge. Recall that, as discussed in Study 2, 
affirming a range of self-aspects establishes a sense of self-integrity for people with HSE 
while affirming the most important and positive self-aspect establishes a sense of self-
integrity for people with LSE. Therefore, it is expected that compared to unaffirmed 
people, people with HSE will show reduced defensiveness and increased message 
acceptance, attitude, and intention if they affirmed a range of self-aspects before exposure 
to a health message, while people with LSE will reduced defensiveness and increased 
message acceptance, attitude, and intention if they affirmed their most important self-
aspect before exposure to a health message. 
Self-affirming after health message exposure enables self-esteem to function as 
expectancies because the self-directed attention caused by self-affirmation will increase 
people’s sensitivity to self-evaluative information in the message and highlights any 
discrepancies between one’s self-expectancies and one’s health-compromising behavior 
(e.g., “I always make wise decisions, but I smoke which puts my health at risk”). People 
with HSE have high expectations for themselves to be competent and prudent while 
people with LSE have lower expectations for themselves to competent and prudent.  
Because the discrepancy between self-expectations and the health-compromising 
behavior is larger for people with HSE than for people with LSE, reading a health 
message then directing attention to their expectations for themselves may trigger greater 
discomfort and thus higher defensiveness for self-affirmed people with HSE than for self-
affirmed people with LSE.  
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In addition, for people with HSE, because the discrepancy between their self-
expectations and the health-compromising behavior is large, self-affirmed people with 
HSE whose discrepancies were highlighted for them through self-affirmation is expected 
to experience greater discomfort and thus express higher defensiveness compared to their 
unaffirmed counterparts whose discrepancies were not highlighted for them. For people 
with LSE, however, because the discrepancy between their self-expectations and their 
health-compromising behavior is small, highlighting the discrepancy through self-
affirmation will not cause much discomfort and thus will not increase defensiveness.  
In conclusion, it is hypothesized that, affirming the most important value before 
message exposure will reduce defensiveness, increase message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention for people with LSE but not HSE, compared to their unaffirmed counter parts. 
Affirming a range of values before message exposure, however, is expected to increase 
defensiveness, reduce message acceptance, attitude, and intention for people with LSE, 
but reduce defensiveness, increase message acceptance, attitude, and intention for people 
with HSE, compared to their unaffirmed counter parts. Self-affirming after message 
exposure, regardless of affirming the most important value or affirming a range of values, 
is expected to increase defensiveness, reduce message acceptance, attitude, and intention 
for people with HSE but not LSE, compared to their unaffirmed counter parts (See 
Figure 4.1).  
In this study, I chose reducing alcohol consumption as the health behavior topic. 
To ensure that the health message about reducing alcohol consumption is personally 
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relevant for every participant, I recruited only people who currently drink more than the 
recommended low-risk/moderate drinking level.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Hypothesized interaction effects between self-affirmation and self-esteem on 
defensiveness, message acceptance, and attitude and intention toward the recommended 
behavior 
Health 
Msg 
Affirm the Most 
Important Value 
HSE 
LSE ↓ Defensiveness, 
↑ Msg Acceptance,  
↑ Att & Int 
No Change  
: 
Health 
Msg 
Affirm a Wide 
Range of Values 
HSE 
LSE ↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance,  
↓ Att & Int 
↓ Defensiveness,  
↑ Msg Acceptance,  
↑ Att & Int  
: 
SE as resource: Self-affirmation enlarges disparities 
SE as resource: Self-affirmation reduces disparities 
Health 
Msg 
Self-Affirmation 
HSE 
LSE 
No change 
↑ Defensiveness, 
↓ Msg Acceptance,  
↓ Att & Int 
: 
SE as expectancy: Self-affirmation highlights discrepancies 
Self-affirm before Message Exposure 
Affirm the most important value: 
Self-affirm after Message Exposure 
Affirm a range of values: 
Affirm the most important value or a range of values: 
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Pilot Studies  
Pilot Study A 
Before the main study design was finalized, a pilot study with a 2 (Self-
affirmation task: scale affirmation, no affirmation) by 2 (Timing of self-affirmation: 
affirm before message exposure, affirm after message exposure) between-subject 
factorial design was conducted online with 100 UMN undergraduate students.  
Participants in the scale self-affirmation condition completed the 32-item self-
affirmation scale that was used in study 2 (Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009) and those in 
the control condition were asked to write about the shops and buildings they saw on a 
route that they traveled regularly (Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009). The timing of self-
affirmation was manipulated by displaying a health message before or after participants 
engaged in the self-affirmation or control task. In the affirm-before-message condition, 
participants completed the self-affirmation/control task before reading the message. In 
the affirm-after-message condition, participants read the message first and then 
completed the self-affirmation/control task. 
Results showed that the length of the scale affirmation task had unintended 
influences on message effects for participants in the affirm-after-message condition: 
Seven participants in the affirm-after-message condition expressed that they did not 
remember reading a health message. Therefore, pilot study B and C were conducted to 
create and test a shorter scale affirmation task.    
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Pilot Study B 
Pilot study B was conducted to select 10 values, personal qualities, or 
characteristics from the 32-item affirmation scale that people, in general, would consider 
as the most important to them and would evaluate themselves most positively on. This 
would reduce scale length by about 2/3. A total of 31 U.S. adults recruited from the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk panel participated in the study. Participants first answered to 
what extent each of the 32 value statements described what they are like (e.g., “I always 
try to keep my word,” “I treat all people equally, regardless of who they might be”; 1 = 
“Not at all like me” – 7 = “Just like me”), then they rated how personally important each 
of these statements was to them (e.g., “Always try to keep your word,” “Treat all people 
equally, regardless of who they might be”; 1 = “Very unimportant to me” – 7 = “Very 
important to me”).  
The self-rating and the corresponding importance rating of each statement were 
summed to form a composite score for each value statement. I sorted the composite 
scores of the 32 value statements in a descending order and judged that the score 
difference between the 10
th
 and the 11
th
 ranked item (10
th
: M = 12.06, SD = 1.84; 11
th
: M 
= 11.84, SD = 1.77) was smaller than that between the 11
th
 and the 12
th
 ranked item (11
th
: 
M = 11.84, SD = 1.77; 12
th
: M = 11.58, SD = 1.96). Therefore, I extended the selection to 
11 items. The mean ratings of the top 11 items were compared against the scale 
affirmation ratings in pilot A (UMN college student sample) and study 2 (MTurk 
sample). Eight of the 11 items ranked in the top 11 across all three samples and 2 of the 
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11 items ranked in the top 11 across both MTurk samples. Therefore, the 11 items were 
selected to form the shortened self-affirmation scale. The mean and standard deviation of 
each value statement and its ranking in each study sample are shown in Table 4.1. 
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Pilot Study C 
To test whether the shortened 11-item self-affirmation scale can achieve 
comparable self-affirmation effects as the original scale, pilot study C was conducted 
online with 91 U.S. adults recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk panel. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five self-affirmation conditions: 11-item 
scale affirmation, random 11-item scale affirmation, 32-item scale affirmation, essay 
affirmation, and control. Participants in the 11-item scale affirmation condition responded 
to the shortened self-affirmation scale. Participants in the random 11-item scale 
affirmation condition responded to 11 items that were randomly selected from the 32-
item Napper et al. (2009) self-affirmation scale. Participants in the 32-item scale 
affirmation condition responded to the original 32-item Napper et al. (2009) self-
affirmation scale. Participants in the control condition were asked to write about the 
shops and buildings they saw on a route that they traveled regularly (Napper, Harris, & 
Epton, 2009). After completing the self-affirmation or control task, participants read the 
high threat flossing message that was used in study 2. Last, participants filled out a 
questionnaire containing self-affirmation manipulation check questions, measures of 
defensiveness and message acceptance. All the measures were adopted from study 2.      
As expected, the 11-item self-affirmation scale performed similar to the original 
32-item scale and the essay affirmation task. There were no substantial differences 
between the 11-item scale and the two established self-affirmation manipulations (i.e., 
essay affirmation, 32-item scale) in terms of whether the task made participants think 
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about things that are positive and important to them, F(2, 51) = 1.57, p = .401, η2 = .035, 
message derogation, F(2, 51) = 2.15, p = .127, η2 = .078, message skepticism, F(2, 51) = 
1.64, p = .205, η2 = .061, perceived manipulation, F(2, 51) = 1.04, p = .362, η2 = .039, 
perceived convincingness, F(2, 51) = 2.91, p = .064, η2 = .102, perceived pleasantness, 
F(2, 51) = .770, p = .468, η2 = .029, or perceived relevance, F(2, 51) = .83, p = .442, η2 = 
.032.  
Moreover, there were statistically significant differences between the 11-item 
self-affirmation scale and the control task in terms of whether the task made participants 
think about things that are positive and important to them, F(1, 33) = 16.05, p = .000, η2 
= .327 and perceived convincingness, F(1, 33) = 6.99, p = .012, η2 = .175. Although these 
two conditions’ differences were not statistically significantly different on message 
derogation (F(1, 33) = 1.33, p = .258, η2 = .039), message skepticism (F(1, 33) = .27, p = 
.609, η2 = .008), and perceived manipulation (F(1, 33) = 1.63, p = .211, η2 = .047), the 
mean differences were in the anticipated direction (See Table 4.4). The two conditions 
did not differ on perceived pleasantness (F(1, 33) = .044, p = .835, η2 = .001) or 
perceived relevance (F(1, 33) = .009, p = .924, η2 = .000).  
In conclusion, Pilot A showed that the length of the 32-item Napper et al. (2009) 
self-affirmation scale may interfere with message effects in the affirm-after-message 
condition. I thus created an 11-item version of the Napper et al. scale through Pilot B and 
confirmed in Pilot C that the 11-item scale can achieve comparable self-affirmation 
effects as the original 32-item scale and the essay affirmation task. 
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Table 4.4 Comparing Self-affirmation Tasks on Message Effects Outcomes: M (SE) 
 11-item 
scale 
32-item 
scale 
Essay  
affirm 
Random  
11-item 
Control  
Manipulation check 5.32 (0.28) 5.33 (0.27) 5.77 (0.29) 5.05 (0.26) 3.86 (0.29) 
Message skepticism 3.67 (0.48) 3.53 (0.46) 2.56 (0.51) 3.90 (0.45) 4.00 (0.49) 
Message derogation 3.86 (0.40) 4.34 (0.39) 3.11 (0.43) 4.36 (0.38) 4.49 (0.41) 
Perceived manipulation 4.03 (0.36) 3.87 (0.36) 3.73 (0.40) 4.03 (0.36) 3.77 (0.39) 
Perceived 
convincingness 
5.49 (0.28) 4.86 (0.27) 5.67 (0.30) 4.59 (0.26) 4.66 (0.29) 
Perceived pleasantness 3.67 (0.38) 3.37 (0.37) 3.94 (0.40) 3.73 (0.36) 3.77 (0.39) 
Perceived relevance 4.89 (0.49) 4.05 (0.47) 4.56 (0.51) 3.75 (0.46) 4.94 (0.50) 
 
Main Study Method 
Participants 
A week before the main study, a screening survey was launched on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk to recruit participants for the main study. The inclusion criteria for the 
main study was that participants had to be U.S. adults whose alcohol consumption exceed 
the recommended levels in USDA dietary guidelines on moderate and low-risk drinking 
(i.e., up to 2 drinks a day for men 65 or younger, up to 1 drink a day for women of all 
ages and men over 65; “Appendix 9. Alcohol,” n.d.). Also, participation were limited to 
those who have completed less than 500 MTurk tasks and have received at least 95% 
approval rating for all previous tasks. This is to exclude professional survey takers and to 
exclude people who do not pay attention to the tasks. This screening survey included 
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measures of alcohol consumption, self-esteem, spontaneous self-affirmation tendency, 
and demographics.  
To measure current alcohol consumption, participants were first provided with 
examples of one drink according to the definition from the National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) (e.g., “By a drink we mean half an ounce of absolute 
alcohol. Examples of one drink: A 12-ounce can or glass of beer (about 5% alcohol), OR 
a 5-ounce glass of table wine (about 12% alcohol), OR […] one shot (1.5 ounces) of 80-
proof distilled spirits (rum, vodka, whiskey, etc.; about 40% alcohol)”). Then, 
participants answered four alcohol consumption questions adapted from NIAAA 
(“Recommended alcohol questions,” n.d.). The first question asked, “During the last 12 
months, how often did you usually have any kind of drink containing alcohol?” (11 
options; from “Every day” to “I never drank any alcohol in my life”). Participants who 
answered “I did not drink any alcohol in the last 12 months” or “I never drank any 
alcohol in my life” were excluded from answering later questions about alcohol 
consumption. The second question asked, “During the last 12 months, on a typical day 
when you drank alcohol, how many drinks did you have?” (10 options range from “25 or 
more drinks” to “1 drink”). Participants’ responses were compared to USDA dietary 
guidelines on moderate and low-risk drinking. Those who typically drink more than the 
moderate and low-risk drinking level were considered as eligible for the main study. The 
third question asked about the maximum number of drinks one had within a 24-hour 
period during last 12 months and the last question asked about the frequency of binge 
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drinking behavior (i.e., 5 or more drinks for men or 4 or more drinks for women in about 
two hours; “Drinking levels defined,” n.d.) during last 12 months.  
A total of 1061 U.S. adults completed the screening survey and 555 participants
3
 
who met the inclusion criteria were sent an email invitation to participate in the main 
study a week after. Among the participants invited, 427 of them participated in the main 
study (retention rate: 76.9%). One participant was removed because the person did not 
pay attention to instructions before responding. This was indicated by the person 
completing the study in less than five minutes and failing three attention check questions. 
The ages of remaining participants ranged from 18 to 76 years with an average age of 
33.04 (Median = 30; SD = 11.15). 66.9% of participants were female (n = 285). A total of 
78.6% of participants were White (n = 335), 8% were Black (n = 34), 4.2% were Asian (n 
= 18), 4% were Hispanic/Latino (n = 17), and 5.2% were multiracial or other (n = 22) 
(See Appendix A.3 for sample characteristics). 
Design and Procedure 
A 3 (Self-affirmation task: essay affirmation, scale affirmation, no affirmation) by 
2 (Timing of self-affirmation: affirm before message exposure, affirm after message 
exposure) plus 1 (message only) between-subjects experiment was conducted online. The 
message only condition was included to establish baseline responses to the health 
                                                 
3
 Because there was no previous research of the same topic based on which I can estimate the effect size, it 
was impossible to conduct a priori power analysis to estimate the sample size needed. Therefore, I 
intentionally oversampled based on the experimental design to ensure that the analyses would have 
sufficient statistical power. Because the independent variable self-esteem was measured rather than 
experimentally manipulated, I aimed for having about 80 participants per experimental condition. 
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message (i.e., responses to the message without the influences from the self-affirmation 
task or the control task). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the seven 
conditions. All participants had completed the Rosenberg Self-esteem (1965) scale a 
week before the main study.  
Participants in the essay affirmation condition were asked to write a short essay 
about their most important value, why it is important to them, and how they have used it 
in life (Harris & Napper, 2005). Participants in the scale self-affirmation condition 
completed the shortened version of the Napper et al. (2009) self-affirmation scale that 
was created in pilot B. However, because of a programming error, instead of all 11 items, 
these participants were displayed 10 items randomly selected from the shortened self-
affirmation scale. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that missing one item would render the 
outcomes of this self-affirmation task drastically different from that of the 11-item scale. 
Participants in the control condition were asked to write about the shops and buildings 
they saw on a route that they traveled regularly (Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009).  
The timing of self-affirmation was manipulated in the same way as in pilot A. In 
the affirm-before-message condition, participants completed the self-affirmation/control 
task before reading a health message. In the affirm-after-message condition, participants 
read the health message first and then completed the self-affirmation/control task. Last, 
participants filled out a questionnaire that included measures of our key variables of 
interest.   
 
   186 
 
Stimuli 
To develop stimuli for study 3, information from NIAAA was used to create 
contents for a health message about limiting alcohol consumption. The message 
contained information about the harmful impacts of excessive drinking on heart health, 
the recommended level of alcohol consumption for men and women of different ages, 
and a sentence recommending people to limit drinking to the moderate level. Aesthetic 
elements were added to make the message look like a real health message that people 
may see in the media environment.  
A pilot test was conducted with 34 U.S. adults recruited from the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk panel to examine whether the messages can successfully induce 
defensiveness among people whose alcohol consumption exceeds the recommended 
level. Participants first answered questions about their current alcohol consumption. 
Next, they read the message and answered questions about their current mood, perceived 
risk of heart disease due to excessive drinking, message derogation, perceived 
manipulation, and message skepticism. Compared to participants whose alcohol 
consumption does not exceed the recommended level, participants whose alcohol 
consumptions exceed the recommended level (n = 15) reported less positive mood (F(2, 
31) = 4.48, p = .042, η2 = .126), lower perceived heart disease risk due to excessive 
drinking (F(2, 31) = 8.33, p = .007, η2 = .212), higher message derogation (F(2, 31) = 
4.41, p = .044, η2 = .125), and higher message skepticism (F(2, 31) = 4.71, p = .038, η2 = 
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.132; See Table 4.5). Therefore, the message was used in study 3 unchanged (See Figure 
4.2 for the message).  
 
Table 4.5 Message Effects between Light and Excessive Drinkers: M (SE) 
 Light Drinkers Excessive Drinkers 
Mood (1 = Negative – 7 = Positive) 5.95 (0.22) 5.17 (0.30) 
Perceived personal heart disease risk  
due to excessive drinking 
5.86 (0.23) 4.75 (0.31) 
Message derogation 2.20 (0.32) 3.31 (0.42) 
Message skepticism 2.14 (0.35) 3.42 (0.47) 
   188 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Anti-excessive drinking message 
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Key Measures  
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965). 
Participants responded to ten 7-point scale items, such as “On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself,” “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others,” 
and “I wish I could have more respect for myself” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”). Five items were reverse scored. Participants’ average scores of the ten 
items were used as the indicator of self-esteem (α = .924, M = 4.98, SD = 1.21). 
Indicators of Defensive Processing  
Psychological Discomfort. As discussed in Study 1, the question stem of the 
original psychological discomfort measure (“How are you feeling right now?”) assessed 
the psychological state after message exposure rather than the psychological state during 
message exposure. To capture the psychological state during message exposure, in this 
study I changed the stem to “[…] how did you feel while reading the message?” The 
three 7-point scale items from Elliot and Devine (1994), “I feel uncomfortable,” “I feel 
uneasy,” and “I feel bothered,” were used (1 = “None of this feeling” – 7 = “A great deal 
of this feeling”). The mean of the three items was used as the composite score for 
psychological discomfort (α = .87, M = 2.21, SD = 1.39).  
Anger was measured with two 7-point scale items “I felt annoyed” and “I felt 
angry” (1 = “None of this feeling” – 7 = “A great deal of this feeling”). The mean of the 
two items was used as the composite score for anger (r = .562, M = 1.75, SD = 1.09).  
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To reduce experimental demand concerns, I included additional items to measure 
self-directed negative emotions (“I felt disappointed with myself” and “I felt guilty”; r = 
.820; M = 2.28, SD = 1.56), self-directed positive emotions (“I felt confident” and “I felt 
good about myself”; r = .649; M = 3.83, SD = 1.82), and anxiety (“I felt anxious”; M = 
2.18, SD = 1.49).       
Message skepticism was measured with the 7-point scale item “While reading 
the message, I was skeptical of what was being said” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = 
“Strongly agree”; M = 2.96, SD = 1.62). 
Message derogation was measured with four 7-point scale items adapted from 
Witte (1994): “The information in the message was exaggerated,” “The information in 
the message was distorted,” “The information in the message was overstated,” and “The 
information in the message was overblown” (1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly 
agree”). The mean of the four items was used as the composite score for message 
derogation (α = .938, M = 2.79, SD = 1.34). 
Perceived manipulation was measured with three 7-point scale items adapted 
from Witte (1994): “The message made me feel manipulated,” “The message made me 
feel exploited,” and “The message deliberately tried to manipulate my feelings” (1 = 
“Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”). The mean of the three items was used as the 
composite score for perceived manipulation (α = .824, M = 2.65, SD = 1.21). 
A measure of perceived personal risk of heart disease due to excessive drinking 
was added to triangulate the results from the above indicators of defensiveness. People 
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who engaged in defensive processing of the health message may use denying personal 
risk as a way to reduce the threat to the self. A high level of perceived personal risk 
indicates that the person is willing to acknowledge one’s vulnerability to the health risk 
thus reflecting low defensiveness. In contrast, a low level of perceived personal risk 
indicates that the person is unwilling to acknowledge one’s vulnerability to the health risk 
thus reflecting high defensiveness. Perceived personal risk of heart disease due to 
excessive drinking was measured with the question “How likely do you think drinking 
more than the moderate amount of alcohol will increase your chance of developing heart 
disease?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 5.24, SD = 1.56).  
Indicators of Message Acceptance 
A 7-item bipolar semantic differential scale (1 – 7) adopted from Yzer et al., 
(2011) was used to measure message acceptance. The stem phrase “To me, the message 
was:” was anchored with seven word pairs. The first four items, “extremely unconvincing 
– extremely convincing,” “extremely unbelievable – extremely believable,” “extremely 
forgettable – extremely memorable,” and “extremely bad – extremely good,” measured 
perceived convincingness (α = .759, M = 5.23, SD = 1.18). The fifth and sixth items, 
“extremely unpleasant – extremely pleasant” and “extremely negative – extremely 
positive” measured perceived pleasantness (r = .598, M = 3.89, SD = 1.50). The last 
item, “extremely not meant for someone like me – extremely meant for someone like 
me,” measured perceived relevance (M = 4.12, SD = 2.00). 
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Attitude and Intentions regarding Limiting Alcohol Consumption 
Ten 7-point bipolar semantic differential items were used to measure attitude: 
“You limiting the amount of alcohol you drink to the moderate level on the days you 
drink would be: “unpleasant-pleasant”, “unenjoyable-enjoyable”, “stressful-relaxing”, 
“negative-positive”, “bad-good”, “harmful-beneficial”, “foolish-wise” and “unnecessary-
necessary.” Participants’ average scores of the ten items were used as the indicator of 
attitude towards daily flossing (α = .901; M = 5.21, SD = 1.19).  
Four 7-point scale items were used to measure intention to limit alcohol 
consumption: “How likely is it that you will limit the amount of alcohol you drink to the 
moderate level on the days you drink? (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely)”, “I can see 
myself limiting the amount of alcohol I drink to the moderate level on the days I drink,” 
“I will limit the amount of alcohol I drink to the moderate level on the days I drink,” and 
“I intend to limit the amount of alcohol I drink to the moderate level on the days I drink” 
(1 = “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”). The average score of the four items was 
used as the overall measure of intention (α = .96; M = 4.74 SD = 1.76).  
Three additional intention measures with time frames were used to examine 
whether people’s intentions to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level would 
differ when a specific temporal context is added. Intention to limit alcohol 
consumption in the following month was measured by a 7-point scale item – “In the 
following month, how likely is it that you will limit the amount of alcohol you drink to 
the moderate level on the days you drink?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 
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4.87, SD = 1.91). Intention to limit alcohol consumption in the next 3 months was 
measured by a 7-point scale item – “In the next 3 months, how likely is it that you will 
limit the amount of alcohol you drink to the moderate level on the days you drink?” (1 = 
“Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 4.82, SD = 1.87). Intention to limit alcohol 
consumption in next 12 months was measured by a 7-point scale item – “In the next 12 
months, how likely is it that you will limit the amount of alcohol you drink to the 
moderate level on the days you drink?” (1 = “Very unlikely” – 7 = “Very likely”; M = 
4.77, SD = 1.88).  
Control Variables  
Similar to Study 2, a week before the main study, participants’ spontaneous self-
affirmation tendency was measured with two 7-point scale items developed by Harris et 
al. (2011): “When I feel threatened or anxious I find myself thinking about my strengths” 
and “When I feel threatened or anxious I find myself thinking about what I stand for” (1 
= “Strongly disagree” – 7 = “Strongly agree”; r = .612, M = 4.4, SD = 1.39). To 
determine whether it would be useful to control spontaneous self-affirmation tendency in 
the analyses, I examined the correlations between spontaneous self-affirmation tendency 
and the dependent variables within each experimental condition. Because spontaneous 
self-affirmation tendency was correlated with all dependent variables except intention to 
reduce alcohol consumption in next three months (See Table 4.6), it was included as a 
control variable in analyses on all dependent variables except intention to reduce alcohol 
consumption in next three months.   
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Regardless of self-affirmation manipulation, people who currently consume 
higher amount of alcohol would report higher defensiveness, lower message acceptance, 
and less favorable attitude and lower intention regarding the recommended behavior 
because the health message challenges their current position on the behavior. Therefore, I 
also included current alcohol consumption as an intended control variable. I measured 
participants’ current alcohol consumption a week before the main study with the 
question “During the last 12 months, on a typical day when you drank alcohol, how many 
drinks did you have?” (10 options; ranging from “25 or more drinks” to “1 drink”). I 
examined current alcohol consumption’s correlations with each dependent variable 
within each experimental condition to determine whether it is useful to include it as a 
control variable. Because current alcohol consumption was correlated with all dependent 
variables except perceived personal heart disease risk, perceived convincingness, and 
perceived pleasantness (See Table 4.7), it was entered as a control variable in analyses on 
all dependent variables except the abovementioned three. 
 
Table 4.6 Bivariate Correlations between Spontaneous Self-Affirmation Tendency and 
Dependent and Independent Variables by Experimental Condition 
 Control Essay Affirm Scale Affirm Message 
Only Timing Before After Before After Before After 
Self-esteem  .17  .42**  .34*  .26*  .39*  .34**  .35** 
Discomfort  .10 -.05  .10 -.22† -.05  .30*  .25* 
Anger -.01 -.09  .12 -.22†  .06  .13  .17 
Skepticism  .02 -.09  .07 -.26*  .04  .04  .04 
Derogation -.05  .01  .07 -.29* -.07 -.05 -.05 
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Perc. Manipul.  .09  .01  .12 -.28*  .17  .01 -.01 
Perc. Risk -.08  .11  .01  .13  .07  .32*  .01 
Perc. Conv.  .08  .28* -.01  .31*  .02  .26*  .06 
Perc. Plea.   .16  .22  .18  .24† -.08  .14  .03 
Perc. Relev. -.01  .08  .05  .05  .02  .34**  .16 
Attitude  .12  .44** -.12  .17 -.05  .00  .05 
Intention  .05  .30* -.20  .13 -.02  .02  .05 
Int (Nxt Wk)  .07  .27* -.14  .25†  .06  .03  .01 
Int (Nxt 3 Mo)  .07  .20 -.19  .19 -.10 -.02  .04 
Int (Nxt 12 Mo)  .13  .20 -.23†  .21  .09 -.09  .13 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manipul. refers to perceived 
manipulation. Perc. Risk refers to perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive 
drinking. Perc. Conv. refers to perceived convincingness. Perc. Plea. refers to perceived 
pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to perceived relevance. Int refers to Intention.  
 
Table 4.7 Bivariate Correlations between Current Alcohol Consumption and Dependent 
and Independent Variables by Experimental Condition 
 Control Essay Affirm Scale Affirm Message 
Only Timing Before After Before After Before After 
Self-esteem  .04 -.09 -.09  .02 -.17  .04 -.27* 
Discomfort  .14  .20  .32*  .29*  .26*  .25*  .42*** 
Anger  .05 -.01  .13  .17  .39**  .28*  .42*** 
Skepticism  .09 -.20  .01  .04 -.14  .08  .24* 
Derogation  .07 -.13  .11  .02 -.03  .14  .22† 
Perc. Manipul.  .00 -.07  .20  .05  .13  .18  .34** 
Perc. Risk -.18 -.01 -.15 -.02  .07  .08  .06 
Perc. Conv. -.15  .12 -.06  .07 -.10  .00 -.13 
Perc. Plea.  -.15 -.01 -.06 -.10 -.10 -.14  .06 
Perc. Relev.  .23†  .20  .10  .08  .07  .16  .14 
Attitude -.29* -.07  .05 -.02  .00  .01 -.07 
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Intention -.24† -.14 -.18 -.02 -.06  .00 -.26* 
Int (Nxt Wk) -.13 -.11 -.19 -.06 -.04  .00 -.25* 
Int (Nxt 3 Mo) -.24† -.21 -.18 -.02  .02 -.01 -.20† 
Int (Nxt 12 Mo) -.25† -.23† -.07  .01  .06  .03 -.21† 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manipul. refers to perceived 
manipulation. Perc. Risk refers to perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive 
drinking. Perc. Conv. refers to perceived convincingness. Perc. Plea. refers to perceived 
pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to perceived relevance. Int. refers to Intention.  
 
Results 
Data Analysis Strategy 
It was hypothesized that affirming the most important value (i.e., Essay 
affirmation) before message exposure decreases the defensive responses toward the 
personally relevant health message and increases message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention among people with LSE but not among people with HSE. In addition, affirming 
the most important value after message exposure was thought to increase the defensive 
responses toward the health message and decrease message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention among people with HSE, but less so among people with LSE. To test the 
hypotheses, the responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the essay affirmation 
before and after message exposure conditions were compared with the responses of those 
in the message only condition.  
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Moreover, it was hypothesized that affirming a range of values (i.e., Scale 
affirmation) before message exposure decreases the defensive responses toward the 
health message and increases message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people 
with HSE while increases the defensive responses toward the health message and 
decreases message acceptance, attitude, and intention among people with LSE. However, 
affirming a range of values after message exposure was expected to increase defensive 
responses toward the health message and decrease message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention among people with HSE, but not among people with LSE. To test the 
hypotheses, the responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the scale affirmation 
before and after message exposure conditions were compared with the responses of those 
in the message only condition.  
To rule out the possibility that the expected effects are due to people completing 
irrelevant tasks before or after health message exposure rather than because of self-
affirmation manipulations, the responses of participants with HSE and LSE in the two 
control task conditions are compared with the responses of those in the message only 
condition. It was expected that compared to participants with HSE or LSE who only read 
the health message, participants with HSE or LSE who completed a control task before or 
after message exposure would not differ in their defensiveness toward the message, their 
message acceptance, or their attitude or intentions regarding limiting alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level.   
   198 
 
Six dummy-coded condition variables were constructed to represent the six self-
affirmation x timing experimental conditions (i.e., Essay Affirm Before, Essay Affirm 
After, Scale Affirm Before, Scale Affirm After, Control Task Before, and Control Task 
After; See Table 4.8). The message only condition was used as a reference group and 
thus was coded as “0” in all six condition variables. Six two-way interaction terms were 
built by multiplying self-esteem with each condition variable (i.e., Self-esteem x Essay 
Affirm Before, Self-esteem x Essay Affirm After, Self-esteem x Scale Affirm Before, 
Self-esteem x Scale Affirm After, Self-esteem x Control Task Before, Self-esteem x 
Control Task After).  
 
Table 4.8 Dummy Coded Self-affirmation and Timing Condition Variables 
 Dummy-coding of condition variables 
Conditions 
Essay 
Affirm 
Before 
Essay 
Affirm 
After  
Scale 
Affirm 
Before 
Scale 
Affirm 
After 
Control 
Task 
Before 
Control 
Task  
After 
Essay affirmation before 
message exposure 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
Essay affirmation after 
message exposure 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Scale affirmation before 
message exposure  
0 0 1 0 0 0 
Scale affirmation after 
message exposure 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
Control task before 
message exposure 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
Control task after  
message exposure 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Message only 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Three sets of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. Indicators of 
defensiveness, message acceptance, attitude, and intention toward limiting alcohol 
consumption were used as the dependent variables. The first set of analyses used data 
from the two essay affirmation conditions (i.e., Essay Affirm Before, Essay Affirm After) 
and the message only condition to test the interaction effects between self-esteem and 
essay affirmation x timing conditions. The second set of analyses used data from the two 
scale affirmation conditions (i.e., Scale Affirm Before, Scale Affirm After) and the 
message only condition to test the interaction effects between self-esteem and scale 
affirmation x timing conditions. The third set of analyses used data from the two control 
conditions (i.e., Control Task Before, Control Task After) and the message only condition 
to test the interaction effects between self-esteem and control task x timing conditions.           
For analyses of psychological discomfort, anger, message skepticism, message 
derogation, perceived manipulation, perceived relevance, alcohol consumption 
reduction attitude, alcohol consumption reduction intention, alcohol consumption 
reduction intention in next month, and alcohol consumption reduction intention in 
next 12 months, the mean-centered current alcohol consumption and mean-centered 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency were entered at step 1 as control variables. The 
dummy-coded condition variables and the mean-centered self-esteem were entered at step 
2 as independent variables and the two-way interaction terms were entered at step 3.   
For analyses of alcohol consumption reduction intention in next three months, 
mean-centered current alcohol consumption was entered as a control variable at step 1. 
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The dummy-coded condition variables and the mean-centered self-esteem were entered 
as independent variables at step 2 and the two-way interaction terms were entered at step 
3.    
For analyses of perceived personal heart disease risk, perceived convincingness, 
and perceived pleasantness, mean-centered spontaneous self-affirmation tendency was 
entered as a control variable at step 1. The dummy-coded condition variables and the 
mean-centered self-esteem were entered as independent variables at step 2 and the two-
way interaction terms were entered at step 3.    
The proposed effects would be indicated by interactions between the condition 
variables and self-esteem. An interaction between Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem 
means that completing an essay affirmation task before message exposure has different 
effects for people with HSE and LSE, and an interaction between Essay Affirm After and 
self-esteem means that completing an essay affirmation task after message exposure has 
different effects for people with HSE and LSE.  
Similarly, an interaction between Scale Affirm Before and self-esteem means that 
completing a scale affirmation task before message exposure has different effects for 
people with HSE and LSE, and an interaction between Scale Affirm After and self-
esteem means that completing a scale affirmation task after message exposure has 
different effects for people with HSE and LSE.  
Last, an interaction between Control Task Before and self-esteem means that 
completing a control task before message exposure has different effects for people with 
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HSE and LSE, and an interaction between Control Task After and self-esteem means 
that completing a control task after message exposure has different effects for people 
with HSE and LSE. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics of dependent and independent 
variables are reported in Table 4.9 to Table 4.12. 
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Outline of Results 
Overall, regression analyses revealed interactions between self-esteem and self-
affirmation manipulations on psychological discomfort, message skepticism, perceived 
personal heart disease risk, perceived convincingness, and perceived pleasantness (See 
Table 4.13). 
Given the complexity of the research design, I will present the results in three 
sections: (1) effects of affirming the most important value before or after message 
exposure, (2) effects of affirming a range of values before or after message exposure, and 
(3) effects of completing a control task before or after message exposure. In each of the 
three sections, I will present the results in three groups based on the category of the 
dependent variable, namely, (1) effects on indicators of defensiveness, (1) effects on 
indicators of message acceptance, and (3) effects on attitude and intention. Next, 
supplemental analyses will be provided to aid further understanding the findings.   
 
Table 4.13 Outline of Study 3 Results 
Effects of affirming the most important value before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Anger - Essay Aff Aft (-) 
Skepticism Essay Aff Aft x SE Essay Aff Bef (-) 
Derogation  - - 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk 
Essay Aff Bef x SE  
Essay Aff Aft x SE 
- 
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Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. 
Essay Aff Bef x SE 
Essay Aff Aft x SE 
- 
Perc. Pleas. Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Perc. Relev. - - 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude - - 
Intention  - - 
Int (Next mo) - - 
Int (Next 3 mo) - - 
Int (Next 12 mo) - - 
Effects of affirming a range of values before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort -  - 
Anger - 
Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Scale Aff Aft (-) 
Skepticism - Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Derogation  - Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk Scale Aff Aft x SE  - 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. Scale Aff Bef x SE  - 
Perc. Pleas. - - 
Perc. Relev. - - 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude - - 
Intention  - Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Int (Next mo) - Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Int (Next 3 mo) - Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Int (Next 12 mo) - - 
Effects of completing a control task before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
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Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort Ctrl Task Bef x SE  - 
Anger - - 
Skepticism - - 
Derogation - - 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Perc. Pleas. - - 
Perc. Relev. - - 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude - - 
Intention  - - 
Int (Next mo) - - 
Int (Next 3 mo) - - 
Int (Next 12 mo) - - 
Note. Discomfort refers to Psychological Discomfort. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manip. refers to Perceived 
Manipulation. Perc. Risk refers to Perceived Personal Heart Disease Risk due to 
Excessive Drinking. Perc. Conv. refers to Perceived Convincingness. Perc. Pleas. refers 
to Perceived Pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to Perceived Relevance. Int refers to 
Intention.  
 
1. Effects of Affirming the Most Important Value before or after Message Exposure 
Effects on Indicators of Defensiveness 
Psychological Discomfort. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
on psychological discomfort between Essay Affirm After and self-esteem, ΔR2Step3 = 
.050, b = -.646, t(184) = -3.26, p = .001 (See Table 4.14 for regression analysis results), 
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but not between Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem. Simple slope analyses showed that 
among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing an essay affirmation task after message 
exposure had a negative effect on psychological discomfort, b = -.999, t(184) = -3.23, p = 
.001. Although the slope for participants with LSE (-1SD) was not statistically 
significantly different from zero, b = .523, t(184) = 1.58, p = .115, it was sufficiently 
higher than the slope for participants with HSE (Z = 3.36, p = .000, one tailed).  
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) expressed lower levels 
of psychological discomfort than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most important value after message 
exposure expressed higher levels of psychological discomfort than their counterparts who 
only read the message (See Figure 4.3).  
 
  
Figure 4.3 Essay Affirm After x self-esteem effect on psychological discomfort 
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Left:    Predicted values for psychological discomfort among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for defensiveness among participants in the Essay Affirm 
After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Anger. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and essay affirmation x 
timing conditions was found on anger. At step 2 of the regression analysis, there was a 
main effect of Essay Affirm After, ΔR2Step2 = .018, b = -.333, t(186) = -1.73, p = .085 
(See Table 4.14 for regression analysis results). Participants who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) reported lower levels 
of anger than participants who only read the message, regardless of their self-esteem 
levels.  
Message Skepticism. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction on 
message skepticism between Essay Affirm After and self-esteem (ΔR2Step3 = .024, b = -
.519, t(184) = -2.05, p = .042) but not between Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem (See 
Table 4.14 for regression analyses results). Simple slope analyses showed that among 
participants with HSE (+1SD), completing an essay affirmation task after message 
exposure had a negative effect on message skepticism, b = -1.14, t(184) = -2.88, p = .004. 
Among participants with LSE (-1SD), completing an essay affirmation task after message 
exposure had no effect on message skepticism, b = .084, t(184) = .198, p = .843.  
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Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) expressed lower levels 
of message skepticism than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most important value after message 
exposure showed no change on message skepticism compared with their counterparts 
who only read the message (See Figure 4.4).  
Moreover, at step 2 of the regression analysis, there was a main effect of Essay 
Affirm Before, ΔR2Step2 = .036, b = -.623, t(186) = -2.18, p = .031 (See Table 4.14 for 
regression analysis results). Participants who affirmed their most important value before 
message exposure were less skeptical of the health message content than participants who 
only read the message, regardless of their self-esteem levels.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Essay Affirm After x self-esteem effect on message skepticism 
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Left:    Predicted values for message skepticism among participants in the Essay Affirm 
After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for defensiveness among participants in the Essay Affirm 
After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Message Derogation. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
essay affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of essay 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.14 for regression analysis results). 
Perceived Manipulation. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
essay affirmation x timing conditions was found on perceived manipulation. There was 
no main effect of essay affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.14 for 
regression analysis results). 
Perceived Personal Heart Disease Risk. The regression analysis demonstrated 
interactions on perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive drinking between 
Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem (ΔR2Step3 = .057, b = .392, t(185) = 1.78, p = .076) 
and between Essay Affirm After and self-esteem (b = .798, t(185) = 3.33, p = .001; See 
Table 4.14 for regression analysis results).  
Regarding the Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that the slope for participants with LSE (-1SD) and that for participants 
with HSE (+1SD) were not statistically significantly different from zero (bLSE = -.514, 
t(184) = -1.41, p = .160; bHSE = .409, t(185) = 1.06, p = .292). However, the slope for 
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participants with HSE was sufficiently higher than the slope for participants with LSE (Z 
= 1.74, p = .041, one tailed). 
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value before message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm Before) expressed lower 
levels of perceived personal risk than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most important value before message 
exposure showed no change on perceived personal risk compared to their counterparts 
who only read the message (See Figure 4.5).   
Regarding the Essay Affirm After and self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), completing an essay 
affirmation task after message exposure had a negative effect on perceived personal risk, 
b = -1.211, t(185) = -3.00, p = .003, while among participants with HSE (+1SD), 
completing an essay affirmation task after message exposure had a positive effect on 
perceived personal risk, b = -.670, t(185) = 1.79, p = .075.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) expressed lower levels 
of perceived personal risk than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most important value after message 
exposure expressed higher levels of perceived personal risk than their counterparts who 
only read the message (See Figure 4.6).   
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Figure 4.5 Essay Affirm Before x self-esteem effect on perceived personal heart disease 
risk due to excessive drinking 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived personal risk among participants in the Essay 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for perceived personal risk
4
 among participants in the Essay 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
                                                 
4
 Because the association between defensiveness and perceived personal risk is negative while that between 
defensiveness and other indicators in the study is positive, to make it easier to compare the observed and 
the hypothesized results of perceived personal risk, I provided separate figures for hypothesized results of 
perceived personal risk rather than using the ones that labeled as “defensiveness” which represent all other 
defensiveness indicators in the study.  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Msg Only Essay Aff Bef
P
er
c.
 P
er
so
n
a
l 
R
is
k
 
Actual Results 
Low SE
High SE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Msg Only Essay Aff Bef
P
er
c.
 P
er
so
n
a
l 
R
is
k
 
Hypothesized Results 
Low SE
High SE
   215 
 
  
Figure 4.6 Essay Affirm After x self-esteem effect on perceived personal heart disease 
risk due to excessive drinking 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived personal risk among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for perceived personal risk among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Effects on Indicators of Message Acceptance 
Perceived Convincingness. The regression analysis demonstrated interactions on 
perceived convincingness of message between Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem 
(ΔR2Step 3 = .040, b = .398, t(185) = 2.56, p = .011) and between Essay Affirm After and 
self-esteem (b = .353, t(185) = 2.08, p = .039; See Table 4.14 for regression analysis 
results).   
Regarding the Essay Affirm Before and self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing an essay 
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affirmation task before message exposure had a positive effect on perceived 
convincingness, b = .586, t(185) = 2.15, p = .033. Although the slope for participants with 
LSE (-1SD) was not statistically significantly different from zero, b = -.352, t(185) = -
1.37, p = .172, it was sufficiently lower than the slope for participants with HSE (Z = -
2.50, p = .006, one tailed). 
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value before message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm Before) expressed higher 
levels of perceived convincingness than their counterparts who only read the message, 
while participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most important value before 
message exposure showed slightly lower perceived convincingness compared to their 
counterparts who only read the message (See Figure 4.7).   
Regarding the Essay Affirm After and self-esteem interaction, similarly, simple 
slope analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing an essay 
affirmation task after message exposure had a positive effect on perceived 
convincingness, b = .535, t(184) = 2.01, p = .046, while among participants with LSE (-
1SD), completing an essay affirmation task after message exposure had no effect on 
perceived convincingness, b = -.351, t(184) = -1.22, p = .223. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) expressed higher levels 
of perceived convincingness than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most important value after message 
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exposure showed no change on perceived convincingness compared to their counterparts 
who only read the message (See Figure 4.8).   
 
 
Figure 4.7 Essay Affirm Before x self-esteem effect on perceived convincingness of 
message 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived convincingness among participants in the Essay 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for message acceptance among participants in the Essay 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
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Figure 4.8 Essay Affirm After x self-esteem effect on perceived convincingness of 
message 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived convincingness among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for message acceptance among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Perceived Pleasantness. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction on 
perceived pleasantness of message between Essay Affirm After and self-esteem (ΔR2Step 3 
= .041, b = .647, t(185) = 2.85, p = .005) but not between Essay Affirm Before and self-
esteem (See Table 4.15 for regression analysis results). Simple slope analyses showed 
that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing an essay affirmation task after 
message exposure had a positive effect on perceived pleasantness, b = .856, t(185) = 2.41, 
p = .017, while among participants with LSE (-1SD), completing an essay affirmation 
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task after message exposure had a negative effect on perceived pleasantness, b = -.668, 
t(185) = -1.77, p = .079.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed their most 
important value after message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After) expressed higher levels 
of perceived pleasantness than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed their most important value after message 
exposure expressed lower levels of perceived pleasantness compared to their counterparts 
who only read the message (See Figure 4.9).   
 
  
Figure 4.9 Essay Affirm Before x self-esteem effect on perceived pleasantness of 
message 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived pleasantness of message among participants in the 
Essay Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD 
below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for message acceptance among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
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Perceived Relevance. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
essay affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of essay 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.15 for regression analysis results). 
Effects on Attitude and Intention 
Attitude. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and essay affirmation 
x timing conditions was found on participants’ attitude toward limiting their alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time they drink. There was no main effect of 
essay affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.16 for regression analysis 
results). 
Intention. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and essay 
affirmation x timing conditions was found on participants’ intention to limit their alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time they drink. There was no main effect of 
essay affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.16 for regression analysis 
results). 
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Table 4.15 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables (Step 2 and 3 Results) 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
N = 192    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 5.19*** .13  3.86*** .17  4.19*** .23 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .14 .10 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .06 .06    .10 .08    .09 .11 
Essay Aff Bef   .10
 
.19    .29 .26   -.29 .35 
Essay Aff Aft   .11 .19    .15
 
.26   -.36 .34 
Self-esteem   .05 .07    .16† .10   -.06 .13 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 2) .015 (.004)  .039 (.020)  .026 (.008) 
(Constant) 5.19*** .13  3.86*** .17  4.19*** .23 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .13 .10 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .06 .06    .11 .08    .09 .11 
Essay Aff Bef   .14
 
.19    .29 .26   -.25 .35 
Essay Aff Aft   .11 .19    .13
 
.25   -.35 .34 
Self-esteem  -.17 .11   -.07 .14   -.08 .20 
SE x Essay Aff Bef   .40* .16    .21 .21    .36 .29 
SE x Essay Aff Aft   .35* .17    .65** .23    .10 .31 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 3) .055 (.040)  .080 (.041)  .034 (.009) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Spon. Self-affirmation refers to 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency. 
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2. Effects of Affirming a Range of Values before or after Message Exposure 
Effects on Indicators of Defensiveness 
Psychological Discomfort. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
scale affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of scale 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.17 for regression analysis results).  
Anger. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and scale affirmation x 
timing conditions was found. At step 2 of the regression analysis, there was a main effect 
of Scale Affirm Before, ΔR2Step2 = .044, b = -.397, t(187) = -2.36, p = .019, and a main 
effect of Scale Affirm After, b = -.310, t(187) = -1.87, p = .063 (See Table 4.17 for 
regression analysis results). This means that participants who affirmed a range of values 
before or after message exposure reported lower levels of anger than participants who 
only read the message, regardless of their self-esteem levels.  
Message Skepticism. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and scale 
affirmation x timing conditions was found. At step 2 of the regression analysis, there was 
a main effect of Scale Affirm Before on message skepticism, ΔR2Step2 = .056, b = -.938, 
t(187) = -3.34, p = .001 (See Table 4.17 for regression analysis results). Participants who 
affirmed a range of values before message exposure were less skeptical of the health 
message content than participants who only read the message, regardless of their self-
esteem levels.  
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Message Derogation. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
scale affirmation x timing conditions was found. At step 2 of the regression analysis, 
there was a main effect of Scale Affirm Before on message derogation (ΔR2Step2 = .028, b 
= -.522, t(187) = -2.27, p = .024; See Table 4.17 for regression analysis results). 
Participants who affirmed a range of values before message exposure showed lower 
message derogation than participants who only read the message, regardless of their self-
esteem levels.  
Perceived Manipulation. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
scale affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of scale 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.17 for regression analysis results).  
Perceived Personal Heart Disease Risk. The regression analysis demonstrated 
interactions on perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive drinking between 
Scale Affirm After and self-esteem (ΔR2Step3 = .034, b = .579, t(188) = 2.58, p = .011) but 
not between Scale Affirm Before and self-esteem (See Table 4.17 for regression analysis 
results). Simple slope analyses showed that among participants with LSE (-1SD), 
completing a scale affirmation task after message exposure had a negative effect on 
perceived personal risk, b = -1.02, t(188) = -2.51, p = .013, while among participants with 
HSE (+1SD), completing a scale affirmation task after message exposure had no effect on 
perceived personal risk, b = .349, t(188) = 1.00, p = .321. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a range of 
values after message exposure (i.e., Scale Affirm After) expressed lower levels of 
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perceived personal risk than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
participants with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a range of values after message exposure 
showed no change on perceived personal risk compared to their counterparts who only 
read the message (See Figure 4.10).   
 
  
Figure 4.10 Scale Affirm After x self-esteem effect on perceived personal heart disease 
risk due to excessive drinking 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived personal risk among participants in the Scale 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for perceived personal risk among participants in the Scale 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
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Effects on Indicators of Message Acceptance 
Perceived Convincingness. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
on perceived convincingness of message between Scale Affirm Before and self-esteem 
(ΔR2Step 3 = .027, b = .359, t(188) = 2.23, p = .027) but not between Scale Affirm After 
and self-esteem (See Table 4.18 for regression analysis results). Simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing a scale affirmation task 
before message exposure had a positive effect on perceived convincingness, b = .801, 
t(188) = 2.37, p = .018, while among participants with LSE (-1SD), completing a scale 
affirmation task before message exposure had no effect on perceived convincingness, b = 
-.073, t(188) = -.31, p = .755. 
Partially supporting the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who affirmed a 
range of values before message exposure (i.e., Scale Affirm Before) expressed higher 
levels of perceived convincingness than their counterparts who only read the message, 
while participants with LSE (-1SD) who affirmed a range of values before message 
exposure showed no change on perceived convincingness compared to their counterparts 
who only read the message (See Figure 4.11).   
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Figure 4.11 Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem effect on perceived convincingness of 
message 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived convincingness among participants in the Scale 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for message acceptance among participants in the Scale 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Perceived Pleasantness. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
scale affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of scale 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.18 for regression analysis results). 
Perceived Relevance. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and 
scale affirmation x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of scale 
affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.18 for regression analysis results). 
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Effects on Attitude and Intention 
Attitude. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and scale affirmation 
x timing conditions was found on participants’ attitude toward limiting their alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time they drink. There was no main effect of 
scale affirmation x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.19 for regression analysis 
results). 
Intention. Unexpectedly, no interaction between self-esteem and scale 
affirmation x timing conditions was found on participants’ intention to limit their alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time they drink. However, there was a main 
effect of Scale Affirm Before on participants’ intentions to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time they drink, ΔR2Step 2 = .038, b = .594, t(187) = 1.93, p = 
.056 (See Table 4.19 for regression analysis results). Participants who affirmed a range of 
values before message exposure showed higher intentions to limit alcohol consumption 
every time they drink than participants who only read the message, regardless of their 
self-esteem levels.  
The same pattern of result carried over to two intention measures with time 
frames. There was a main effect of Scale Affirm Before on participants’ intentions to 
limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time they drink in the following 
month, ΔR2Step 2 = .015, b = .596, t(187) = 1.68, p = .095, and in next three months, 
ΔR2Step 2 = .020, b = .640, t(188) = 1.91, p = .058 (See Table 4.19 for regression analysis 
results). Compared to participants who only read the message, participants who affirmed 
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a range of values before message exposure reported higher intentions to limit their 
alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time they drink in the following month 
and in next three months.  
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Table 4.18 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables (Step 2 and 3 Results) 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
N = 195    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 5.20*** .13  3.84*** .17  4.22*** .22 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .14 .09 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .10 .06    .03 .08    .23* .11 
Essay Aff Bef   .19
 
.20   -.28 .26   -.18 .34 
Essay Aff Aft   .02 .20    .22
 
.26    .44 .33 
Self-esteem  -.00 .07    .03 .09   -.03 .12 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 2) .023 (.006)  .020 (.019)  .063 (.017) 
(Constant) 5.19*** .13  3.84*** .17  4.22*** .22 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .13 .09 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .10 .06    .02 .08    .23* .11 
Essay Aff Bef   .21
 
.20   -.27 .26   -.18 .34 
Essay Aff Aft   .01 .20    .23
 
.26    .40 .33 
Self-esteem  -.18† .11   -.03 .14   -.14 .19 
SE x Essay Aff Bef   .36* .16    .24 .21    .09 .27 
SE x Essay Aff Aft   .24 .16   -.02 .21    .28 .28 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 3) .049 (.027)  .029 (.008)  .068 (.005) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Spon. Self-affirmation refers to 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency. 
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3. Effects of Completing a Control Task before or after Message Exposure  
Effects on Indicators of Defensiveness 
Psychological Discomfort. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
on psychological discomfort between Control Task Before and self-esteem (ΔR2Step3 = 
.016, b = -.350, t(179) = -1.74, p = .084), but not between other condition variables and 
self-esteem (See Table 4.20 for regression analysis results). Simple slope analyses 
showed that the slopes for participants with HSE (+1SD) (b = -.339, t(179) = -1.02, p = 
.311) and with LSE (-1SD) (b = .548, t(179) = 1.45, p = .149) were not statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, the slope for participants with LSE was 
sufficiently higher than the slope for participants with HSE (Z = 1.76, p = .039, one 
tailed).  
Unexpectedly, participants with LSE (-1SD) who completed a control task before 
message exposure (i.e., Control Task Before) expressed slightly higher levels of 
psychological discomfort than their counterparts who only read the message, while 
people with HSE (+1SD) who completed a control task before message exposure 
expressed slightly lower levels of psychological discomfort than their counterparts who 
only read the message (See Figure 4.12).  
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Figure 4.12 Control Task Before x self-esteem effect on psychological discomfort 
Left:    Predicted values for psychological discomfort among participants in the Control 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for defensiveness among participants in the Control Task 
Before or After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below 
the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Anger. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and control task x timing 
conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x timing conditions, 
either (See Table 4.20 for regression analysis results). 
Message Skepticism. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and 
control task x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.20 for regression analysis results). 
Message Derogation. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and 
control task x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.20 for regression analysis results). 
1
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Perceived Manipulation. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and 
control task x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.20 for regression analysis results). 
Perceived Personal Heart Disease Risk. The regression analysis demonstrated 
an interaction on perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive drinking between 
Control Task After and self-esteem (ΔR2Step3 = .022, b = .410, t(180) = 1.98, p = .050), 
but not between Control Task Before and self-esteem (See Table 4.20 for regression 
analysis results). Simple slope analyses showed that the slopes for participants with HSE 
(+1SD) (b = .592, t(180) = 1.51, p = .208) and with LSE (-1SD) (b = -.447, t(180) = -
1.26, p = .208) were not statistically significantly different from zero. However, the slope 
for participants with HSE was sufficiently higher than the slope for participants with LSE 
(Z = 1.96, p = .024, one tailed).  
Unexpectedly, participants with HSE (+1SD) who completed a control task after 
message exposure (i.e., Control Task After) expressed slightly higher levels of perceived 
personal risk than their counterparts who only read the message, while people with LSE 
(-1SD) who completed a control task after message exposure expressed slightly lower 
levels of perceived personal risk than their counterparts who only read the message (See 
Figure 4.13). 
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Figure 4.13 Control Task After x self-esteem effect on perceived personal heart disease 
risk due to excessive drinking 
Left:     Predicted values for perceived personal risk among participants in the Control 
Task After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for perceived personal risk among participants in the Control 
Task Before or After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD 
below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Effects on Indicators of Message Acceptance 
Perceived Convincingness. The regression analysis demonstrated an interaction 
on perceived convincingness of message between Control Task After and self-esteem 
(ΔR2Step 3 = .032, b = .403, t(180) = 2.41, p = .017), but not between Control Task Before 
and self-esteem (See Table 4.21 for regression analysis results). Simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing a control task after 
message exposure had a positive effect on perceived convincingness, b = .592, t(180) = 
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1.86, p = .064, while among participants with LSE (-1SD), completing a control task after 
message exposure had no effect, b = -.429, t(180) = -1.51, p = .134. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, people with HSE (+1SD) who did a control task after 
message exposure (i.e., Control Task After) expressed higher levels of perceived 
convincingness than their counterparts who only read the message, while participants 
with LSE (-1SD) who did a control task after message exposure showed no change on 
perceived convincingness compared to their counterparts who only read the message (See 
Figure 4.14).   
 
  
Figure 4.14 Control Task After x self-esteem effect on perceived convincingness of 
message 
Left:    Predicted values for perceived convincingness among participants in the Control 
Task After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
Right:  Hypothesized results for message acceptance among participants in the Control 
Task Before or After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD 
below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
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Perceived Pleasantness. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and 
control task x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.21 for regression analysis results). 
Perceived Relevance. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and 
control task x timing conditions was found. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.21 for regression analysis results). 
Effects on Attitude and Intention 
Attitude. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and control task x 
timing conditions was found on participants’ attitude toward limiting their alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time they drink. There was no main effect of 
control task x timing conditions, either (See Table 4.22 for regression analysis results). 
Intention. As expected, no interaction between self-esteem and control task x 
timing conditions was found on participants’ intention to limit their alcohol consumption 
to the moderate level every time they drink. There was no main effect of control task x 
timing conditions, either (See Table 4.22 for regression analysis results). 
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Table 4.21 Regression Analyses with Message Acceptance Measures as Dependent 
Variables (Step 2 and 3 Results) 
 
Perceived 
Convincingness  
Perceived 
Pleasantness  
Perceived 
Relevance 
N = 187    b SE     b SE     b SE 
(Constant) 5.20*** .14  3.86*** .17  4.20*** .22 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .22 .09 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .13 .07    .14 .08    .16 .11 
Essay Aff Bef  -.20
 
.22   -.14 .26   -.19 .34 
Essay Aff Aft   .02 .22    .07
 
.26   -.10 .34 
Self-esteem  -.03 .08    .01 .09   -.07 .12 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 2) .022 (.008)  .018 (.003)  .045 (.004) 
(Constant) 5.20*** .14  3.86*** .17  4.20*** .22 
Alcohol Consumption    -   -     -   -    .22 .09 
Spon. Self-affirmation   .12† .07    .13 .09    .14 .11 
Essay Aff Bef  -.19
 
.21   -.15 .26   -.14 .34 
Essay Aff Aft   .08 .21    .09
 
.26   -.05 .34 
Self-esteem  -.19 .12   -.08 .14   -.07 .19 
SE x Essay Aff Bef   .11 .17    .11 .21   -.20 .28 
SE x Essay Aff Aft   .40* .17    .18 .20    .18 .27 
R
2
 (ΔR2 Step 3) .054 (.032)  .023 (.004)  .054 (.009) 
Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .1. Spon. Self-affirmation refers to 
spontaneous self-affirmation tendency. 
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Supplementary Analysis 
Similar to Study 2, the distribution of self-esteem scores in the sample was 
negatively skewed, though less severe than in the Study 2 sample (Skewness Study3 = -.395 
vs. Skewness Study2 = -.795; See Figure 4.15). As discussed in Study 2, the skewed 
distribution of self-esteem might have reduced the statistical power of the regression 
analyses in detecting self-esteem x self-affirmation interaction effects (McClelland & 
Judd, 1993).  
Previous research suggests that self-affirmation effects are usually more 
pronounced among individuals who are at moderate to high risk, because to them, the 
health risk information is most personally relevant and threatening (e.g., Harris & 
Napper, 2005; van Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009). Thus, because the self-affirmation 
effects are theorized to be more pronounced (e.g., have bigger effect sizes) among people 
at moderate to high risk, if there were essay affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects 
but the skewed self-esteem distribution reduced the statistical power for detecting these 
effects, we may still be able to detect these effects among participants at moderate to high 
risk if they were not found in the full sample. 
To examine whether the proposed interaction effects can be found among people 
for whom the self-affirmation effects are theoretically most pronounced, I restricted the 
sample to participants with high levels of personal risk and reran the regression analyses 
for each dependent variable.   
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Personal risk level in this study refers to participants’ levels of risk of developing 
heart disease due to excessive drinking. It is inferred though participants’ current alcohol 
consumption levels. I operationalized high levels of personal risk as engaging in high-risk 
drinking defined by USDA dietary guidelines 2015-2020: consuming more than 3 drinks 
on any day for women
5
 and more than 4 drinks on any day for men (“Appendix 9. 
Alcohol,” n.d.). Selecting high-risk drinkers resulted in a sample size of 218 for the new 
analyses (See Table 4.23). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Histogram showing the distribution of self-esteem scores 
                                                 
5
 The question assessing alcohol consumption on a typical drinking day collapsed 3 drinks and 4 drinks into 
the same category. Therefore, I categorized women who selected “3 to 4 drinks” or more as high-risk 
drinkers.  
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Table 4.23 Current Alcohol Consumption 
Reponses to the question “During the last 12 months, on a typical day when you drank 
alcohol, how many drinks did you have?” 
 Women Men Other
6
 
Number of Drinks Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
2 drinks 145 50.9   1     25 
3 to 4 drinks 94 33.0 60 43.8 2 50 
5 to 6 drinks 26 9.1 36 26.3 1 25 
7 to 8 drinks 7 2.5 18 13.1   
9 to 11 drinks 6 2.1 10 7.3   
12 to 15 drinks 1 .4 7 5.1   
16 to 18 drinks 3 1.1 4 2.9   
19 to 24 drinks 1 .4 1 .7   
25 or more drinks 2 .7 1 .7   
Total 185 100 137 100 4 100 
 
Regression analyses with the high-risk drinker subsample were conducted for 
each dependent variable with mean-centered self-esteem and dummy-coded self-
affirmation x timing experimental condition variables (i.e., Essay Affirm Before, Essay 
Affirm After, Scale Affirm Before, Scale Affirm After, Control Task Before, and Control 
Task After) entered at step 1 and the six two-way interaction terms of condition variable 
x self-esteem entered at step 2. To avoid further reducing degree of freedom in the 
                                                 
6
 Because the question on gender asked about the gender participants identify with rather than their 
biological and physiological characteristics “sex,” it is impossible to determine whether participants who 
identified as “other” were male or female. I followed the guideline for male for these participants and 
categorized the participant that drinks 5 to 6 drinks on a typical drink day as high-risk drinker. 
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analyses, I did not include spontaneous self-affirmation tendency or current alcohol 
consumption as control variables. 
On the indicators of defensiveness and message acceptance, most of the self-
affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects that were identified in previous analyses with 
the full sample remained evident in the analyses with high-risk drinkers. Exceptions were 
the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction on message skepticism, the Essay 
Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction on perceived personal risk and perceived 
convincingness, and the Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction on perceived 
convincingness (See Table 4.24 for an outline). Because the nature of the interaction 
effects on the indicators of defensiveness and message acceptance is consistent with the 
interaction effects identified in the previous analyses with the full sample, I will not 
report individual simple slope analyses for these interactions.   
Interestingly, the new analyses with the high-risk drinkers revealed interaction 
effects on attitude and intention measures between Essay Affirm After and self-esteem, 
between Scale Affirm Before and self-esteem, and between Control Task After and self-
esteem: 
On attitude toward limiting alcohol consumption to the moderate level, the 
regression analysis revealed an Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction (ΔR2Step 3 = 
.034, b = .471, t(204) = 1.78, p = .077) and a Control Task After x self-esteem interaction 
(b = .451, t(204) = 1.86, p = .064).  
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On intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level, the regression 
analysis revealed an Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction (ΔR2Step 3 = .042, b = 
.692, t(204) = 1.84, p = .067) and a Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction (b = 
.876, t(204) = 2.42, p = .016).  
On intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level in the 
following month, the regression analysis revealed an Essay Affirm After x self-esteem 
interaction (ΔR2Step 3 = .054, b = .994, t(204) = 2.40, p = .017), a Scale Affirm Before x 
self-esteem interaction (b = 1.06, t(204) = 2.67, p = .008), and a Control Task After x 
self-esteem interaction (b = .650, t(204) = 1.72, p = .087).  
On intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level in next three 
months, the regression analysis revealed an Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction 
(ΔR2Step 3 = .028, b = .894, t(204) = 2.23, p = .027).  
On intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level in next twelve 
months, the regression analysis revealed an Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction 
(ΔR2Step 3 = .045, b = 1.12, t(204) = 2.75, p = .007) and a Scale Affirm Before x self-
esteem interaction (b = .845, t(204) = 2.16, p = .032).      
 
Table 4.24 Outline of Analyses Results with the High-Risk Drinker Subsample 
Effects of affirming the most important value before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Anger - Essay Aff Aft (-) 
Skepticism Essay Aff Aft x SE Essay Aff Bef (-) 
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Essay Aff Aft (-) 
Derogation  - - 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk 
Essay Aff Bef x SE  
Essay Aff Aft x SE 
- 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. 
Essay Aff Bef x SE 
Essay Aff Aft x SE 
- 
Perc. Pleas. Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Perc. Relev. - Essay Aff Aft (-) 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Intention  Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Int (Next mo) Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Int (Next 3 mo) Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Int (Next 12 mo) Essay Aff Aft x SE - 
Effects of affirming a range of values before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort Scale Aff Bef x SE - 
Anger - 
Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Scale Aff Aft (-) 
Skepticism - 
Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Scale Aff Aft (-) 
Derogation  - Scale Aff Bef (-) 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk Scale Aff Aft x SE  - 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. 
Scale Aff Bef x SE  
Scale Aff Aft x SE 
- 
Perc. Pleas. - - 
Perc. Relev. - - 
Attitude and Attitude - - 
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Intention 
Measures 
Intention  Scale Aff Bef x SE Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Int (Next mo) Scale Aff Bef x SE 
Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Scale Aff Aft (+) 
Int (Next 3 mo) - 
Scale Aff Bef (+) 
Scale Aff Aft (+) 
Int (Next 12 mo) Scale Aff Bef x SE - 
Effects of completing a control task before or after message exposure 
Dependent Variables Interaction Effects Main Effects 
Indicators of 
Defensiveness 
Discomfort Ctrl Task Bef x SE  - 
Anger - Ctrl Task Aft (-) 
Skepticism - - 
Derogation - - 
Perc. Manip. - - 
Perc. Risk Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Indicators of 
Message 
Acceptance 
Perc. Conv. Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Perc. Pleas. - - 
Perc. Relev. - - 
Attitude and 
Intention 
Measures 
Attitude Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Intention  - - 
Int (Next mo) Ctrl Task Aft x SE - 
Int (Next 3 mo) - - 
Int (Next 12 mo) - - 
Note. Discomfort refers to Psychological Discomfort. Skepticism refers to Message 
Skepticism. Derogation refers to Message Derogation. Perc. Manip. refers to Perceived 
Manipulation. Perc. Risk refers to Perceived Personal Heart Disease Risk due to 
Excessive Drinking. Perc. Conv. refers to Perceived Convincingness. Perc. Pleas. refers 
to Perceived Pleasantness. Perc. Relev. refers to Perceived Relevance. Int refers to 
Intention.  
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Attitude toward Limiting Alcohol Consumption 
Regarding the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had a positive effect on attitude toward limiting alcohol 
consumption, b = .758, t(204) = 1.76, p = .088. However, among participants with LSE (-
1SD), affirming the most important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -
.418, t(204) = -.90, p = .367 (See Figure 4.16).  
Regarding the Control Task After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), completing a control task after 
message exposure had a positive effect on attitude toward limiting alcohol consumption, 
b = .814, t(204) = 1.87, p = .063. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), 
affirming the most important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -.312, 
t(204) = -.68, p = .495 (See Figure 4.16).  
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Figure 4.16 Effects of Essay Affirm After x self-esteem and Control Task After x self-
esteem on attitude toward limiting alcohol consumption to the moderate level among high 
risk drinkers 
a. Predicted values for attitude among participants in the Essay Affirm After condition 
and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD 
above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
b. Predicted values for attitude among participants in the Control Task After condition 
and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD 
above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Intention to Limit Alcohol Consumption 
Regarding the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time one drinks, b = 1.550, t(204) = 2.55, p = .012. However, 
among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming the most important value after message 
exposure had no effect, b = -.178, t(204) = -.27, p = .787, bMean SE = .686, t(204) = 1.61, p 
= .109 (See Figure 4.17).  
Regarding the Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD) and those with mean levels of 
self-esteem, affirming a range of values before message exposure had a positive effect on 
intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time one drinks, b = 
2.151, t(204) = 3.32, p = .001. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD) affirming 
the most important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -.037, t(204) = -.06, p 
= .953 (See Figure 4.17).  
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Figure 4.17 Effects of Essay Affirm After x self-esteem and Scale Affirm Before x self-
esteem on intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time one 
drinks among high risk drinkers 
a. Predicted values for intention among participants in the Essay Affirm After condition 
and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD 
above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
b. Predicted values for intention among participants in the Scale Affirm Before condition 
and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD 
above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Intention to Limit Alcohol Consumption in the Following Month 
Regarding the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time one drinks in the following month, b = 2.286, t(204) = 
3.40, p = .001. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming the most 
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important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -.196, t(204) = -.27, p = .787 
(See Figure 4.18). 
Regarding the Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD) and those with mean levels of 
self-esteem, affirming a range of values before message exposure had a positive effect on 
intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time one drinks in the 
following month, b = 2.507, t(204) = 3.51, p = .001. However, among participants with 
LSE (-1SD), affirming the most important value after message exposure had no effect, b 
= -.015, t(204) = -.22, p = .828 (See Figure 4.18).  
Regarding the Control Task After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a range of values before 
message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption to the 
moderate level every time one drinks in the following month, b = 1.79, t(204) = 2.63, p = 
.009. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had no effect, b = .166, t(204) = .233, p = .816 (See Figure 4.18).  
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Figure 4.18 Effects of Essay Affirm After x self-esteem, Scale Affirm Before x self-
esteem, and Control Task After x self-esteem on intention to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time one drinks in the following month among high risk 
drinkers 
a. Predicted values for intention in the following month among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
b. Predicted values for intention in the following month among participants in the Scale 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
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c. Predicted values for intention in the following month among participants in the Control 
Task After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Intention to Limit Alcohol Consumption in Next Three Months 
Regarding the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time one drinks in the following month, b = 2.062, t(204) = 
3.16, p = .002. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming the most 
important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -.171, t(204) = -.24, p = .808 
(See Figure 4.19). 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Essay Affirm After x self-esteem effect on intention to limit alcohol 
consumption to the moderate level every time one drinks in next three months among 
high risk drinkers 
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Predicted values for intention in next three months among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the mean) 
and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
Intention to Limit Alcohol Consumption in Next Twelve Months 
Regarding the Essay Affirm After x self-esteem interaction, simple slope analyses 
showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming the most important value 
after message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption to 
the moderate level every time one drinks in next twelve months, b = 2.132, t(204) = 3.22, 
p = .001. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD), affirming the most important 
value after message exposure had no effect, bLSE = -.666, t(204) = -.94, p = .351 (See 
Figure 4.20). 
Regarding the Scale Affirm Before x self-esteem interaction, simple slope 
analyses showed that among participants with HSE (+1SD), affirming a range of values 
before message exposure had a positive effect on intention to limit alcohol consumption 
to the moderate level every time one drinks in next twelve months, b = 2.041, t(204) = 
2.92, p = .004. However, among participants with LSE (-1SD) affirming the most 
important value after message exposure had no effect, b = -.070, t(204) = -.10, p = .918 
(See Figure 4.20).  
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Figure 4.20 Effects of Essay Affirm After x self-esteem and Scale Affirm Before x self-
esteem on intention to limit alcohol consumption to the moderate level every time one 
drinks in next twelve months among high risk drinkers 
a. Predicted values for intention in next twelve months among participants in the Essay 
Affirm After condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
b. Predicted values for intention in next twelve months among participants in the Scale 
Affirm Before condition and the message only condition with low (1 SD below the 
mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of self-esteem (SE) 
 
 
In summary, the above results showed that among high-risk drinkers, compared to 
their counterparts who only read the message, affirming the most important value after 
message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm After), affirming a range of values before message 
exposure (i.e., Scale Affirm Before), or completing the control task after message 
exposure (i.e., Control Task After) increased attitude and intention toward limiting 
alcohol consumption among participants with HSE but not LSE. This finding supported 
my hypothesis that affirming a range of values before message exposure increases 
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attitude and intention for people with HSE but not LSE. However, it did not support my 
hypotheses that affirming the most important value after message exposure decreases 
attitude and intention for people with HSE but not LSE and that completing a control task 
before or after message exposure has no differential effects on people with HSE and LSE.  
The nature of the above self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects among 
the high-risk drinkers on attitude and intention is consistent with the interaction effects 
identified on defensiveness and message acceptance with the full sample: regardless of 
the format and timing, self-affirmation benefited participants with HSE but not LSE. 
What is surprising is that even completing a control task after message exposure 
benefited people with HSE but not LSE. There are two areas about these findings that are 
especially puzzling: (1) timing of self-affirmation did not matter and (2) people with HSE 
always benefit, even with a control task. In the following sections, I will discuss my 
tentative explanation for each of them.  
Timing of Self-Affirmation 
Given the complexity of the study design, a brief recap of the reasoning behind 
my hypothesis regarding the timing of self-affirmation may help make clear the 
discrepancies between the results and the hypotheses. I proposed that the timing of self-
affirmation in relation to message exposure (i.e., self-affirm before or after message 
exposure) would determine when self-affirmation reduces defensiveness among people 
with HSE and LSE, because the timing of self-affirmation would determine whether self-
esteem functions as resources or as expectancies (Stone, 1999).  
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Self-affirming before health message exposure enables self-esteem to function as 
resources because self-affirmation brings favorable knowledge about the self into the 
working memory before the threat to the self occurs. Therefore, those who have more 
favorable self-knowledge in the working memory (e.g., people with HSE) will be more 
capable of withstanding the threat than those with less favorable self-knowledge (e.g., 
people with LSE). The overall pattern of results from Study 3 confirmed this hypothesis: 
people with HSE benefited from self-affirming before message exposure (i.e., reduced 
defensiveness, increased message acceptance, attitude, and intention) while people with 
LSE did not.  
Self-affirming after health message exposure enables self-esteem to function as 
expectancies because the self-directed attention caused by self-affirmation increases 
people’s sensitivity to self-evaluative information in the message and highlights any 
discrepancies between one’s self-expectancies and one’s health-compromising behavior. 
Therefore, those who hold higher self-expectancies (e.g., people with HSE) will 
experience greater discrepancies and thus exhibit higher defensiveness than those who 
hold lower self-expectancies (e.g., people with LSE). The overall pattern of results from 
Study 3 contradicted this hypothesis: again, people with HSE benefited from self-
affirming after message exposure (i.e., reduced defensiveness, increased message 
acceptance, attitude, and intention) while people with LSE did not.  
How, then, dose self-affirming after message exposure result in the same 
differential effects for people with HSE and LSE as self-affirming before message 
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exposure? One possible explanation is that people who self-affirmed after message 
exposure may have used completing the self-affirmation task as a way to repair their 
challenged sense of self-integrity after message exposure. The logic is as follows. When 
the self is threatened, the discomforting implication of the threat for the self will propel 
the individual to use whatever means that is most readily available to reduce the 
discomfort and restore a sense of self-integrity (Steele, 1988). Given that the self-
affirmation task was presented immediately after message exposure and that the task was 
designed to focus participants’ minds on their positive knowledge of themselves, the self-
affirmation task may have provided an excellent venue for participants to restore their 
sense of self-integrity by reminding themselves that they are doing well in other domains 
of life. Therefore, because their sense of self-integrity is restored, the discomfort 
subsided, and the need to engage in defensive processing reduced.   
If this is the case, we should expect participants in the self-affirmation after 
message exposure conditions to cast themselves in a more favorable light when 
responding to the self-affirmation tasks than participants in the self-affirmation before 
message exposure conditions. This speculation is based on previous research that when 
people’s positive views about themselves are questioned, they tend to enhance the 
positivity of their alternative personal qualities or traits to compensate for the threat to the 
self (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Brown & Smart, 1991), a phenomenon known as 
compensatory self-enhancement (Baumeister & Jones, 1978). People with HSE are found 
to be more likely to use compensatory self-enhancement as a strategy to cope with threat 
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to the self (e.g., Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; 
Crocker at al., 1987). 
To test whether participants in the self-affirmation after message exposure 
conditions engaged in compensatory self-enhancement during the self-affirmation task, I 
compared participants’ responses to the scale self-affirmation task7 between scale 
affirmation before and after message exposure conditions. If participants in the scale 
affirmation after message exposure condition used the opportunity to complete the value 
scale as a way to compensate for the blow to the self caused by the health message, they 
would express higher average agreement with the ten value statements than their 
counterparts who completed the value scale before message exposure. I thus computed 
the mean of each participant’s responses to the value scale (M = 5.95, SD = .72) and 
compared the mean levels between participants who completed the value scale before and 
after message exposure.  
Analysis with the full sample showed that the difference on the average 
agreement with the value statements between those who scale affirmed after message 
exposure (M = 6.05, SD = .72) and those who scale affirmed before message exposure (M 
= 5.84, SD = .70) was not statistically significant but was in the hypothesized direction, d 
= .29, t(118) = 1.58, p = .116. Among the high-risk drinkers, however, the difference was 
substantial: participants who completed the scale affirmation task after message exposure 
showed much higher average agreement with the value statements (M = 6.21, SD = .59) 
                                                 
7
 The self-affirmation scale contained ten positively phrased statements about personal strengths and values. 
Participants in these two conditions indicated to what degree each of the statements described who they are. 
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than participants who completed the scale affirmation task before message exposure (M = 
5.55, SD = .70), d = 1.01, t(59) = 3.97, p = .000. This means that participants in the self-
affirmation after message exposure condition, particularly the high-risk drinkers to whom 
the health message was most threatening, might have engaged in compensatory self-
enhancement to restore their sense of self-integrity.  
To test whether high-risk drinkers with HSE were more likely to engage in 
compensatory self-enhancement through the scale affirmation task after message 
exposure than high-risk drinkers with LSE, a regression analysis was conducted with 
high-risk drinkers’ average agreement of the scale affirmation value statements as the 
dependent variable. Mean-centered self-esteem and dummy-coded timing condition were 
entered at step 1 and the interaction term of self-esteem x timing was entered at step 2. 
The analysis showed no interaction between self-esteem and timing on high-risk 
drinkers’ average agreement of the value statements (ΔR2Step 2 = .004). There was a main 
effect of self-esteem (R
2
Step 1 = .368, b = .243, t(57) = 3.80, p = .000) and a main effect of 
timing (b = .534, t(57) = 3.50, p = .001). 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to suggest that self-affirming after message 
exposure resulted in the same differential effects for people with HSE and LSE as self-
affirming before message exposure is because participants in the self-affirmation after 
message exposure condition, particularly the high-risk drinkers, might have engaged in 
compensatory self-enhancement through the self-affirmation task to restore their sense of 
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self-integrity. This compensatory self-enhancement might have reduced the discomfort 
induced by the threatening message and thus reduced the need for defensive processing. 
High Self-Esteem and the Control Task 
How do we interpret the finding that completing a control task achieved similar 
effects as the self-affirmation tasks for people with HSE? I speculate that this is because 
people with HSE are more adept in finding ways to repair the sense of self-integrity when 
it is threatened. The control task in this study asked participants to recall buildings on a 
route they travel regularly. Although did not explicitly reverence the self, drawing 
attention to something that has been a familiar part of their lives may still be self-
focusing and therefore may have made certain types of knowledge about the self 
accessible. Because people with HSE have more favorable knowledge about themselves, 
even though only a small portion of it were made salient by the control task, they may 
still have more salient favorable knowledge about themselves to use to buffer threat than 
people with LSE. This may explain why completing a control task before message 
exposure benefited people with HSE but not LSE.  
Additionally, as discussed earlier that people tend to engage in compensatory self-
enhancement when their favorable views about themselves are challenged. Because the 
control task was framed as designed to examine how easy people find it to recall items 
they are familiar with, people with HSE might have used this task as a way to 
demonstrate they have good memory, which might have served the purpose of 
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compensatory self-enhancement and helped restoring the sense of self-integrity and hence 
reduced the need for defensive processing.   
Discussion 
Effects of Affirming the Most Important Value before or after Message Exposure 
It was hypothesized that affirming the most important value before message 
exposure would decrease defensiveness (and increase message acceptance, attitude, and 
intention) for people with LSE but not HSE, while affirming the most important value 
after message exposure would increase defensiveness (and decrease message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention) for people with HSE but not LSE.  
Results showed that affirming the most important value after message exposure 
(i.e., Essay Affirm After) benefited people with HSE but not those with LSE. Compared 
to their counterparts who only read the health message, people with HSE who affirmed 
the most important value after message exposure showed lower psychological discomfort 
and message skepticism, higher perceived personal heart disease risk due to excessive 
drinking, and higher perceived convincingness and perceived pleasantness of the 
message, while people with LSE who affirmed the most important value after message 
exposure showed higher psychological discomfort, lower perceived personal heart 
disease risk, and lower perceived pleasantness of the message.  
This means that contrary to my hypothesis, affirming one’s most important value 
after message exposure decreased defensiveness and increased message acceptance 
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among people with HSE but increased defensiveness and decreased message acceptance 
among people with LSE. Although these findings did not support my hypothesis, they are 
consistent with the proposition that self-esteem functions as resource and that self-
affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and those with LSE, but are 
inconsistent with proposition that self-esteem functions as expectancies and that self-
affirmation highlights discrepancies.  
The same result pattern emerged among participants who affirmed the most 
important value before message exposure (i.e., Essay Affirm Before), but it was limited 
to two outcome variables: perceived personal heart disease risk and perceived 
convincingness of the message. Compared to their counterparts who only read the 
message, participants with LSE who affirmed the most important value before message 
exposure showed lower perceived personal heart disease risk while participants with HSE 
showed no change. Additionally, participants with HSE who affirmed the most important 
value before message exposure showed higher perceived convincingness of the message, 
while participants with LSE showed no change, compared to their counterparts who only 
read the message.  
This finding contradicted my hypothesis that affirming the most important value 
before message exposure decreases defensiveness (and increases message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention) among people with LSE but not HSE. However, it is again 
consistent with the proposition that self-esteem functions as resource and that self-
affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and those with LSE, but is 
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inconsistent with proposition that self-esteem functions as expectancies and that self-
affirmation highlights discrepancies. 
Effects of Affirming a Range of Values before or after Message Exposure 
It was hypothesized that affirming a range of values before message exposure 
would decrease defensiveness (and increase message acceptance, attitude, and intention) 
for people with HSE but increase defensiveness (and decrease message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention) for people with LSE, while affirming a range of values after 
message exposure would increase defensiveness (and decrease message acceptance, 
attitude, and intention) for people with HSE but not for people with LSE.  
The results showed inconclusive evidence partially supporting this hypothesis. 
Compared with participants who only read the health message, affirming a range of 
values before message exposure (i.e., Scale Affirm Before) increased perceived 
convincingness of the message among people with HSE but not among people with LSE.  
However, unexpectedly, affirming a range of values after message exposure (i.e., Scale 
Affirm After) decreased perceived personal heart disease risk (in other words, increased 
defensiveness) among people with LSE but not among people with HSE, compared to 
participants who only read the health message.  
This means that affirming a range of values before message exposure can increase 
message acceptance among people with HSE while affirming a range of values after 
message exposure can increase defensiveness among people with LSE. Although did not 
fully support my hypothesis, these findings are again consistent with the they are 
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consistent with the proposition that self-esteem functions as resource and that self-
affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with HSE and those with LSE, but are 
inconsistent with proposition that self-esteem functions as expectancies and that self-
affirmation highlights discrepancies. 
Effects of Completing a Control Task before or after Message Exposure 
It was hypothesized that compared to participants with HSE or LSE who only 
read the health message, participants with HSE or LSE who completed a control task 
(i.e., recalling buildings) before or after message exposure should not differ in their 
defensiveness toward the message, their message acceptance, or their attitude or 
intentions regarding limiting alcohol consumption to the moderate level.  
The results largely supported the hypothesis. Completing a control task before or 
after message exposure had no differential effects between participants with HSE and 
LSE on all but two dependent variables. Completing a control task after message 
exposure increased perceived personal risk and perceived convincingness for participants 
with HSE but not for people with LSE.   
In summary, across self-affirmation and timing conditions, the results showed that 
consistent with the self-esteem as resource proposition, self-affirmation enlarged the 
disparities between people with HSE and those with LSE in terms of defensiveness and 
message acceptance: self-affirmation decreased defensiveness and increased message 
acceptance among people with HSE but increased defensiveness and decreased message 
acceptance among people with LSE (See Table 4.25). 
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Table 4.25 Summary of Study 3 Findings 
Hypotheses Results 
Affirm the most 
important value 
 
Before message exposure: 
Compare Essay Aff Bef condition & Msg Only condition 
Completing essay affirmation before message exposure: 
· Decreases 
defensiveness among 
people with LSE but 
not among people with 
HSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Decreased message skepticism 
regardless of self-esteem level 
· Decreased perceived personal heart 
disease risk among people with LSE 
but not among people with HSE 
· Increases message 
acceptance among 
people with LSE but 
not among people with 
HSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Increased perceived convincingness 
among people with HSE but not among 
people with LSE 
· Increases attitude and 
intention toward daily 
flossing among people 
with LSE but not 
among people with HSE 
Not supported · No change in attitude or intention 
After message exposure: 
Compare Essay Aff Aft condition & Msg Only condition 
Completing essay affirmation after message exposure: 
· Increases defensiveness 
among people with HSE 
but less so among 
people with LSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Decreased psychological discomfort 
among people with HSE but increased 
it among people with LSE  
· Decreased message skepticism among 
people with HSE but not among people 
with LSE 
· Increased perceived personal heart 
disease risk among people with HSE 
but decreased it among people with 
LSE 
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· Decreased anger regardless of self-
esteem level 
· Decreases message 
acceptance among 
people with HSE but 
less so among people 
with LSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Increased perceived convincingness 
among people with HSE but not among 
people with LSE 
· Increased perceived pleasantness 
among people with HSE but decreased 
it among people with LSE 
· Decreases attitude and 
intention among people 
with HSE but less so 
among people with LSE 
Not supported 
· Among high risk drinkers, increased 
attitude and intention among people 
with HSE but not among people with 
LSE 
Affirming a range of 
values 
 
Before message exposure: 
Compare Scale Aff Bef condition & Msg Only condition 
Completing scale affirmation before message exposure: 
· Decreases 
defensiveness among 
people with HSE but 
increases it among 
people with LSE 
Not supported 
· Decreased anger, message skepticism, 
and message derogation regardless of 
self-esteem level  
· Increases message 
acceptance among 
people with HSE but 
decreases it among 
people with LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· Increased perceived convincingness of 
the message among people with HSE 
but not among people with LSE 
· Increases attitude and 
intention among people 
with HSE but decreases 
them among people with 
LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· Increased intention regardless of self-
esteem level 
· Among high risk drinkers, increased 
attitude and intention among people 
with HSE but not among people with 
LSE 
After message exposure: Compare Scale Aff Aft condition & Msg Only condition 
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Completing scale affirmation after message exposure: 
· Increases defensiveness 
among people with HSE 
but not among people 
with LSE 
Not supported 
(Contradicted) 
· Decreased perceived personal heart 
disease risk slightly among people with 
LSE but not among people with HSE 
· Decreases message 
acceptance among 
people with HSE but 
not among people with 
LSE 
Not supported 
· No change in message acceptance 
indicators 
· Decreases attitude and 
intention among people 
with HSE but not 
among people with LSE 
Not supported · No change in attitude or intention 
Complete a control task 
Before or after message 
exposure: 
Compare Ctrl Task conditions & Msg Only condition 
· No change in 
defensiveness among 
people with HSE or 
LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· Completing a control task after message 
exposure, increased perceived personal 
heart disease risk slightly among people 
with HSE but decreased it slightly 
among people with LSE 
· No change in other defensiveness 
indicators 
· No change in message 
acceptance among 
people with HSE or 
LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· Completing a control task after message 
exposure, increased perceived 
convincingness among people with 
HSE but not among people with LSE 
· No change in perceived pleasantness or 
perceived relevance  
· No change in attitude or 
intention among people 
with HSE or LSE 
Partially 
supported 
· Among high risk drinkers, increased 
attitude and intention among people 
with HSE but not among people with 
LSE 
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Conclusion 
Study 3 showed that, regardless of the format and the timing, self-affirmation 
decreased defensiveness, increased message acceptance, attitude, and intention among 
people with HSE but increased defensiveness and decreased message acceptance among 
people with LSE. These effects were most pronounced among high-risk drinkers to 
whom the health message would be most personally relevant and threatening. These 
findings are consistent with the self-esteem as resource view (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 
1993) that self-affirmation makes positive knowledge about the self salient and that 
people with HSE who have more positive knowledge will benefit while people with LSE 
who have less positive knowledge will not.  
Although the pattern of the differential self-affirmation effects on people with 
HSE and LSE is similar between self-affirming before and after message exposure, these 
effects might have resulted from two different mechanisms. Self-affirming before 
message exposure might have exerted influence by making the person aware of other 
positive knowledge about the self and thus securing his or her sense of self-integrity, 
which in turn lead to lower threat experienced from message exposure, whereas self-
affirming after message exposure might have exerted influence by providing the person 
an opportunity of compensatory self-enhancement that restored the sense of self-integrity 
and reduced the discomfort caused by the threat from the message exposure.  
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
It is concerning that people often ignore or reject accurate and well-intended 
health messages that inform them about their health risks and encourage them to take 
positive actions. While the prevalence of this so-called defensive processing of health 
messages is well-documented, ways to mitigate it are not well-understood. A promising 
line of research guided by the self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) suggests that the 
resistance to personally relevant health messages is driven by the fundamental human 
motive to protect a sense of self-integrity. If people are given an opportunity to secure the 
sense of self-integrity through reflecting on unthreatened, cherished values or personal 
attributes (i.e., a self-affirmation manipulation), they may look beyond the parts of the 
self that they feel threatened by the message and process the beneficial health information 
more open-mindedly. Although there is cumulating evidence suggesting that self-
affirmation manipulations can reduce defensive processing, increase message acceptance, 
and improve the uptake of positive actions, the documented effects are small and not 
universal (e.g., Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Epton, et al., 2015). The small effect sizes and 
inconsistencies call for more research on the potential moderators of self-affirmation 
effects. 
Responding to this call, this dissertation research tested whether people’s strength 
of self-esteem moderates self-affirmation effects on health message processing. Three 
experimental studies were conducted to examine when self-affirmation benefits people 
with high versus low levels of self-esteem.  
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Summary of Findings 
Study 1 (Chapter 2): Domain of Self-Threat  
Study 1 tested whether the proposition that self-esteem functions as resources and 
that self-affirmation enlarges the disparities between people with high and low levels of 
self-esteem (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), applies in a health communication context 
where an autonomy threat is induced by a health message with controlling language. The 
results showed that self-esteem moderated self-affirmation effects on message 
processing. Contrary to the self-esteem as resources hypothesis’ direction, self-
affirmation increased the willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat (measured 
through psychological discomfort), self-directed negative emotions, sunscreen use 
attitude, and intention among participants with LSE, but decreased them among 
participants with HSE.  
Study 2 (Chapter 3): Adequacy of the Affirmed Self 
Study 2 tested whether the adequacy of the affirmed self, i.e., the extent to which 
self-affirmation manipulation secured participants’ sense of self-integrity, determines 
when people with HSE versus LSE benefit from a self-affirmation manipulation. Three 
self-affirmation conditions that would vary for people with HSE and LSE in terms of the 
adequacy of the affirmed self were used. Supporting my hypothesis, the results showed 
that affirming a range of values, which arguably is a self-affirmation manipulation that 
will not secure a sense of self-integrity for people with LSE, increased perceived 
manipulation among people with LSE but not HSE. However, inconsistencies emerged 
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when it comes to self-affirmation effects on intention. Particularly, affirming a range of 
values decreased daily flossing intention for people with HSE but not LSE. The two 
essay affirmation conditions did not lead to differential effects for people with HSE and 
LSE.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Study 3 (Chapter 4): Timing of Self-Affirmation 
Study 3 tested whether inducing self-affirmation before versus after the onset of a 
threat to the self (i.e., health message exposure) determines whether self-esteem functions 
as resources or functions as expectancies and produces differential effects for people with 
HSE and LSE. Regardless of the timing in relation to message exposure, self-affirmation 
decreased defensiveness, increased message acceptance, attitude, and intention to limit 
alcohol consumption among people with HSE but increased defensiveness and decreased 
message acceptance among people with LSE. These effects were most pronounced 
among high-risk drinkers to whom the health message would be most personally relevant 
and threatening.  
Making Sense of the Findings 
The findings across three studies suggest that individuals’ strength of self-esteem 
can moderate self-affirmation effects on health message processing: people with HSE and 
LSE may respond differently to self-affirmation based health communication 
interventions in certain situations. However, given the evident inconsistencies across the 
three studies, I cannot yet reach a clear conclusion regarding when and through what 
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mechanisms self-affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE. Nonetheless, or 
perhaps because of this, the findings underscore the importance of continued exploration 
of the boundary conditions of self-affirmation effects. Particularly, more research is 
needed to understand how individual differences factors might inform when self-
affirmation manipulations reduce defensiveness towards personally-relevant health 
messages and determine the effectiveness of self-affirmation based health communication 
interventions. In the following sections, I will discuss the implications and limitations of 
the present research and specify future directions.  
Self-Esteem x Self-Affirmation Interaction Effects  
Study 1 
Study 1 set out to test whether the proposition that self-esteem functions as 
resources and that self-affirmation reduces defensiveness among people with HSE but 
increases it among people with LSE (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), applies in a health 
message processing context. Study 1 showed that self-affirmation increased the 
willingness to acknowledge experiencing threat (measured through psychological 
discomfort), self-directed negative emotions, attitude, and intention among people with 
LSE, but decreased them among people with HSE. At first glance, the results 
contradicted the self-esteem as resources proposition. The self-esteem as resources 
proposition would predict that, because self-affirmation makes people with LSE aware 
that they lack favorable self-knowledge, which makes the situation more threatening to 
the self, people with LSE would feel more motivated to resolve the threat through 
   276 
 
defensive processing as that is the most promising solution at hand to restore self-
integrity.  
In Study 1, there was no clear evidence that self-affirmation increased 
defensiveness among people with LSE. But, self-affirmation did make people with LSE 
experience more discomfort (e.g., feeling uncomfortable, bothered, and uneasy) and feel 
worse about themselves (e.g., feeling guilty, disappointed at oneself, and annoyed with 
oneself) after message exposure. This is in fact consistent with the prediction of the self-
esteem as resources proposition that people with LSE may feel more threatened after self-
affirmation because of being aware of their lack of self-resources. However, interestingly, 
feeling worse about oneself did not motivate people with LSE to be more defensive; 
rather, self-affirmed people with LSE showed higher intention to engage in the 
recommended behavior to control the risk.  
A similar finding in previous research is that self-affirmation increased the 
experience of anticipated regret in response to a health message and led to higher 
intentions and actual behavior changes (van Koningsbruggen et al, 2014). The authors 
argue that self-affirmation may provide a strategy to enable people to experience negative 
emotions without becoming defensive, and consequently engage in “danger control” 
activities (Witte, 1992) instead of maladaptive responses (e.g., “fear control”; Witte, 
1992). If this is the case, the present finding may imply that this beneficial effect of self-
affirmation is more pronounced among people with LSE who are more prone to 
experience negative emotions in response to personally relevant health messages.   
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Study 2 
Study 2 set out to test whether the type of self-affirmation manipulation would 
influence the adequacy of the affirmed self, and determine when people with HSE and 
LSE benefit from self-affirmation. Partially confirming my hypothesis, the scale 
affirmation manipulation (i.e., affirming a range of values), which was expected to be 
unable to secure a sense of self-integrity for people with LSE, increased perceived 
manipulation among people with LSE. This supported the self-esteem as resource 
proposition that people with LSE who lack positive self-knowledge would display 
stronger defensiveness after self-affirmation. However, the result that scale affirmation 
decreased daily flossing intention for people with HSE, contradicted the prediction that 
people with HSE would express lower defensiveness and hence higher message 
acceptance, attitude, and intention. This is puzzling, because for people with HSE, 
affirming a range of values would remind them of their abundant favorable self-
knowledge and should thus render the threat from the message less provoking. So, what 
caused the decrease in behavioral intentions?  
I speculate two possible explanations. Frist, because self-affirmation freed people 
with HSE from self-evaluative concerns, self-affirmed people with HSE were able to 
evaluate the message objectively and focus on the quality and the merits of the message 
(Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). It is possible that the use of controlling language 
made the message less realistic and credible. Therefore, for self-affirmed people with 
HSE, the message became less persuasive. However, this argument is difficult to verify 
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with the present data as there were no self-affirmation effects on message acceptance 
measures (e.g., perceived convincingness, perceived pleasantness, and perceived 
relevance). My second speculation is that self-affirmation may have further elevated the 
high self-evaluations people with HSE have. As they became content with their sense of 
self and free from self-evaluative threat, performing the recommended behavior to avoid 
the potential health risk may seem less urgent. Therefore, lower behavioral intentions 
were reported.  
It is interesting that in the high threat condition, the two essay affirmation 
manipulations did not produce any differential effects for people with HSE and LSE. In 
fact, regardless of self-esteem levels, there was no difference on any of the outcomes 
when the two essay affirmation conditions were compared with each other or when they 
were compared with the control condition. This is puzzling, because theoretically, 
directing attention to an aspect of the self that is more important than the one threatened 
in the message should achieve an adequate sense of self for people with LSE, and the 
manipulation check confirmed that participants in the essay affirmation 2 condition were 
the most likely to report that the task made them think about their positive values and 
things that are important to them. Then, why there were no self-affirmation effects at all? 
One speculation is that although the essay affirmations did not produce positive effects, 
they might have prevented the negative effects seen in the scale affirmation condition.  
 
   279 
 
Study 3 
Study 3 set out to test whether the timing of self-affirmation manipulation in 
relation to message exposure (i.e., self-affirm before or after message exposure) would 
determine when self-esteem function as resources or expectancies and when self-
affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE. Though not supporting my hypothesis, 
the patterns of Study 3 findings were very consistent: regardless of the timing and the 
format of self-affirmation manipulations, self-affirmation benefited people with HSE but 
not LSE. Specifically, regardless of affirming the most important value or a range of 
values before or after message exposure, people with HSE showed lower defensiveness, 
and higher message acceptance than their unaffirmed counterparts. Among high-risk 
drinkers, self-affirmation also increased attitude and intention towards reduce alcohol 
consumption. However, self-affirmed people with LSE showed higher defensiveness and 
lower message acceptance. Among the three studies, this was the only one whose results 
consistently supported the self-esteem as resource proposition.  
It is interesting that self-affirmation after message exposure achieved comparable 
self-affirmation effects as self-affirming before message exposure. However, as discussed 
in the supplementary analysis section in Study 3, self-affirming before and after message 
exposure might have achieved similar beneficial self-affirmation effects for people with 
HSE through two different mechanisms. Self-affirming before message exposure puts 
positive self-knowledge in the working memory which can be used to secure a sense of 
self-integrity when the threat strikes, whereas self-affirming after message exposure 
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provides people a venue for compensatory self-enhancement which reduces the need to 
secure self-integrity through responding to the message defensively.   
The Distribution of Self-Esteem Scores 
To understand the findings regarding self-esteem, we need to address a 
methodological issue. The self-esteem score distributions of all three study samples were 
negatively skewed. In each of the three samples, the mean and median self-esteem scores 
were much higher than the scale midpoint “4” (range: 1 –7), with the Study 2 sample 
being the most severely skewed among the three (Study 1: M = 4.96, SD = 1.02, Median 
= 5.00, Skewness = -.161; Study 2: M = 5.34, SD = 1.28, Median = 5.65, Skewness = -
.795; Study 3: M = 4.98. SD = 1.21, Median = 5.20, Skewness = -.395). If a measured 
self-esteem score of “4” truly represents a moderate level of self-esteem, then these 
skewed distributions imply that all my studies had a sampling issue, that is, people with 
low levels of self-esteem were heavily under-represented. But, does the conceptual 
midpoint of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale truly represent a moderate level of self-
esteem?  
Previous research showed that a negatively skewed self-esteem score distribution 
is not uncommon for studies using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. In fact, reviews 
showed that in most samples, across self-esteem scales, the mean measured self-esteem 
score was higher than the scale midpoint (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; 
Gentile, Twenge, & Campbell, 2010; Schmitt & Allik, 2005), and some even noted that 
individuals who fail to endorse the items at least at the moderate level are probably 
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clinically depressed (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). Existing studies that examined the 
moderating role of self-esteem on self-affirmation effects showed similarly skewed self-
esteem score distributions. For example, the sample used in Steele, Spencer, and Lynch 
(1993) study 2 had a median of 40 on a scale ranging from 10 to 50, and the U.K. adult 
sample used in Düring and Jessop (2015) had a mean score of 2.92 on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 4 (SD = 0.53). The above evidence suggests that my study samples were 
comparable with that of previous research in terms of self-esteem score distributions.  
Does this mean that we can dismiss the self-esteem score distribution as a concern 
when interpreting the findings of this research? Not really. The universally skewed self-
esteem score distributions question the validity of using measured self-esteem scores to 
infer individuals’ true self-esteem levels. If the scale midpoint does not represent true 
moderate level of self-esteem, how can we then determine high versus low levels of self-
esteem? Baumeister, Tice, and Hutton (1989) suggest that self-esteem reflects people’s 
attitude toward themselves, but because filling out a self-esteem scale involves describing 
their attitude about themselves to someone else, it is thus intertwined with the 
individual’s self-presentational concerns. Because it is socially desirable to be competent 
and worthy, if people are motivated to make themselves look better in front of others, 
they will score themselves more positively than what their true self-evaluations are. 
Another view on the nature of low self-esteem suggests that people with low self-esteem 
are low in self-esteem only in a relative sense, that is, in comparison to the very positive 
way that people with high self-esteem portray themselves (Tice, 1993). People with low 
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self-esteem are essentially neutral in their self-descriptions, attributing neither strongly 
positive nor strongly negative traits to themselves (Tice, 1993). Therefore, it is safe to 
suspect that because of self-presentation concerns, some high self-esteem scores in my 
samples might came from people with moderate levels of self-esteem, while some 
moderate self-esteem scores might came from people with low levels of self-esteem.  
Nonetheless, without further evidence, I cannot rule out the possibility that the 
three studies might have suffered from sampling bias: people with low levels of self-
esteem were underrepresented in the samples. It is possible that people with low self-
esteem are more likely to avoid situations that involve self-focus and self-evaluation 
because such situations can intensify negative affect, leading to stronger self-criticism 
and further negative outcomes (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Given that the 
description of my studies indicated that participants will be asked about their opinions on 
themselves and some of their activities, it is possible that people with low self-esteem 
were less likely to voluntarily participate in these studies, thus leading to skewed 
representation of people with low and high levels of self-esteem. If this is the case, we 
need to use caution when interpreting the findings of this research. First, the low and high 
levels of self-esteem in this research should be understood in a relative sense rather than 
in an absolute sense. In the analyses, low self-esteem was operationalized as one standard 
deviation below the mean self-esteem score, which roughly corresponds to the moderate 
level on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (scale midpoint “4”). While the findings about 
people with HSE may reflect how people with true high levels of self-esteem may 
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respond in self-threatening situations and when self-affirmation may reduce their 
defensiveness towards personally relevant health messages, the findings about people 
with LSE may in fact reflect how people with moderate levels of self-esteem may 
respond in self-threatening situations. Second, if we assume that the differences in self-
affirmation effects between people with true high and low self-esteem levels follow a 
linear pattern, then the differences in self-affirmation effects between people with high 
and moderate levels of self-esteem would be about half of the effect size of that between 
people with high and low self-esteem levels. This would imply that the adverse effects 
identified for people with LSE in this research (though truly moderate level of self-
esteem) would be more severe for people with true low levels of self-esteem. However, it 
is also likely that people with true low levels of self-esteem may respond in qualitatively 
different ways compared to people with high and moderate levels of self-esteem. If this is 
the case, then the findings in this research cannot speak for how people with true low 
levels of self-esteem may respond in self-threatening situations, and when self-
affirmation may reduce their defensiveness towards personally relevant health messages.     
Even if we accept that the moderate measured self-esteem scores represent low 
levels of self-esteem, the distributions might still have posed a challenge for identifying 
self-esteem x self-affirmation interaction effects. As discussed in the supplementary 
analysis section of Study 2, the statistical power of the interaction test is maximized when 
both the predictor and moderator variables have half of the observations happen at each 
extreme and when the extreme values of the predictor variable co-occur with the extreme 
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values of the moderator variable (McClelland & Judd, 1993). In Study 1 and Study 3, the 
majority of the scores were between 4 and 6, while in Study 2 the majority of scores were 
between 5 and 7 (See Figure 5.1). The self-esteem score distributions in all three studies 
have limited the statistical power of the tests. A distribution with observations 
concentrated at two extremes is difficult to find with measured rather than manipulated 
variables, therefore, this challenge may exist in all studies that use measured self-esteem 
scores to test interaction effects.  
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Figure 5.1 Histograms showing the distributions of self-esteem scores in Study 1, Study 
2, and Study 3 
 
It is interesting that although both recruited from the same MTurk panel, the 
Study 2 sample had a more heavily skewed self-esteem score distribution than the Study 
3 sample, while the Study 3 sample was quite comparable with that of Study 1. Of all 
Study 2 participants, 39.5% had a self-esteem score of 6 or higher, while that number for 
Study 3 and Study 1 were 23.7% and 18.3%, respectively. It is unlikely that Study 2 was 
more attractive to people with high self-esteem than Study 3, as both studies had a very 
general title (i.e., health communication study) and description. The only difference in 
sampling procedures between Study 2 and Study 3 was that in Study 3, people who have 
completed more than 500 MTurk tasks were prevented from participating, while Study 2 
had no such restriction. Therefore, Study 2 might have had a number of professional 
survey takers who were familiar with the scale. However, I cannot explain why they 
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would score higher on it. This difference has implications for data collection on 
anonymous online panels like MTurk. It is important to carefully define the selection 
criteria and implement data quality control measures. Limiting the number of previous 
tasks completed may bring you more novices than professional survey takers and thus 
may provide more natural responses. Embedding simple attention check questions will 
help identify people who do not pay attention to study instructions. 
Main Effects of Self-Affirmation  
It is worth noting that the positive main effects of self-affirmation on reducing 
defensiveness, enhancing message acceptance, attitude, and behavioral intention found in 
previous research (e.g., Epton et al., 2015) were not consistently found in my studies. In 
Study 1 and Study 2, the main effects of self-affirmation were sporadic and contradictory. 
In Study 1, self-affirmation showed negative effects: it increased anger in the high threat 
condition and reduced attitude in the low threat condition. In Study 2, in the low threat 
condition, writing an essay about a value less important than “independent 
(autonomous)” increased sunscreen use intention, but completing the scale affirmation 
task, however, increased psychological discomfort and anger, and decreased message 
skepticism and increased perceived relevance. In the high threat condition, completing 
the scale affirmation task only reduced perceived pleasantness of the message.  
In Study 3, however, the main effects of self-affirmation were more frequent and 
were consistent with previous research. Completing an essay affirmation before message 
exposure reduced message skepticism and completing an essay affirmation after message 
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exposure reduced anger. Also, completing the scale affirmation before message exposure 
reduced anger, message skepticism, and message derogation, and increased intention to 
reduce alcohol consumption.  
The inconsistencies between my studies and the documented positive self-
affirming effects in previous research are puzzling. The content analysis of the self-
affirmation essays in Study 1 and the manipulation checks in Study 2 and Study 3 
showed that my self-affirmation manipulations did what they were supposed to do: focus 
people’s minds on their unthreatened, cherished, positive aspects of the self. Then, why 
were there barely any positive self-affirmation main effects in Study 1 and Study 2? 
There are three potential explanations. First, the samples used in Study 1 and Study 2 
included people who were at low risk of the health problem, i.e., those who already 
perform the recommended behaviors, while Study 3 sample only included those who 
were at moderate to high risk of the health problem. Previous research suggests that 
people at low risk are less likely to benefit from self-affirmation manipulations compared 
to people at moderate to high risk (e.g., Harris & napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; van 
Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009). For individuals at low risk, a health message will not 
pose a threat to the self because they either do not engage in the health-compromising 
behavior or already perform the recommended protective behavior. Therefore, the 
message with the health risk information is not personally relevant. Also, because they 
are taking care of themselves by performing the protective behavior or by not engaging in 
the health-compromising behavior, they would not experience the dissonance typically 
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induced by people recognizing they are not as competent as they thought in taking care of 
their health. Therefore, because there was no threat to the self to begin with, self-
affirmation may have been irrelevant, which explains the lack of self-affirmation effects. 
Another reason for the null effects of self-affirmation may be that the health risks 
associated with not performing the recommended behaviors in Study 1 and 2 (i.e., using 
sunscreen daily, flossing daily) were less threatening than the health risks associated with 
not performing the recommended behavior in Study 3 (i.e., reducing alcohol 
consumption). For college student participants in Study 1, the negative consequences of 
not using sunscreen may not be threatening because there are other behavior alternatives 
to protect skin from sun overexposure (e.g., stay in shade). Also, because the detrimental 
health effects of sun overexposure (e.g., skin cancer) usually happen later in life, it may 
be difficult for young people to conceptualize risks that happen in the distant future. For 
adult participants in Study 2, getting gum disease due to not flossing daily might have 
been a health risk they were very familiar with and thus it is not very threatening. Also, 
participants might have perceived gum disease to be a condition with low threat because, 
unlike cancer or heart disease, gum disease seldom leads to detrimental consequences. 
Therefore, because the perceived health risks may be lower, the threats induced by the 
health messages in Study 1 and 2 may be lower and self-affirmation might have been less 
relevant. If this is the case, future research may benefit from testing whether self-
affirmation effects are contingent on participants’ familiarity of the health risks and on 
the severity of the consequences.    
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Third, the inconsistencies in the main effects of self-affirmation may be due to the 
differences in the type of self-threats featured in the health messages. In Study 1 and 2, 
the health messages not only listed health risk information but also featured high and low 
levels of autonomy threat manipulated through using controlling (e.g., “Must,” “Should,” 
“You don’t have a choice.”) versus autonomy supporting languages (e.g., “May,” 
“Could,” “The choice is yours.”). In Study 3, however, the message only featured health 
risk information. It is possible that the threat to the self caused by the combination of 
autonomy threat and health risk information was qualitatively different from the threat 
caused by presenting health risk information only, which may have produced differential 
self-affirmation effects among people with HSE and LSE. To examine this possibility, 
future meta-analysis research can test whether previous research’s message 
characteristics, which reflect the types of threat to the self participants would experience, 
moderate self-affirmation effects.   
It is worth mentioning that despite the somewhat rosy picture painted by existing 
meta-analyses and syntheses about the positive self-affirmation effects, null findings and 
adverse self-affirmation effects are not difficult to find in previously published research. 
For example, among recent studies, Meier et al. (2015) found that self-affirmation was 
ineffective in reducing defensive processing or high-risk drinking behaviors among 
heavy-drinking US college students. Moreover, Zhao et al. (2014) found no positive 
effects of self-affirmation on most outcome variables among daily smokers and self-
affirmation backfired among occasional smokers. Similarly, Mays and Zhao (2016) found 
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that self-affirmation increased young adult women’s indoor tanning intentions and may 
have done so through producing greater defensiveness toward the indoor tanning 
prevention messages. The early self-affirmation studies in the health domain had largely 
relied on college student samples (e.g., Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Harris et al., 2007; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). When research expanded to 
diverse health topics and when more heterogeneous samples were included, null findings 
and adverse effects started to pop up. It is possible that the positive effects of self-
affirmation on health message processing are not as uniform and robust as previously 
thought. Therefore, it is important to not dismiss studies with null findings and adverse 
effects, but to explore alternative explanations and potential moderators of self-
affirmation effects.  
Directions for Future Research 
Given the evident inconsistencies across the three studies, clearly, more research 
is needed to determine when and through what mechanisms individuals’ strengths of self-
esteem moderate self-affirmation effects on health message processing. In the following 
sections, I will identify two areas of future research that may shed light on how self-
affirmation benefits people with high and low levels of self-esteem and further our 
understanding of self-affirmation effects in general.   
Internal versus External Self-threats 
An area worth exploring concerns the type of threat to the self a health message 
may induce. As mentioned earlier, I speculate that the different message features in Study 
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1 and 2 (i.e., controlling language) and in Study 3 (i.e., health risk information) may have 
induced different self-threats that may responded differently to self-affirmation 
manipulations. It is possible that the message feature that is most salient to the recipient 
determines what type of self-threat a message triggers. A health message communicating 
behavior recommendations through the use of controlling language (e.g., “You must floss 
everyday”) may convey a threat to one’s sense of being autonomous (i.e., autonomy 
threat) while a message emphasizing the negative consequences of an unhealthy behavior 
(e.g., “smoking greatly increases your risk of cancer”) may signal a threat to one’s sense 
of being healthy (i.e., health threat) or being capable of making wise decisions.  
The two scenarios, though both prone to induce self-threat and motivate defensive 
responses, convey different connotations. Specifically, the controlling language aims at 
urging people to comply with the message’s behavioral recommendations; complying 
with the message’s request means relinquishing one’s control over decisions to an 
external figure, which challenges one’s idea of being free of outside control on decision-
making – this is a self-threat induced by an external source (i.e., external self-threat). In 
contrast, health risk information makes people realize that one’s judgements about health 
is inaccurate or one’s current behaviors might impair their health; accepting the 
information means admitting that oneself is at fault or is incompetent in accurately 
evaluating and controlling life outcomes, which contradicts one’s idea of being 
adaptively adequate. This is a self-threat induced by people’s own actions (i.e., internal 
self-threat).  
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The qualitatively different external and internal self-threats may impact the main 
effects of self-affirmation and also influence the moderating role of self-esteem in 
different ways. Specifically, I speculate that in the internal self-threat contexts (e.g., 
considering health risk information, performed poorly on an exam), self-esteem may 
function as resources, while in the external self-threat context (e.g., reading a message 
with controlling language, in an upward social comparison situation), self-esteem may 
function as expectancies. Recall that because self-affirmation manipulation focuses 
people’s attention on the self, self-affirmed individuals will attend to a self-relevant 
health message more readily than unaffirmed individuals and will be more sensitive to 
the self-threat conveyed in the message. Experiencing temporary elevation of positive 
self-evaluation while being more sensitive to self-threats may lead to different outcomes 
when people confront an external versus internal self-threat. 
When people confront an external self-threat (e.g., perceiving that a message is 
trying to restrict one’s autonomy on health behavior decisions), self-affirmation would 
highlight the intrusiveness of the message, if one is highly satisfied with the present self. 
Given that people in general are reluctant to adjust self-evaluation downwards, in an 
attempt to protect the elevated positive self-evaluation, self-affirmed people will be more 
likely to resort to defensive responses, compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. 
Because people with HSE perceive greater discrepancies between the elevated self-
evaluation and the threat than people with LSE, they will be especially more likely to 
resort to defensive responses. 
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When people confront an internal self-threat (e.g., recognizing that one’s current 
behaviors are putting one’s health at risk), having been assured that one’s self-worth is 
also sustained by sources other than the aspect of self under threat will make the idea that 
one might be less competent in some domains of the self (e.g. being healthy) more 
acceptable and ease the self-inflicted discomforting implication for the self. Therefore, it 
is expected that self-affirmed people, especially those with HSE who are aware that they 
are adequate in a number of other domains, will be less likely to resort to defensive 
responses compared to their unaffirmed counterparts. 
Mediating Relations 
Another area that deserves more attention regards the question how self-
affirmation and its moderating factors produces a cascade of effects from immediate 
affective and cognitive outcomes, such as reducing psychological discomfort and 
enhancing attentional bias to threatening components of message (Klein & Harris, 2009), 
to more downstream outcomes, such as perceived message effectiveness and beliefs 
about the recommended behavior, and eventually to behavior change. Although in this 
research I tested the self-affirmation x self-esteem effects on three categories of outcomes 
individually (i.e., indicators of defensiveness, message acceptance, attitude and 
intention), theoretical arguments can easily be made that there is a causal link between 
these three categories of outcomes and even between the variables within each category. 
For example, self-affirmation x self-esteem interaction effects on behavioral intention 
may be mediated by attitude, which may be mediated by perceived message 
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convincingness, which may be mediated by message skepticism, which may be mediated 
by psychological discomfort.  
Many previous studies have theorized mediating relations of self-affirmation 
effects, but few have empirically tested them. Among the few that tested the theorized 
mediating relations, all of them relied on the statistical approach of mediation analysis, 
such as the technique proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, relying on 
measured mediator from a single experimental study and a statistical analysis to study 
mediation has been criticized as prone to bias, because this approach relies on satisfying a 
number of assumptions that are difficult to meet (e.g., Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010; 
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). For instance, one of the requirements is that the mediator 
is independent of unmeasured factors that affect the outcome. However, situations that 
meet this requirement are rare in communication research. A simple example of a 
violation of this assumption would be that both the mediator and the outcome were 
assessed with similar types of self-report measures, which means that both may be 
influenced by method bias.  
Therefore, to minimize biases in the estimates of mediation effects, future 
research testing the mediating relations in self-affirmation effects can consider the 
experimental approaches of mediation analysis instead of the statistical approach (e.g., 
Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). One such approach is 
conducting several experimental studies: first manipulate the independent variable and 
test its effect on the mediator, then manipulate the mediator and test its effect on the 
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outcome variable. Future research on the mediating relations in self-affirmation effects 
may benefit form experimental approaches like this, because by manipulating both the 
independent variable and the mediator, this approach has the advantage of ensure strong 
inferences about the causal chain of events (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation tested whether people’s strength of self-esteem 
moderates self-affirmation effects on health message processing. The findings across 
three studies suggest that individuals’ strength of self-esteem can moderate self-
affirmation effects on health message processing: people with HSE and LSE may respond 
differently to self-affirmation based health communication interventions in certain 
situations. However, despite the theoretical coherence, evident empirical inconsistencies 
exist across the three studies. Therefore, at this point, I cannot reach a clear conclusion 
regarding when self-affirmation benefits people with HSE versus LSE and cannot 
provide specific suggestions on how self-affirmation should be used in health 
communication practices. Nonetheless, this research has shown that individuals’ self-
esteem levels can influence the effectiveness of self-affirmation-based health 
communication interventions, and sometimes not in a desirable direction. Interventionists 
therefore should use caution when incorporating self-affirmation elements in health 
communication interventions as it may have positive effects for some, but weak or even 
adverse effects among others.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Sample Characteristics 
Appendix A.1 Study 1 Sample Characteristics (N = 115) 
 Frequency  Percent 
Age    
18 – 20 78  67.8 
21 – 25 36  31.3 
26 or older 1  0.9 
 
Gender 
   
Male 34  29.6 
Female 81  70.4 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
   
American Indian/Alaska Native 1  0.9 
Asian/Asian American 24  20.9 
Black/African American 1  0.9 
Hispanic/Latino 1  0.9 
Multiracial 5  4.3 
White/Caucasian 83  72.2 
 
Appendix A.2 Study 2 Sample Characteristics (N = 294) 
 Frequency  Percent 
Age    
18 – 30 119  40.5 
31 – 40 56  19.5 
41 – 50 45  15.3 
51 – 60 43  14.6 
61 – 70 29  9.9 
71 or older 2  0.1 
 
Gender 
   
Male 175  59.5 
Female 117  39.8 
Other 2  0.7 
   320 
 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
   
Asian/Asian American 13  4.4 
Black/African American 22  7.5 
Hispanic/Latino 14  4.8 
Multiracial 10  3.4 
White/Caucasian 235  79.9 
 
Education 
   
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 1  0.3 
High school graduate (or equivalent) 27  9.2 
Some college (1-4 years, no degree) 68  23.1 
Associate’s degree (including occupational or academic 
degrees) 
26  8.8 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, AB, etc) 115  39.1 
Master’s degree (MA, MS, MENG, MSW, etc) 46  15.6 
Professional school degree (MD, DDC, JD, etc) 6  2.0 
Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, etc) 5  1.7 
 
Household Income 
   
Less than $10,000 19  6.5 
$10,000 to $14,999 13  4.4 
$15,000 to $24,999 53  18.0 
$25,000 to $49,999 83  28.2 
$50,000 to $99,999 90  30.6 
$100,000 to $149,999 29  9.9 
$150,000 to $199,999 4  1.4 
$200,000 or more 2  0.7 
 
Appendix A.3 Study 3 Sample Characteristics (N = 426) 
 Frequency  Percent 
Age    
18 – 30 227  53.3 
31 – 40 110  25.8 
41 – 50 50  11.7 
51 – 60 27  6.3 
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61 – 70 11  2.6 
71 or older 1  0.2 
 
Gender 
   
Male 137  66.9 
Female 285  32.3 
Other 4  0.8 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
   
American Indian/Alaska Native 2  0.5 
Asian/Asian American 18  4.2 
Black/African American 34  8.0 
Hispanic/Latino 17  4.0 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 1  0.2 
Multiracial 19  4.5 
White/Caucasian 335  78.6 
 
Education 
   
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 3  .7 
High school graduate (or equivalent) 35  8.2 
Some college (1-4 years, no degree) 130  30.5 
Associate’s degree (including occupational or academic 
degrees) 
45  10.6 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, AB, etc) 140  32.9 
Master’s degree (MA, MS, MENG, MSW, etc) 61  14.3 
Professional school degree (MD, DDC, JD, etc) 7  1.6 
Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, etc) 5  1.2 
 
Household Income 
   
Less than $10,000 35  8.2 
$10,000 to $14,999 21  4.9 
$15,000 to $24,999 46  10.8 
$25,000 to $49,999 129  30.3 
$50,000 to $99,999 129  30.3 
$100,000 to $149,999 44  10.3 
$150,000 to $199,999 15  3.5 
$200,000 or more 7  1.6 
 
